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Abstract
The concept of resilience is increasingly applied to policy-making. However, despite its
widespread use, resilience remains poorly defined, open to multiple interpretations, and
challenging to translate into practical policy instruments. Three particularly problematic
aspects of resilience concern its rigid conceptualisation of adaptation and learning, its
de-politicised interpretation of participatory decision-making, and the ill-defined role and
relevance of social vulnerability indicators. My research analyses these three aspects within
the context of flood risk management in the UK, which is uniquely suited to studying the
practicability of a cross-disciplinary concept like resilience, because it connects issues of
natural resource management, social planning, and disaster management. First, I analyse two
case studies of experimental pilot projects in natural flood management. Through studying
project reports, and interviewing stakeholders involved in project implementation, I determine
whether the theorised learning-by-doing method in resilience is reflected in experiences from
real experimental projects. Secondly, I use one of these case studies to map out the political
structure of local participatory bodies in flood management, and also conduct a small survey
of local community groups. The purpose of this second study is to determine if collaborative
methods can indeed lead to a knowledge-driven policy process as envisioned in resilience
literature. Lastly, I use statistical analysis to compare a traditional flood management model
and a socio-economic model. The aim of the statistical modelling is to determine whether
socio-economic factors are indeed useful for informing flooding policy, and whether they
offer new insights not already being used in modern flood management. I find that resilience
gives insufficient consideration to the importance of political constraints and economic
trade-offs in policy-making, and that evidence for the usefulness of socio-economic factors is
inconclusive. Future work could focus on further refining the statistical modelling to pinpoint
empirically verifiable indicators of resilience.
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In recent decades, there have been notable changes to the regularity and pattern of extreme
weather and climate events across the globe, and some of this observed climate change is
attributable to human influences. Climate change is expected to continue for the foreseeable
future, will amplify and create new risks for natural and human systems, and increase the
likelihood of severe and pervasive impacts on societies (IPCC, 2014). It is generally agreed
that the most appropriate response to climate change is to attempt to limit global warming to
no more than 2ºC by reducing the world’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC, 2014).
However, regardless of the success of the efforts to reduce GHG emissions, it is assumed that
some changes in the climate are inevitable, due to the considerable uncertainty surrounding
estimates of the magnitude of future warming and its impacts (CCC, 2015). Therefore, in
addition to preventive measures aimed at the root causes of climate change, there is also
strong agreement that initiatives intended to prepare and adapt societies to the consequenes of
climate change - most notably increasing frequency and magnitude of natural hazards such as
droughts,floods, and storms - are also needed (Bulkeley and Broto, 2013; HMG, 2012). One
concept that is arguably suited for dealing with the possibilities and uncertainties resulting
from climatic change, is resilience, which is increasingly used by those in the disaster risk
reduction (DRR) field to study how the harmful impact of greater and more frequent natural
hazards can be reduced (Carpenter et al., 2012; Fekete et al., 2014). The concept has grown
in influence over the past decade, and now rivals sustainability as an omnipresent catchphrase
in climate change adaptation literature, with numerous government bodies producing reports
intended to develop resilience-building toolkits for practitioners (Jha et al., 2013; UNISDR,
2012; WB, 2008). The increasing usage of resilience to guide policy decisions is somewhat
precipitant however, since it is currently vaguely conceptualised, which can limit its value
for informing practical policy-making.
2 Introduction
Proponents of resilience assert that the strength of the concept is that it is abstract and
malleable enough to be applicable in a wide range of areas (Walker and Cooper, 2011). How-
ever, it is not quite clear what is meant by resilience, beyond the assumption that it is good
to be resilient (Reid and Botterill, 2013). The scope of resilience has noticeably broadened
as it has transitioned into the vernacular of sustainability science (Xu and Marinova, 2013),
and there are now more than 70 different definitions of “resilience” in the literature (Fisher,
2015). This begs the question of whether its abstraction is truly deliberate, or whether it is
in fact the result of a lack of agreement on what the term actually means (Hodgson et al.,
2015; Welsh, 2014). Whatever the reason, the current conceptual discourse on resilience
can best be described as being in a state of “Babylonian confusion” (Janssen and Ostrom,
2006), with multiplying meanings of resilience that bear only superficial resemblance to each
other. Furthermore, the most pertinent issues surrounding climate change (such as surprises,
uncertainty, feedback mechanisms etc.) are already being explored and analysed in scientific
research without necessarily appealing to the idea of resilience (Batabyal, 1998). These
issues elicit questions of whether the concept of resilience actually provides any added value
for policy-makers tasked with developing climate change adaptation measures, or whether it
is simply an attempt at packaging “new wine in old bottles” (Alexander, 2013).
In part because resilience, as a system property, emerged from the field of ecology
(Holling, 1973), little thought is given in the literature to the effect that contextual factors
and social dynamics can have on both the formulation and implementation of policies. This
omission is especially worrisome considering that resilience is intended, and in some cases is
already being used, to guide policy-making. An example of a contextual factor is that social
systems - unlike natural ones - have political processes that affect individuals’ behaviour, and
resilience literature currently does not fully take into consideration the impact that power,
politics, and formal institutions can have on overall system behaviour. Additionally, in
resilience literature, adversarial relations pitting stakeholders against each other is considered
to be a consequence of conventional policy practices rather than a fundamental dynamic of
societies (Armitage et al., 2009). The possibility that people may desire many competing
and incompatible outcomes is not sufficiently explored in resilience literature, where the
assumption seems to be that what is good for the system as a whole (for example ecosystem
preservation) supersedes other policy goals (Gunderson, 2010).
Given the issues of conceptual ambiguity and insufficient attention to the particularities of
social systems, it is unclear what the added value of resilience is for practical policy-making.
Perhaps nowhere is the issue of added value more pertinent than in the field of flood risk
3management (FRM). Flooding is an appropriate topic because firstly, the Climate Change
Risk Assessment (CCRA) conducted by the Committee for Climate Change (CCC) identified
increasing frequency and severity of flooding as the main anticipated challenge brought on
by climate change in the UK (CCC, 2015). Average annual rainfall - one of the major contrib-
utory factors to inland flood risk in the UK - has increased by an estimated 9% over the past
twenty years, which has contributed to an increase in more severe events (Marsh et al., 2016).
Furthermore, aside from being a highly current topic, FRM is also an uniquely appropriate
field to test the added value of a resilience approach since many methods and ideas in modern
FRM overlap with those of resilience-based approaches, especially the greater emphasis on
partnership approaches (Biggs et al., 2012), and eschewing strictly technical, engineered,
solutions to environmental issues (Walker and Salt, 2006). In fact, use of natural flood man-
agement (NFM) methods - management that focusses on non-intrusive measures that work
with natural processes - have steadily increased in modern FRM initiatives. Within flood
management research, NFM used to counted as a sub-set of semi-structural measures, and
the UK in particular has made concerted efforts to introduce NFM and other less engineered
methods of managing water and reducing flood risk (Green et al., 1993; Smith and Ward,
1998; Tempels and Hartmann, 2014). The similarities between NFM and resilience-based
approaches makes the UK especially suitable for studying how principles of resililience can
be applied in practice, which might in turn give insights into what added value resilience
can provide for practical policy-making. With this in mind, the purpose of my research is to
empirically study whether resilience is a practicable concept, that can add value through new
insights for policy-making, when applied to the field of FRM in the UK.
I will focus my research on the core distinguishing aspects of resilience, which I have
divided into a procedural component, and an evidential component (e.g. evidence-based
practice). The procedural component concerns how resilience envisions the policy process
and how policies are formulated, and consists of learning and experimentation, as well
as participatory methods. Meanwhile, the evidential component of resilience consists of
the information (indices and other measurements) used to better understand the underlying
problems, and help justify why particular policies are needed. The research is structured in
the following manner:
Chapter 2 gives a review of resilience literature, detailing theoretical developments from
its origins to current research. I also expand on the literature review by identifying potential
questions arising from existing resilience theory.
4 Introduction
Chapter 3 focusses on learning and experimentation, which is one facet of the procedural
component of resilience. The objective is to determine if learning, as conceptualised in
resilience literature, is feasible in a practical policy context. This is done by studying how
learning comes about during the practical implementation of two experimental pilot projects
that incorporate multiple NFM measures, and whether it resembles the learning process
envisioned in resilience literature.
In chapter 4, I analyse the practicability of a participatory method, which is another facet
of the procedural component of resilience. The objective is to examine if particpatory bodies
are indeed capable of improving information-sharing, diversify stakeholders’ perceptions,
and induce behavioural changes (such as greater self-reliance) as theorised in resilience
literature. These issues are studied using a two-pronged approach, first by carrying out a
desk study of meeting documents of local participatory bodies, and secondly by surveying
local residents who are likely to participate in these participatory bodies.
Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the evidential component of resilience, by studying how the
concept is currently measured. The objective is to determine whether current resilience mea-
surements can offer added value by providing new insights for policy-makers in the field of
FRM. Taking the 2013/14 and 2015/16 Winter floods in England as test cases, I use statistical
modelling to analyise whether indicators frequently used in resilience measurements are
effective at predicting flood recovery. Chapter 5 gives an overview of the method, while
chapter 6 summarises the results analysis.
Finally, Chapter 7 presents a summary of the findings and some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Literature review and theory
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into three sections, with the first two sections presenting a chronologi-
cal history of resilience – as used in the study of coupled human-nature systems – detailing
theoretical developments from its origins to how it is conceptualised today. The final section
expands on the literature review by identifying potential issues with existing resilience theory.
These further theoretical thoughts are meant to act as primers for the following chapters,
which will explore the identified issues in more depth.
2.2 Conception - from descriptive property to theoretical
framework
2.2.1 Origins of resilience
The Oxford English Dictionary defines resilience as (i) the act of rebounding or springing
back and (ii) elasticity. The origin of the word is in Latin, where resilio means to jump back.
Resilience, in the purely mechanical sense, is the quality of being able to store strain energy
and deflect elastically under a load without breaking or being deformed (Gordon, 1978).
However, since the 1970s the concept has also been used metaphorically to describe the
ability of systems that undergo stress to recover and return to their original state. The term is
currently used in multiple fields of study, from Ecology (Morecroft et al., 2012), to Material
Science (Campbell, 2008), Medicine (Torres et al., 2016), and Psychology (Gavidia-Payne
et al., 2015). Timmerman (1981) was one of the first researchers to apply the term to the study
of the interaction between society and nature, and he defines resilience as the measure of a
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system’s capacity to absorb and recover from the occurrence of a natural hazard. However,
the researcher who has arguably had a more notable impact on contemporary research into
the resilience of human systems (Gaillard, 2010; Xu and Marinova, 2013) is C.S Holling,
who in his paper on systems ecology theorised that:
“Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and
is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables,
driving variables, and parameters, and still persist. In this definition resilience
is the property of the system and persistence or probability of extinction is the
result”.
(Holling, 1973)
This definition of resilience attempts simply to describe a property exhibited by particular
ecosystems that undergo extreme fluctuations. Here, resilience can be understood as an
approximate measure of the likelihood that a system will survive/persist through internal or
external stressors. Hence, the resilience of a system is consistent with low stability for some
of the component populations of the system because emphasis is put on the survival of the
system as a whole over its component parts (Common and Perrings, 1992).
Holling’s initial conceptualisation of resilience has its epistemological roots in evolu-
tionary biology, and is strongly influenced by cybernetics research at the time. His view
of resilience essentially considers a system to have a closed signalling loop, meaning any
action by a system that changes the environment in which it exists will be reflected – through
feedback mechanisms – thereby triggering a change in the system as well (Ashby, 1963).
Importantly, Holling seems to have been influenced by the dominant thought at the time that
negative feedback mechanisms leads to system organisation, while positive feedback mecha-
nisms1 leads to system disorganisation and eventual destruction (Dyke and Weaver, 2013).
Consequently, his conceptualisation of resilience followed the theory that organised systems
had self-corrective mechanisms in place that steer the system back towards an optimal (or
equilibrium) state whenever external stressors act upon it. Examples of other cybernetic
systems that sense changes in external conditions to maintain stable internal functioning
include: homeostasis of an organism, thermostats in homes, and auto-pilots on airplanes or
trains.
1An example of a negative feedback loop would be perspiration to regulate body temperature, whereas a
positive feedback loop would be the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere accelerating further
warming at the Earth’s surface
2.2 Conception 7
Other researchers have questioned the assumption that human systems (e.g. societies)
have an equilibrium state to which they return after perturbations (Klein et al., 2003). In
fact, Timmerman (1981) argued early on that pursuing an equilibrium state is “a strategy of
reliability rather than a strategy of resilience”. Others note that maintaining equilibrium states
requires stabilising, negative feedback loops to predominate over destabilising, positive feed-
back loops (Dyke and Weaver, 2013). While this type of systems behaviour can be observed
at smaller scales (homeostasis in an organism), it is doubtful whether such mechanisms can
scale up to significantly more complex systems.
2.2.2 Resilience and complexity theory
Almost at the same time that Holling’s seminal work on systems resilience was published in
1973, the field of cybernetics was already moving on from the “science of observed systems”
to “a science of observing systems” (von Foerster, 1992). An observing system does not
merely regulate parameters to maintain a static internal environment, but also incorporates
“the observer” (e.g. human beings) into the equation. This means that those who designed the
system must also be governed by it. Dovers and Handmer (1992) for example, point out that
a major difference between ecosystems and societies is the human capacity for anticipation
and learning, and since human beings can adapt to external stimuli, this would require that
the governance system also be adaptive and can change its basics structure. Essentially,
the challenge of understanding and designing an observing (or adapting) system is how to
account for human subjectivity.
Perhaps in recognition of the limitations of a system equilibrium approach to conceptual-
ising resilience, Holling and other like-minded scholars partook in a 5-year collaboration
programme called the “Resilience Project”, that was organised under the auspices of the
Beijer Institute in Stockholm in the mid 1990s (Holling, 2001). The collaboration consisted
of an international group of economists, ecologists, social scientists, and mathematicians,
whose goal was to find an “integrative theory” that includes “the essence of ecological, eco-
nomic, and social science theory” (Gunderson and Holling, 2002; Holling, 2001) that could
be used to guide policies for promoting sustainability. The search for an integrated theory was
motivated by the fact that each discipline only represented one, partial, part of reality and are
incapable of individually making sense of social systems as a whole (Holling, 2003). They
were then seemingly attempting to find the social equivalent of a “Grand Unified Theory”.
The involvement of the economists and mathematicians was of particular importance for
ensuing theoretical developments of resilience as well as the conceptual frameworks used to
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anchor it in social contexts.
The contributions from economic theory consisted mainly of criticism of the dominant
economic growth paradigm that guides economic policy and resource use. Their argument
was that existing “command-and-control” policies gave insufficient consideration to how
(unsustainable) resource management practices could potentially impact societies (Berkes
et al., 2000). “Command-and-control” in the context of resilience does not refer to the
use of legislation and regulatory tools (such as standards and compliance requirements) to
govern economic activity. Rather, it is a term used to describe what those working on the
“Resilience Project” referred to as a “pathology of natural resource management” (Holling
and Meffe, 1995), where arguably too much focus was being put into optimising for resource
efficiency. One oft-criticised example of a traditional “command and control” approach is the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) practice for agricultural production, where the objective
is to achieve as much production as possible given existing environmental conditions. It
was argued that by only focussing on achieving as much production as possible, the system
would be poorly equipped to handle issues such as soil degradation, vulnerability to disease,
and other slowly emergent features (Holling, 1996). Over time, the system would then
enter a “lock-in trap” (Allison and Hobbs, 2004), becoming rigid and unable to cope with
any changes or surprises that may arise. Therefore, rather than focussing exclusively on
economic growth or maximum production efficiency, a resilient economic policy would take
into consideration uncertainties in the system, and ensure that resource-use never exceeded a
system’s “carrying capacity” (Arrow et al., 1995) both in the short-term and long-term.
With the economists and ecologists having pointed out that “command and control” eco-
nomic policies fail to fully take into consideration uncertainty, the mathematicians were then
tasked with creating a framework that could be used to guide the decision-making process.
This is where complexity was introduced to the integrative theory. Complexity, as applied
to social systems, is the idea that the risks for an entire system and the risks for individuals
within that system may not always align (May et al., 2008). Therefore, actions taken by indi-
viduals and policy-makers may not have the intended outcomes. It is basically a formalised
way to explain that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. A general definition is that
it is a system “in which agents or elements that compose the system interact non-linearly,
and in such a convoluted way that it is impossible to describe the behaviour of the system in
terms of the simpler behaviour of its components” (Baranger, 2000). Non-linearities, self-
organisation, and emergence are three complexity concepts that have particular importance
for the theoretical development of resilience. Non-linearity simply refers to cases where there
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is disproportionate cause and effect, which means that it is impossible to accurately predict
outcomes because the outputs of an interaction do not necessarily correspond linearly (1 to
1) to the inputs. Self-organisation in complex systems implies that order is not determined
by central control, but materialises through synergies of the whole group. While emergence
simply means that collective system behaviour is impossible to predict from behaviours of the
individual parts. Self-organisation and emergence are relevant for operating within complex
systems because they add uncertainty – that grows exponentially with time – which increases
the chance of errors in our predictions of potential outcomes (Goldenfeld and Kadanoff,
1999).
Originally, Holling’s descriptive definition of resilience concerned only the ability of
an ecosystem to persist. The complexity of a system was largely inconsequential as the
properties determining its resilience were not entirely tied together with the number of
variables involved. A simple system could be equally (or more) resilient than a complex
one, and vice versa. However, it is improbable that a human-nature system can be governed
without accounting for complexity. As Marchezini et al. (2017) point out:
“institutions, households, and other entities (natural and human-made)
function on different temporal and spatial scales. Political electoral cycles,
business cycles, life cycles. . . all of these have a rhythm. . . and decisions
made in national captitals thousands of kilometres distant affect [people living
elsewhere] in the form of information flows, price fluctuations and geopolitics”
The uncertainties arising from non-linear interactions and self-organising, emergent
system behaviours, required any attempt at an integrative theory for resilience to incorporate
complexity theory to the study of coupled human-nature systems. Subsequent theoretical
developments of resilience therefore abandoned any delineation between the two concepts,
and became primarily focussed on incorporating complexity concepts into resilience theory.
The outcome of the 5-year collaboration project is Panarchy (Gunderson and Holling,
2002). Panarchy is essentially a resource-cycle heuristic that emphasises renewal and re-
organisation. It attempts to rationalise the interlinking elements of human-natural systems
by describing it as continuously undergoing an adaptive cycle of “growth, accumulation, re-
structuring, and renewal” (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). The heuristic is largely influenced
by elements of complexity theory such as: diversity, individuality of components, localised
interactions, and autonomous processes (Levin, 1999; Levin et al., 1998). The theory states
that as a system grows increasingly productive and efficient, it also becomes increasingly
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vulnerable due to rigidities being introduced into the system. At this point, any unexpected
stimulus (e.g. natural catastrophe) causes the system to collapse, forcing it to re-organise
itself and start a renewal process, whereby the cycle re-commences. Resilience, as described
in Panarchy, necessitates embracing uncertainty and unpredictability because sudden changes
are inevitable in systems of people and nature (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes, 2003). As such,
the aim of resilience is to nurture and preserve elements that allow the system to renew and
reorganise itself (Allison and Hobbs, 2004; Walker et al., 2004) in order to avoid collapse
as a result of external disturbances. Here, it appears that the authors have borrowed the
term panarchy from the field of international relations to draw parallels between natural and
human subjects. Like panarchy global governance, the system envisioned by the authors
exhibits no central control, but is rather governed “of all by all and for all” (Sewell and Salter,
1995). At this point, systems resilience evolved from simply being about persistence to also
incorporate “adaptiveness, variability, and unpredictability” (Holling, 2001). Also of note is
that the authors consider the adaptive-cycle heuristic to not only apply to ecosystems, but
social systems as well (Walker and Cooper, 2011).
It should be noted here that the incorporation of complexity theory is in some sense a
case of the “Resilience Project” catching up with developments in other fields related to
cybernetic research. For example, Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine formulated in the 1970s
that processes promoting disorder and disorganisation as not necessarily destructive, and that
new structures can evolve out of fluctuations. For societies, this translates to perturbations
(e.g. disasters) not only having destructive consequences, but also offering opportunities
to rebuild and “to enact beneficial changes that might not have been feasible otherwise”
(Kelman, 2007). Panarchy, therefore, can be seen as an attempt to incorporate evolving
systems theories into Holling’s original conceptualisation of resilience.
2.2.3 Social-ecological systems
Influenced by complexity theory, Panarchy entrenched the idea that the only meaningful
way to understand human-nature systems is by treating them as complex adaptive systems
(CAS) (Anderies et al., 2004; Norberg and Cumming, 2008), where each component cannot
be studied in separation from the whole. Attempting to do so would only lead to erroneous
conclusions (Folke, 2006; Walker et al., 2006) because these systems are inherently variable,
uncertain, and prone to change in unexpected ways. To distinguish this branch from studies
of complex systems in other fields, the term socio-ecological systems (SES) was coined to
refer to the study of resilience of integrated human-nature systems (Anderies et al., 2004;
Walker et al., 2004). With the increasing influence of complexity theory, the core ideas
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of self-organisation and emergence gradually came to dominate the conceptualisation of
resilience.
With the growing influence of complexity, resilience literature encountered a dilemma.
While they had created a working theoretical framework that helped describe in detail how
coupled human-nature systems might behave, little headway had been made in making
resilience more actionable. The SES branch of resilience research had hitherto focussed
almost entirely on the natural system, with social systems being mostly an afterthought.
There was a growing realisation that although systems may self-organise, “the capacities
and intent of the human actors strongly influence” the trajectory of the system (Walker et al.,
2004). They had essentially encountered what Dovers and Handmer (1992) among others
had identified as an issue quite some time: human subjectivity. To account for the human
capacity to interpret our environment and act upon these interpretations, resilience literature
incorporated elements of anticipation, learning, and reason into the overarching idea of
“adaptation” (Liu et al., 2007; Norberg and Cumming, 2008). With the inclusion of adaptation
as a central aspect of resilience, its definition also changed to an amalgamation of:
“the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while un-
dergoing change, so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure,
identity, and feedbacks”
(Folke et al., 2010)
“the ability to absorb perturbations without changing overall system function,
the ability to adapt within the resources of the system itself, and the ability to
learn, innovate, and change”.
(Adger et al., 2011)
At this stage, the strain between Holling’s original conceptualisation of resilience as
a stability property, and the new understanding brought in by complexity theory that sta-
bility isn’t always achievable (or desirable) became more apparent. The SES branch of
resilience was essentially concerned with creating a theoretical framework for identifying
critical “controlling processes” (Longstaff, 2009; Nelson et al., 2007) that could be used to
determine the “planetary boundaries” (Rockstrom et al., 2009) within which society could
operate without fear of causing catastrophic environmental change (Westley et al., 2011).
The attempt to describe macro-scale boundaries of our Earth, while at the same time allowing
for disruptive change at other scales, has led to some terminological confusion that remains
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largely unresolved. Because of the diverging focus on both maintaining system organisation,
while simultaneously espousing the need for system re-organisation, there still is no clear
answer to the question: “resilience of what, to what?” (Carpenter et al., 2001). Despite
significant advances in creating a comprehensive conceptual framework of resilience, there
is very little development in creating practical policy instruments or strategies for enhancing
resilience in a system. This begs the question of whether too much effort had been put
into creating a concept that would be useful in all circumstances, since it is highly doubtful
whether any general rules for the functioning of environmental systems even exist (Bodin
and Wiman, 2004; Boettiger and Hastings, 2013).
Furthermore, SES resilience strongly espouses a long-term perspective for managing
human-nature systems, with a particular emphasis on looking at a problem from multiple-
scales (Armitage and Plummer, 2010). However, complexity theory dictates that adding
components and increasing time-horizons lead to greater uncertainty and less reliable deci-
sions (Goldenfeld and Kadanoff, 1999). For example, a meteorologist’s prediction of the
weather in London in an hour’s time is likely to be significantly more accurate than their
estimate for what the weather in the whole of the UK will be like a year from now. As such,
actionable advice on what interventions are needed to enhance resilience will necessarily need
to have limitations (of time, space, and relevant components). Yet putting such limitations on
decision-making contradicts the edicts of long-term and multi-scalar perspectives (Adger
et al., 2005; Boyd, 2012). These contradictions in how the SES branch applies complexity
theory remain largely unexplained.
Some have posited that the solution to the dichotomy between stability and change when
defining resilience is to simply eschew recovery and “bouncing back” since these concepts
discount the fact that perturbations are almost inevitably accompanied by change (Manyena
et al., 2011). Instead of recovery, Manyena et al. (2011) suggests that the notion of “bounce
forward” is a more suitable way to conceptualise resilience for human-nature systems. In
his “bounce forward” theory, Manyena espouses that practitioners and other stakeholders
adopt proactive approach and continuously adopt policies ang governance structures to
changing risks and the needs of the communities affected by disasters. Resilience by
“bouncing forward” necessitates that the choices made after a disaster are transformative
and represents a shift in thinking of those involved (Manyena et al., 2011). Basically, the
idea is that policies should not be focussed on “doing less bad” (i.e. prevent or mitigate the
impact of disasters, and to recover to the original state as much as possible), and instead
on “doing more good” (i.e. improve the circumstances of those affected by disasters by
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changing fundamental policies and structures) (Birkeland, 2012). This is the preferred
conceptualisation of resilience amongst those studying disaster risk reduction (DRR) and
vulnerability, which will be discussed further on in this chapter.
2.3 Transfer to policy discourse - operationalising resilience
2.3.1 Catalysts of current resilience research
Starting in 2005, there was drastic growth in the number of research publications that dealt
with the topic of resilience (Xu and Marinova, 2013), and as a result of the growing interest,
resilience research expanded in scope and entered the vernacular of a wider variety of disci-
plines. Two publications that served as notable catalysts that spurred the popularisation of
the concept, and aided its adoption within policy circles are:
a) Creation of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Hyogo
Framework for Action in 2005
The Hyogo Framework is most noteworthy for being the first global policy document that
uses the term “disaster resilience” to describe a concept that up until then had mostly been
referred to as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). The framework called for the “integration
of disaster risk considerations into sustainable development policies” and advocated for
strengthening “capacities” across all levels, particularly “at the community level” (Hyogo,
2005). By emphasising sustainable development, and the empowerment of communities and
local authorities, the framework was a starting point for popularising the use of resilience
concepts amongst a wider audience of policy-makers. The Hyogo Framework also put greater
emphasis on the role of international development objectives such as vulnerability reduction
and poverty alleviation, which the SES branch of resilience had hitherto only given cursory
consideration to (Adger, 2000; Adger et al., 2005). In essence, the Framework served as
a useful synthesis document of the resilience concept up to that point, and helped guide
the direction of future research by emphasising some key issues that have become more
prominent within resilience research.
b) Revision of the US Department of Homeland Security’s National Strategy for Home-
land Security in 2007
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American contingency planning had focussed mostly on counter-terrorism and homeland
security after the events that transpired on 9/11. But in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean
Tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, it was decided that a course correction on
priorities would be needed, which resulted in the revised National Strategy for Homeland
Security published in 2007. The new strategy was notable for insisting that none of the
threats to infrastructure, communities and institutions were fully preventable (Walker and
Cooper, 2011). It therefore proposed that in lieu of prevention, contingency planning needed
to focus on “operational resilience” (USDHS, 2007). In practice, this meant that emergency
planning and response would focus on preparedness for any potential threats (natural and
human-induced) rather than a single one. A secondary aim was also to change public
mentality from safety, to readiness and being prepared for anything (Coaffee and Rogers,
2008). The dual goals of shifting to multi-hazard disaster preparedness, and assigning
greater responsibility to communities and individual citizens happened to align smoothly
with principles of complexity and self-organisation mentioned in resilience literature. As
the Hyogo Framework helped cement the importance of vulnerability reduction and poverty
alleviation, so did the DHS National Strategy aid in giving multi-hazard preparedness and
individual self-reliance central roles in resilience discourse. These ideas would become core
principles of current conceptualisations of resilience.
2.3.2 Current definition of resilience
The transfer of resilience from a theorised property of human-nature systems discussed in
academic circles, to a concept used to inform policy making, resulted in an expanded use of
the term that has seen its definition become increasingly vague. This increasing ambiguity of
resilience is partly due to the inherent contradictions within the current conceptualisations
of resilience, where emphasis is placed on both stability and change. Holling (1996) partly
attempted to clarify this dichotomy by separating what he called “engineering resilience”
from the SES approach. Holling’s use of the term should not be confused with its use
in the field of engineering however, where it is mostly considered a mechanical property
used to measure material elasticity (Campbell, 2008). In resilience literature, “engineering
resilience” refers to a management perspective that focusses on efficiency, and regulates
systems so that they remain near a pre-determined equilibrium. The main difference be-
tween the two branches of resilience can briefly be summarised by the explanation that
engineering resilience emphasises “bounce-back” or “recovery ability” (Norris et al., 2008),
whereas SES - by incorporating elements of complexity theory - highlights re-organisation
and adaptation (Leichenko, 2011). Combining these two branches allowed a much more
comprehensive cover of potential risks, where the resilience concept would be applicable
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to both currently known risks (historical conditions), as well as future unpredictable risks
(changing conditions). Currently, one of the most widely used definitions of resilience is:
“(Resilience is) the ability of a system, community or society exposed to
hazards to resist, absorb, accomodate to and recover from the effects of a
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions”.
Source: (UNISDR, 2009)
Key determinants of resilience in its current conceptualisation include: a) adaptive
capacity, b) multi-level governance and participation, and c) vulnerability (Cutter et al., 2014;
Frazier et al., 2013; Leykin et al., 2013).
a) Adaptive Capacity
As mentioned in section 2.1.3, adaptation is used to reconcile the concepts of emergence and
self-organisation with particularities of human societies such as rules, norms, and institutions
etc. Due to the current conceptual ambiguity of resilience, there is no general agreement
on some basic questions regarding adaptation such as: “capacitiy of what to adapt?”, “who
adapts?”, and “how and for what purpose does adaptation take place?” One of the main
branches of resilience literature conceptualises adaptation as a learning process that comes
about through a deliberate, experimental approach (Armitage et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2015;
Folke et al., 2005; Gunderson et al., 2008). They argue that since human-nature systems
are inherently variable and prone to change unexpectedly, adaptation through a deliberate
process of experimental probing and learning is the only viable approach to account for
complexity (Evans, 2011; Walker et al., 2009). This conceptualisation envisions nature as the
primary cause/driver of change, and human societies are required to adapt to these external
drivers of change (Turnbull et al., 2013; Walker and Salt, 2006). Adaptation is argued to
be most achievable through adjusting relevant management practices and policy tools, by
incorporating newly acquired knowledge that relevant stakeholders have learned through
experimental initiatives (Chang et al., 2014; Reyers et al., 2015; White et al., 2015). In this
conceptualisation, an adaptive management process would be:
Perturbation > Learning > Knowledge acquisition > Adaptation > Resilience
In practice, the proposed experimental approach to adaptation entails a management
process that “integrates scientific knowledge into policy-making in an on-going, recursive
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learning cycle” (Voss and Bornemann, 2011). Policy planning and implementation is un-
derstood as a hypothesis testing exercise (Ahern, 2013), where policy-makers, scientists
and other stakeholders come together to co-produce new knowledge that will guide future
policy-making (Evans, 2011). The underlying assumption of this approach is that “failure
is a statistical inevitability for any system” (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Since perturbations
that cause damage to the system are inevitable, effective management under a resilience
approach requires policy-makers and stakeholders to shift “from a mindset of fearing change”
to embracing it (Chapin III et al., 2009; Park et al., 2013). Embracing change translates
into viewing disruptions not as something to be avoided, but rather as necessary to achieve
resilience (Blann et al., 2003; Liao, 2014). It is implied that learning and adaptation can
only take place by experiencing perturbation (Becker et al., 2015; Gunderson, 2010), and
some have even suggested that each disaster “that is prevented is a loss of opportunity for
learning” (Liao, 2012). Basically, recursive learning is about making systems “safe-to-fail”
by accepting failure as inevitable rather than something to be avoided (Ahern, 2011). It is
believed that practitioners can learn more by allowing “modest failures” (Park et al., 2011) to
take place, which will make them better at preparing and adapting policies that are capable
of dealing with potentially catastrophic failures.
Adaptive capacity, as described above, is very similar to the concept of “bouncing forward”
developed by Manyena et al. (2011), and the argument that change and disruption does not
necessarily have to lead to purely negative consequences. An underlying principle is that the
“secret to safety lies in danger”, and in order to become resilient, society needs to foster a
process of continuous learning to maintain creativity (adaptability), that strikes a balance
between order and chaos (Comfort, 1994).
b) Multi-level governance and participation
A core argument within resilience literature is that “centrally administered bureaucracies are
ill-suited to managing complex social-ecological systems” (Becker et al., 2015). The reason
for this is that policies from central authorities tend to be rigidly standardised with little
consideration for local conditions and contexts (Cavallo and Ireland, 2014). Conventional
management methods are also argued to be less capable of handling the dynamic nature of
various threats facing societies because they take insufficient consideration to long-term sys-
tem trends (Jabareen, 2013). Since effective management requires a thorough understanding
of local conditions as well as current and future risks (Jha et al., 2013; Turnbull et al., 2013),
a “bottom-up” approach is needed to fully deal with the full range of hazards that a system
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can be exposed to (Wardekker et al., 2010).
According to current resilience research, an ideal governance structure for dealing with
uncertainties is polycentric, applied at an appropriate scale, and features participatory man-
agement (Becker et al., 2015). This is because strictly focussing on larger-scale, institutional
stakeholders will give a biased understanding of the issues, and one risks missing out on the
influence of more micro-scale actors (Marchezini et al., 2017). Since local authorities and
stakeholders arguably understand their risks better, empowering them will tap in to local
capacities and resources that can be crucial for effectively managing unexpected changes
(Folke et al., 2005). Therefore, a collaborative “bottom-up” approach that focusses on build-
ing local capacities will result in a more resilient society that is better able to overcome future
disturbances (NRC, 2012; Toubin et al., 2014).
c) Vulnerability
Interestingly, while scholarly debate on resilience have taken place both in the field of ecology
and DRR over decades, theoretical developments have largely been done independently of
each other until quite recently (Cutter et al., 2008; Menoni et al., 2012). Where attempts have
been made to integrate the two fields, it has generally been assumed that resilience is a sub-
component of the risk umbrella, which includes other concepts such as vulnerability (Fekete
et al., 2014). As with resilience, the concept of vulnerability is elaborated in a multitude of
research disciplines ranging from geophysical sciences to psychology. Importantly, it has
become a core concept in hazard and disaster risk reduction (DRR) research (Blaikie et al.,
1994; Burton et al., 1978; Hewitt, 1983; O’Keefe et al., 1976; Wisner et al., 2004). A full
account of the various conceptualisations of vulnerability within DRR is beyond the scope of
this study, but crucially, the predominant view in DRR is that the interaction between hazard,
exposure, and vulnerability constitutes risk (Gallopin, 2006; Wisner, 2011). Hazards can
mean natural, technological, or other processes that can endanger people, while exposure
– in the case of natural hazards – usually means that people living in certain locations are
more likely to suffer loss and harm. Vulnerability meanwhile, can be understood as the
propensity to be harmed (by a hazard), and to be unable to deal with that harm. It is a
term – when used in DRR – that encompasses a society’s values, attitudes, behaviours and
governance structures (Kelman et al., 2016). It puts the onus on human decisions, rather
than the hazard phenomena, as the root causes of disasters (Alexander, 1997), and therefore
strongly links poverty as a significant factor of disaster causation (O’Keefe et al., 1976). The
reasoning is that disasters are more impactful for the poor due to prolonged loss of income,
whereas for the rich these events are “more often an inconvenience than a personal tragedy”
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(Alexander, 1997) due to the possibility of, for example, insurance coverage. There is some
terminological confusion concerning how resilience fits into the “umbrella” of risk (Aldrich
and Meyer, 2015; Gaillard, 2010), where some have argued that resilience is essentially
a synonymous term to response capacity (Wagner et al., 2014), but others see it more as
cohesiveness and coping capacity (Balica and Wright, 2011; Hinkel, 2010). There seems to
be general agreement however, that hazard risks cannot be reduced by focussing solely on
infrastructural and technical solutions (Birkmann et al., 2013).
The reason why targeted infrastructural or technical solutions are considered inadequate
is because they are predicated on an assumption about there being a normal - or stable -
state in which society normally operates (Hewitt, 1983). The risks posed by natural hazards
are therefore arguably mainly the result of human decisions, such as “acting on a false
sense that ‘risks of nature’ have been dealth with” (Hewitt, 1983), rather than the hazars
themselves. For example, it is well known that the Mexican Gulf area suffers from hurricanes
annually, therefore if society suffers catastrophic damages then this would seemingly be due
to decisions that have been made rather than the fact that there are frequent storms. Since the
consequences of disasters are the result human decisions rather than environmental factors, it
is asserted that measures aimed at reducing vulnerability through improving socio-economic
factors would be the most effective options for overcoming any potential disruption (Cutter
et al., 2008). Factors such as social connectedness, and community social capital in the form
of mutual resources and support are considered crucial elements because they contribute to
the ability to self-organise after disruptions (Peacock et al., 2010; UNISDR, 2012). With an
increased ability to self-organise, there will consequently be less need for policy interventions
from central governments. Furthermore, because resilience literature considers system failure
to be an inevitability, it is argued that improving people’s self-sufficiency would be more
beneficial in the long term than giving them a false sense of security (Boon, 2014).
2.3.3 Operationalising resilience
The expanding theoretical framework and conceptual ambiguity of resilience is reflected in
the widely ranging attempts at operationalising resilience at national levels. Taking a sample
from the spectrum of national resilience strategies, they all adopt a similar definition of
resilience. However, the methods and objectives for their resilience initiatives differ widely.
There seems to be general agreement amongst policy practitioners that resilience refers to
a society’s ability to prepare for, persist through, and recover from unexpected disruptions
(such as natural disasters). But the exact nature of these disruptions varies a great deal, which
is reflected in the detailed policies promoted within these national strategies. A number of
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examples are discussed below.
Australia (2011) – National Strategy for Disaster Resilience: Emphasises climate change
and multiple kinds of potential disasters such as flooding, droughts, wildfires. Because
it is difficult to predict which perturbation is relevant, the strategies focus on community
preparedness and promoting self-reliance.
Canada (2016) – National Disaster Mitigation Program: Primarily concerned with flood
risk, therefore focusses on reducing the impact of flooding by ensuring that critical infrastruc-
ture (energy, water, health provision, transport, telecommunications) can persist and function
through flooding.
Japan (2013) – Fundamental Plan for National Resilience: Focusses specifically on
earthquake response. The onus of suggested measures is on limiting damages to vital infras-
tructure, and increasing capacity to recover from earthquakes and building overall response
capacity to ensure that things go back to normal as quickly as possible.
Sweden (2015) – Making Cities Resilient in Sweden: Refers mostly to flood risk man-
agement and ensuring that critical infrastructure in cities is able to function throughout the
event. Also mentions the need to build up community awareness and preparedness.
NFRR (2016) – National Flood Resilience Review: As the report name suggests, re-
silience in the UK primarily refers to flooding. As with Canada and Sweden, the proposed
measures mainly focus on ensuring that critical infrastructure is able to persist and function
through flooding. The UK also developed a Strategic National Framework on Community
Resilience (2011), which emphasises public security and emergency response capabilities.
Unlike resilience strategies from other countries, this strategic framework gives particular
emphasis to man-made threats.
FEMA (2012) – FEMA Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic
Action in an Age of Uncertainty: This is the broadest of all national resilience strategies,
covering public safety and disaster management. The document is meant to assist planners
for both man-made and natural events. As in the case with Australia, the strategy is meant to
apply to a wide variety of potential threats, and therefore the proposed measures highlight
the importance of public engagement, community readiness, and building local capacities.
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Looking at the sample of national resilience strategies, it seems that the conceptual
ambiguity of resilience has resulted in individual practitioners being responsible for finding
suitable definitions in order to operationalise the concept. These definitions, along with the
accompanying suggested policy measures, strongly reflect the particularities of the problems
that these practitioners are trying to solve. For example, in cases where practitioners are
concerned with a specified threat (earthquake for Japan, flooding for Canada, Sweden, and
UK), strategic priorities focus on critical infrastructure and their ability to function during,
and after the disaster. Australia and the U.S. on the other hand, use resilience as a guiding
principle of crisis management, putting emphasis on improving community preparedness
and self-reliance, with the implicit assumption that authorities are unable to sufficiently plan
for all possible contingencies. With this in mind, it would be pertinent to question whether
the concept of resilience has become too general, since attempts to operationalise resilience
suggest that it is so terminologically ambiguous that it can mean whatever the author wants it
to mean. Despite this growing ambiguity, the enthusiasm for “building resilience” within
some areas of DRR remains unabated, with there being an almost unquestioning acceptance
that resilience is good and should be promoted (Fekete et al., 2014). This growing ambiguity
offers very limited scope for measuring, testing, and formalising resilience, which in turn
makes it extremely challenging to create operational tools for policy and management
purposes.
2.4 Further theoretical thoughts on resilience
2.4.1 The problematic link between learning and adaptation
One assertion that encapsulates the potential problems with current resilience research is
Jack Ahern’s claim that: “resilience is a more strategic than normative concept, because,
to be effective, resilience must be explicitly based on, and informed by, the environmental,
ecological, social, and economic drivers” (Ahern, 2011). This assertion ignores that basic
strategic questions such as: “who decides”, “who should act”, and “who is responsible
and accountable”, clearly require consideration of issues beyond strictly technical criteria
(Wiering et al., 2015). Furthermore, the desirability of a resilience-based approach will
vary depending on one’s perspective. For example, one of the fundamental disagreements
remaining in global climate negotiations is the “right” to produce further greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, where developing nations have long argued that drastic reductions un-
fairly restricts their growth potential (UNFCCC, 2004). As such, something that resilience
literature would undoubtedly consider to be the “correct” decision, meaning reducing GHG
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emissions in order to avoid catastrophic climate change, still entails a fundamentally norma-
tive judgement; that preventing climate change is of greater importance than ensuring global
economic prosperity. Perhaps they are right in assuming this, but it is still quite specious
to suggest that resilience does not include broad normative dimensions (Brand and Jax, 2007).
Resilience is considered to be a superior concept to guide management of human-
environment systems because it takes into consideration (a) complexity, and (b) the long-term
perspective needed to handle unexpected change (Nelson et al., 2007). It may be true that
designing for resilience will make societies better able to deal with new challenges; however,
foregoing short-term benefits for long-term persistence is not without costs (Anderies et al.,
2006). While the need to adopt a long-term perspective in face of multiple uncertainties
may seem self-evident for resilience researchers, for policy-makers doing so would require
determining: (a) how to design for resilience, and (b) what the costs are (Anderies et al.,
2004; McShane et al., 2011). From a policy design perspective, the choice is therefore not
as straightforward as picking a superior option over an inferior one. It is about deliberately
choosing to alter the objectives of policy-making, and attempting to find effective strategies
for managing the accompanying trade-offs (Saleh, 2008).
Acknowledging that resilience entails normative policy design choices is important
because its conceptualisation of the learning/adaptation process is somewhat problematic.
Firstly, its assertion that the learning-by-doing process is a hypothesis-testing exercise (Ahern,
2013; Reyers et al., 2015), used to pinpoint better management practices, is somewhat spec-
ulative. Hypothesis-testing in social contexts, at the scale proposed in resilience literature,
is notoriously challenging because of the prevalence of white noise factors that can affect
outcomes (Orr, 1999). An experimental management process assumes that the effects that
policy interventions have on outcomes can be isolated from other contextual factors, and also
that practitioners are able to bypass their own personal biases when making policy choices.
Given the well-known difficulties of determining intervention-effects in the field of social
experimentation (Grogger and Karoly, 2005), and that implicit bias is an established phe-
nomenon in human decision-making (Baron, 2008), it would be highly relevant to question
how feasible these assumptions are.
Furthermore, adaptation as conceptualised in much of resilience research is a process
akin to evolution (Levin et al., 1998), which is not entirely unproblematic. Chapin III et al.
(2009) for example, state that:
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“Allowing large corporations to fail during economic crises provides space
for innovation and adjustment to shifting economic opportunities. Such man-
agement that fosters change at one scale might enhance resilience at a broader
scale”.
Disregarding the obvious normative parallels between the above quote and laissez-faire
economics, the implication of constantly having to adapt to changing circumstances is that
a resilience approach to policy-making becomes a Red Queen’s race (Van Valen, 1973).
Systems that do not adapt perish, and therefore in order to survive, they are forced to
continuously adapt without end. Over time, adaptation becomes a management goal in of
itself. As the eponymous Red Queen said in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass:
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place”.
The point is that by assuming the evolutionary perspective, the objective of policy-
making is not necessarily about enhancing well-being in society, but rather about improving
management practices to become better at adapting. Importantly, it is unclear why being
adaptive and capable of change will lead to greater well-being for the stakeholders involved.
Even through a framework such as “bouncing forward”, where positive change is theoretically
achieved through co-operation between stakeholders who undergo mutual learning, and pro-
actively work to adapt the system to a changing environment, there are key questions that
remain largely unanswered. How might we define what constitutes a positive or negative
consequence? How can this learning process extract the positive consequences of a disaster
while also minimising the negative ones? Is it possible that resilience-building is in fact a
zero-sum game, where some stakeholders will inevitably we worse off irrespective of whether
a system “bounces back” or “bounces forward”? Having pointed out some of the questions
surrounding the experimental, learning-by-doing resilience approach, I will further examine
the issues of feasibility in chapter 3.
2.4.2 The muddled conceptualisation of participation and collabora-
tion
Another noteworthy aspect in the conceptualisation of resilience is the sometimes derisive
undertones in its treatment of political, cultural and economic factors in the policy implemen-
tation process. These factors are sometimes seen as “barriers” to resilience, and in order to
achieve desirable outcomes it may be necessary to “circumvent” or “overcome” limitations
imposed by them (Moser, 2008; Westley et al., 2011). Hierarchical political structures with
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significant central authority is especially seen as inimical to resilience, and polycentric, flexi-
ble arrangements involving local stakeholders are considered the solution to barriers such as
political deadlock or inertia (Davidson-Hunt and Berkes, 2003). A participatory, “bottom up”
(Axelrod and Cohen, 1999) approach is viewed as more effective because it arguably ensures
more stakeholder buy-in, while simultaneously increasing community capacities (Lorenz,
2013). Increased community capacity means greater “self-reliance” (Davoudi, 2012) in that
people are able to deal with disturbances and self-organise rather than relying on government
support.
The shortcomings of the participatory management approach espoused in resilience
research is that collaboration and participation does not necessarily mean that questions of
power and diverging political interests disappear (Kuhlicke, 2013). Assigning the decision-
making process to a more participatory arrangement simply ensures that the political debate
shifts from an intra-institutional forum to a public one. For example, in a “bouncing forward”
process, organising stakeholders in affected communities through mutual learning and a
co-operative decision process theoretically leads to positive change. However, this assumes
that the stakeholders who participate in the decision-making will agree that change is positive.
This may not necessarily be the case since it is quite possible that they act to prevent
change instead, due to political or cultural conservatism for example. Simply put, it is
never made clear why a collaborative/participatory approach would be better at dealing
with surprises and uncertainties - and engender change - than more centrally organised
management structures. In fact, the support for participatory methods within resilience
literature seems to coincide with the larger societal context, where “stakeholder engagements”
are considered “best practice” for supporting policy decisions (Cornwall, 2008; Dunn, 2007).
Given these considerations, it would be fair to ask whether a collaborative/resilience approach
is truly a required component for building resilience, or whether it has simply been tacked-
on as a compulsory element of “good governance”. I will explore the practicability of
participatory methods further in chapter 4.
2.4.3 The debatable added-value of a multi-hazard perspective
As is mentioned earlier, despite the central role of adaptive capacity within the conceptuali-
sation of resilience, what constitutes adaptation is still subject to multiple and sometimes
conflicting interpretations (Bulkeley and Tuts, 2013). This conceptual confusion can partly
be attributed to the focus on making resilience a multi-hazard property (Balsells et al., 2015),
which has led to a notable lack of specificity and understanding regarding the type of surprises
and non-linearities that practitioners need to be aware of (Schlueter et al., 2012). The result
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is that even when referring to a specific disaster, say flooding, resilience is still defined using
general - sometimes contradictory - terms (Toubin et al., 2014). For example, some have
asserted that movement of people and displacement is a failure of adaptation (Adger and
Adams, 2013). Whereas others have found that mobility and migration can be an indication
of high adaptive capacity because of abilities to tap into necessary capabilities and assets
(Warner et al., 2013; Wrathall, 2012). Basically, even though they are completely opposite
outcomes, remaining in place and moving away can both be considered resilient adaptations.
The problem of lacking an explicitly stated definition for adaptation can perhaps be
further clarified with the following hypothetical scenario. Assume that central London were
to experience catastrophic flooding, severely damaging all iconic landmarks around the
Thames. Once the flooding passes, the Government would have a chance for a fresh start
and plan everything from a clean slate. It is also assumed that similar kinds of extreme
flooding affecting London will become more likely with climate change. Would it then be
considered a great achievement, or one of the most foolish decisions in history, to rebuild and
restore the city and its historic landmarks in their original locations? How one answers that
question probably depends on a multitude of (highly normative) factors that range widely
outside the scope of a simple planning decision on whether to rebuild or relocate. The point
is simply that without explicitly stated definitions and delineations, one’s understanding of
what constitutes adaptation would be highly influenced by normative values and biases
The issues associated with making resilience a multi-hazard property matter not just
because it can result in contradictory policies. Focussing primarily on adaptive capacity and
treating society as a complex system is also not entirely uncontroversial. Adaptation is said
to come about through system self-organisation, but when self-organisation is translated into
the social context, there is strong potential for creating ideological overtones to the concept
(Davoudi, 2012) (i.e. laissez-faire). In flood risk management for example, planning can be
broadly understood using the following function:
FloodRisk = f (hazard,exposure,andvulnerability) (2.1)
Flood Risk means the overall level of threat posed by a flood in terms of potential dam-
age; Hazard refers to the characteristics of the flood, its gravity, chance of occurrence etc.;
Exposure refers to the extent to which people and infrastructure will be affected by a flood;
and Vulnerability refers to the susceptibility to suffer damages as a result of flooding, due
to for example poor housing conditions (Aerts et al., 2013; Lugeri et al., 2010). A flood
hazard in a remote, uninhabited part of the Scottish highlands would pose no flood risk for
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example, since there would be no people or infrastructure exposed to the flood. Therefore,
managing the risks of a disaster like flooding can be done by targeting either exposure or
vulnerability (Aerts et al., 2014), but a resilience approach focusses almost exclusively on
vulnerability. The idea that exposure to disasters is unavoidable may be technically correct
from an academic standpoint, but the assertion that self-organisation is more effective than
central planning does seem to suggest that resilient people should not look to states to secure
their well-being because it will be necessary to secure it for themselves anyhow (Reid, 2012;
Welsh, 2014). Some researchers argue that formulating a more explicit definition of resilience
and adaptation may lead to practitioners over-simplifying a multi-faceted issue (Chelleri
et al., 2015). But lacking details and specificity about what is meant by resilience could
also potentially allow highly normative interpretations to take shape, where the concept can
be used to abrogate the role and necessity of central government interventions in disaster
management for example.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear why the literature suggests that the best method for
enhancing resilience towards perturbations is to focus efforts on socio-economic factors.
While non-linearities and self-organisation have been core components of resilience from its
conception (Holling, 2001), deliberate policy interventions targeting specific management
practices or environmental factors was still believed to the the most effective means of
achieving adaptation (Nelson et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2009). One possibility that explains
this shift from emphasising targeted policy interventions to the impetus being put on wider
socio-economic factors. There has long been an underlying hypothesis in disaster vulnera-
bility research of a strong positive correlation between low socio-economic status and high
vulnerability. Or as Blaikie et al. (1994) state: “as a rule the poor suffer more from hazards
than the rich”. Furthermore, Hewitt (1983) in his seminal work, states that “’alienation from
the land’ through modernisation is integral to the vulnerability of ordinary people”, and the
root causes can therefore be found in the social and economic structures that govern society.
More to the point, many question “the nature of economic growth and whether it is, as is
assumed, necessarily a good thing” (Wisner, 2011).
This begs the question: is resilience a property that describes the ability of a system to
withstand disasters, or is it a measurement of a system’s economic equality and degree of
social justice? If it is the latter, then is disaster risk planning and management necessarily
the most appropriate forum to address these issues? Does it necessarily follow through
logically that the best means by which policy-makers can manage for example, flood risk,
is to apply policy instruments intended to to alleviate destitution? In chapters 5 and 6, I
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will further explore the usefulness of incorporating socio-economic indicators into flood





It was noted in the previous chapter that, according to the SES literature, adaptation through
an experimental, learning-by-doing process is one of the primary means by which a society
can enhance its resilience to perturbations like natural disasters. Considering how strongly
connected learning is to adaptation in the theoretical discourse, there is a conspicuous lack of
agreement among researchers on what constitutes recursive learning, or how such a process
might take place in practice. Existing case studies on learning and adaptation focus primarily
on theoretical development and proof of concept rather than exploring how an experimental
process can be implemented in practice (Olsson et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 2007; UNDP,
2014; Walker et al., 2009). The few case studies that have analysed experimental processes
have found equivocal evidence that it leads to adaptation (Melis et al., 2015; Voss and Borne-
mann, 2011). Given that the recursive, experimental, approach to learning is highly idealised,
the lack of empirical studies begs the question of whether such a learning process is in fact
feasible in practice. Seeing as much of current resilience literature is aimed at guiding and
informing policies (Bene, 2013; Boyd, 2012; Jha et al., 2013; NRC, 2012), the feasibility
of an experimental learning process is of central importance, since a concept that cannot be
implemented in practice would provide minimal added-value for policy-making.
With these issues in mind, the goal of this chapter is to determine whether learning, as
conceptualised in resilience literature, is feasible in a practical policy context. This will be
done by using two Defra-funded experimental FRM pilot projects located on the Holnicote
Estate and in Pickering Beck, as case studies. The method of study consists of interviews with
relevant policy managers and practitioners, focussing specifically on how learning comes
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about in a practical policy setting, and whether it resembles the recursive learning process
envisioned in resilience literature.
3.2 Background and theory of learning in resilience litera-
ture
In SES literature, learning is broadly understood as the process through which society can
achieve adaptation. It is a highly deliberate process of recursion that comprises sensing,
anticipation, and knowledge-acquisition that eventually leads to adaptation (Ahern, 2013;
Armitage et al., 2008; Biggs et al., 2012). The objective of learning, as defined in SES
literature, is knowledge acquisition (Olsson et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2006). This knowledge
is then useful when applied to change policies and help improve the capacity of a system to
adapt to disruptions, thereby enhancing overall resilience. This conceptualisation essentially
understands adaptation as synonymous with policy change, which is ideally accomplished
through a recursive learning process. This “experimental” framework (Nelson et al., 2007)
implies that policy formulation and implementation is constantly in a state of improvement
to become better by taking into consideration changing conditions. By putting the onus
on policy improvement, it is implied that policy changes are only made when taking into
consideration relevant inputs from changing conditions, and all other inputs identified as
white-noise will be disregarded. Basically, SES literature currently views decision-making as
an essentially rational process (Simon, 1977), where problems are tackled through a series
of cumulative and logical steps, and choices are made based on good quality information
(Turner et al., 2003; Wagner et al., 2014).
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, adaptation is very broadly interpreted. Two
wide ranging assumptions are made about the learning process that receive insufficient
attention, and put in doubt how feasible it is in a practical context. It is firstly assumed that
adaptation comes about through a reactive learning process, where changes are dictated by
natural conditions. This conceptualisation fails to acknowledge that societies have many
intentionally designed elements that can be difficult to modify. Secondly, it is assumed that
policy changes are guided mainly by newly acquired knowledge, with little influence from
factors that are not directly related to practical policy implementation. The lack of attention
given to these two assumptions make it relevant to question whether a recursive learning
process as envisioned in resilience literature is feasible in practical policy implementation.
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3.2.1 Intentional design as limitation on learning
A likely reason for the insufficient consideration given to the intentionally designed elements
in societies is the strong influence of complexity theory on resilience. A core tenet of com-
plexity is that system order does not come about through intentional planning, but rather
through the spontaneous ordering (or self-organisation) that theoretically results from actions
of taken by individuals within that system. But what distinguishes social systems from
natural ones is that measures are frequently introduced that are intended to alter the overall
functioning of the system rather than simply the circumstances of each individual. This
means that rather than order exclusively emerging through actions taken by every individual
only looking out for their self-interests, societies can introduce actively designed measures
(like policies) intended to alter the entire system. While it is partly correct that emergence
and self-organisation do not preclude society from having intentionally designed elements,
only that whatever we do will have unintended consequences. It is nevertheless undeniable
that because of our capacity for intentional design, adaptation in a social system cannot
simply be about passively accepting changing conditions and making needed changes as
dictated by external inputs. Having a capacity for intentional design means that societies can
actively attempt to alter conditions to better suit our needs. Currently, resilience literature
mostly treats policies as tools used to allow societies to accommodate and adjust to changing
conditions. However, policies are not just instruments we use to change certain elements of
society. They are highly normative, reflecting our fundamental values and beliefs, and are
intended to shape society in a way that reflects these values to the furthest extent possible.
The implications of intentional design on the learning process are profound. While
learning can be a passive exercise driven by changing external conditions, it can also be an
active process that leads to measures being taken that actively reduce, or even neutralise, the
impact of external conditions. A clear example of passive and active learning is the different
views society holds of natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes on one hand, and
river flooding on the other. Passively adapting to earthquakes or hurricanes is feasible because
it is widely accepted that there is very little we can do to stop them, or minimise the risk of
them affecting societies. Therefore, purely pursuing mitigating measures and simply learning
to live with these disasters is acceptable policy. River flooding on the other hand, is not
widely viewed as unavoidable, and a passive policy approach that treats floods as inevitable
is unlikely to be accepted. In flooding, there is an expectation that policies at least partially
be designed to ensure that the risk of floods is minimised. Consequently, learning might not
necessarily mean learning to live with floods. It can equally likely mean learning how to
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manage water so as to avoid flooding altogether.
Simply put, intentional design is relevant because the recursive learning process envi-
sioned in much of resilience literature fails to recognise that the motivation – or raison d’etre
– of policies matter. The purpose of learning in policy implementation cannot be limited to
making better policies, the objective needs to be making policies that are better for society.
In essence, learning is not necessarily limited to a process of identifying "universally correct
solutions", but rather about finding "viable solutions" among a multitude of possibilities
(Yamori, 2008, 2011). Basically, a learning process that is sub-optimal, but feasible within
its political and social context, can oftentimes be preferable over an ideal learning process
that cannot be fully implemented.
3.2.2 How outside factors can influence the learning process
The idealised, rational, policy learning process depicted in resilience literature strongly
resembles the systematic design theory of policy formulation (Alexander, 1982). In sys-
tematic design, policy practitioners go through a deliberate search for different options to
generate and compare alternative interventions to find the best available choice (Linder and
Peters, 1985; Weiss, 1982). In such a scenario, policy changes would only come about as a
result of new knowledge being acquired that offer pertinent input for improving the existing
policy. But policy-making does not exist in a vacuum, and much of current criticisms against
systematic design point towards its tendency to isolate policy decisions from outside factors
(Hajer, 2003; Oliver and Lodge, 2003). Factors that can constrict learning include: differing
legal codes, cultural sentiments, and governing systems (Dolowitz, 2013); policy bias and
bureaucratic politics of involved authorities (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013; Pedersen, 2007); and
the economic and technical resources available to support policy programmes (Busenberg,
2001). Basically, even experimental policies are unlikely to begin with a clean slate. New
policy interventions have to exist in an established landscape of existing policies and political
interests (Kay, 2005) that cannot be ignored by practitioners.
Furthermore, political ideas (Dudley, 2003; Hall, 1993) and a “core-belief system”
(Sabatier, 1987) can be deeply important in shaping decisions and driving policy imple-
mentation. The normative convictions of stakeholders can be highly relevant across almost
all policy domains (Sabatier, 1999). They can put restrictions on the policy choices available
to practitioners since certain stakeholders might find some alternatives to be unappetising
by virtue of them being incompatible with their belief system. This is especially pertinent
to methods – such as adaptive management – that require stakeholders to learn, and change
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their perspectives throughout the course of programme implementation, since empirical
studies show that core policy beliefs tend to remain fairly constant over time (Eberg, 1997;
Van Est, 1999). It is entirely possible that if stakeholders’ core beliefs are not aligned at
the start of a policy programme, then what they learn from policy interventions could be
widely different. This is acknowledged in disaster management research for example, where
Kates (1962) found very early on that when given the same information, individuals will
still have dissimilar perceptions of hazard, and therefore also exhibit different behaviour.
Inded, he found that the likelihood of an individual taking action and responding to policy
interventions "is heightened by flood experience, and particularly either repetitive experience
or those entailing personal loos or effort" (Kates, 1962).
3.3 Overview of case studies
In 2009, as a response to one of the recommendations expressed in the Pitt Review of the
Summer 2007 floods (Pitt, 2007), Defra commissioned three Multi-Objective Flood Manage-
ment Demonstration Projects. These projects were intended to be highly experimental, with
little guidance provided by Defra for how implementation should go about or what the project
targets were. The project leads were therefore free to choose whatever means they deemed fit
as long as they could provide tangible evidence of how their measures impacted flood risks.
One requirement however, was that projects had to specifically demonstrate how working
with natural processes, using natural flood management (NFM) measures, and adopting a
partnership approach could contribute to reducing flood risk. NFM refers to specific FRM
techniques that are meant to work with natural hydrological and morphological processes,
rather than control them the way that engineered flood defences (dikes, flood-wall, levees
etc.) do. Examples of NFM techniques include river restoration, wetland enhancement,
alteration of riparian land etc.
These pilot projects are especially suitable for studying the feasibility of the learning
process envisioned in resilience literature because they fulfil several core criteria. They
are explicitly experimental, and are aimed at gathering hard evidence rather than achieving
specific targets, meaning the core objective is knowledge acquisition. They acknowledge the
importance of a holistic approach that emphasises working with natural processes. Finally,
they are partnership projects where measures are not dictated centrally, but are produced
through a collaborative effort between relevant stakeholders, which should theoretically lead
to more diverse sources of knowledge that help support decisions.
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Among a multitude of proposals submitted by various interested partners, the three chosen
project sites and partners were:
• “Making Space for Water Project” (Dark Peak, Derbyshire) - Moors for the Fu-
ture/Environment Agency
• “Source to Sea Project” (Holnicote, Somerset) - National Trust
• “Slowing the Flow Project” (Pickering, North Yorkshire) - Forest Research/Forestry
Commission
Only the Holnicote and Pickering projects will be used as case studies in this chapter
because the Dark Peak project was implemented at a much smaller scale than the other two,
with fewer measures implemented and fewer stakeholders involved (Pilkington et al., 2013).
This meant that potential learning from the Dark Peak project would have been more limited
than for the other two projects.
3.3.1 Holnicote
The “Source to Sea Project” comprises two study catchments, Horner Water and the Aller,
which are situated wholly within the Holnicote Estate owned by the National Trust (see
Figure 3.1). Project implementation at Holnicote took place between 2009 to 2015, with
an initial phase in 2009-11 constituting mostly modelling and scoping work to identify
appropriate sites to implement measures. The measures were implemented mainly in 2012-
13 and include: moorland drainage impedance, woody debris dams, woodland creation,
leaky weirs and offline flood storage areas. Almost all of the tenants living on the Holnicote
Estate reside in the downstream Aller catchment area, whereas most of the more intrusive
initiatives, such as woodland creation and woody debris dams, were implemented in the
upstream Horner Water catchment area. Since the project area is on the edge of Exmoor
National Park, and waterways flow directly down to the sea, relevant stakeholders are limited
to the Environment Agency (EA), the National Trust (NT), village residents in Allerford,
West Lynch, and Bossington, as well as tenant farmers.
3.3.2 Pickering
The “Slowing the Flow Project” includes the River Seven and Pickering Beck catchment
areas, which include the towns of Sinnington, Wrelton, and Pickering (see Figure 3.3). The
project took place between 2009 to 2015, with phase I taking place between 2009 - 2010,
and phase II from 2011 - 2015. The initial phase comprised mostly of modelling and scoping
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Fig. 3.1 Holnicote Project Area
Source: NT (2015)
Fig. 3.2 Flood Bund
Source: Landscape Institute
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Fig. 3.3 Pickering Project Area
Source: Forestry Commission
work, with limited work on planting woodland, building large woody debris (LWD) dams,
and blocking moorland drains. Much of the work in phase II was delayed due to funding
shortages, but the remaining work, including planting woodland and building a low-level
bund near Newbridge, roughly one mile upriver from the town of Pickering, was completed
in early 2015. A bund (Figure 3.2) in this case refers to a type of water retention area, much
like a reservoir, which allows water to flow through unimpeded under normal conditions,
but backs up at times of flooding, forcing the water to run into surrounding fields. Relevant
stakeholders either involved in or affected by the project include: Forest Research/Forestry
Commission (FC), the EA, North York Moors National Park Authority (NYMNPA), Ryedale
District Council (RDC), Pickering Town Council, local residents, and farmers.
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3.4 Method for case studies
The issues of scale and finding suitable definitions for what is meant by “local” (or “commu-
nity”) affect both the structure, and the findings of the study. The definition of “local” used
in this study is largely guided by the way in which FRM is structured in the UK, where the
lowest level of “granularity” is essentially at the county district level. Therefore, the local
population – or community – is defined as residents who live within Ryedale district. This is
obviously an imperfect definition since a single flood event can cross over multiple districts
for example. However, it has been chosen because of it being the lowest level of granularity
for policy implementation, and thus the most immediate level at which residents and local
populations can engage with policy makers and practitioners.
The aim of the case studies is to determine if a recursive learning process as envisioned
in resilience literature is feasible in a practical policy context. To do this, it is imperative
that learning is clearly defined, so that a set of structured questions can be devised to guide
the analysis that can help determine its practical feasibility. However, as has already been
mentioned, learning is conceptualised in multiple ways in resilience literature, and there is
no little coherence in the theoretical framework that can guide the formulation of relevant
questions. To account for this issue, I have borrowed a theoretical framework of learning
used in policy change literature in order to identify a set of descriptive properties for learning,
that I use to guide the line of enquiry. Using this set of properties (adapted to reflect learning
as conceptualised in resilience literature), I examine experimental FRM projects that have
been implemented in practice to determine whether a resilience approach to learning is
feasible for practical policy implementation. The core questions used to triangulate a suitable
definition for learning are mainly based on Bennett and Howlett (1992), and Grin and Loeber
(2007)’s set of questions for identifying various types of learning:
1. What are the subjects of learning (who learns)?
2. What are the objects of learning (what do they learn)?
3. What is learning supposed to contribute to (what is the objective)?
4. How does learning come about (drivers of learning)?
5. What constitutes learning (when has learning been achieved)?
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Properties of learning in resilience literature
By interpreting conceptual descriptions found in resilience literature, the descriptive proper-
ties that define learning are:
Table 3.1 Learning in resilience literature
Who learns Everyone involved, including practitioners, stakeholders, and institutions
What is learnt New knowledge useful for improving policy instruments
Objective of learning Knowledge acquisition that leads to policy change and adaptation
Drivers of learning Changing external conditions such as increasing frequency/magnitude
of natural disasters
What constitutes learning “True” learning is achieved when there is adaptation - meaning the
“policy paradigm” of how soceity understands a problem - shifts
In resilience literature, learning by individual practitioners is frequently analogous to or-
ganisational learning (Boyd, 2012). This is a strong assumption since it entails that whatever
new knowledge gained by individuals will be distributed to, and accepted by their colleagues,
and the organisations they work for. It is unclear to what extent new knowledge gained
by individuals is assimilated by others. In fact, Etheredge and Short (1983) identified that
learning can be done on the level of the individual, of a team, and of the collective whole.
Knowledge transfer between these different levels of stakeholders is not well understood
(Leeuw et al., 2000), and drawing an analogy between individual and organisational learning
is highly assumptive.
The questions of “what is learnt” and the objectives of learning are intertwined with
adaptation and the recursive process in resilience literature. This means the objective is for
society to adapt, and policy learning implies identifying the correct instruments and practices
that enable adaptation. As mentioned previously in section 3.1, this assumes that only new
relevant knowledge acquired during the implementation leads to changes in policy, and that
there is consensus on the necessity of these changes by all relevant stakeholders. These
assumptions are in contrast to current research into policy learning, where it is generally
agreed that policy programmes do not exist in isolation from the overall policy system, and
securing agreement between stakeholders is far from straightforward (Reber, 2007; Yamori,
2011).
Experimental - recursive - learning suggests that true adaptation to flooding necessitates
repeatedly exposing an area to flooding, thereby permitting continuous data monitoring and
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minor improvements on policy design. Learning, in the form of incremental improvements,
will contribute to better flood management practices and a more resilient/adaptive society.
Needless to say, communities at risk of flooding are highly unlikely to approve of measures
that require their homes to be periodically flooded, even if they are told that this might
improve their capacity to deal with flooding in the long run. Reactive learning and policy
change may indeed be feasible for dealing with most natural disasters, but it is also likely to
be impracticable in the field of FRM.
The emphasis in resilience literature on shifting the “policy paradigm” is highly ambitious,
since it is a very profound measure of learning that requires stakeholders to change their
“core beliefs” (Sabatier, 1999) of a problem. A way to understand the significance of this
requirement is to use Hall (1993)’s classification system, which has three forms of learning,
each one being more difficult to attain than the previous:
• First order learning – the most basic level where learning only affects specific settings
of basic policy instruments, for example adjusting the strength of levees and dams or
dredging rivers
• Second order learning – a more profound level of learning where the policy instruments
themselves change, for example switching to upstream water retention measures in
addition to (or in place of) dams and levees
• Third order learning – highest level of learning that leads to changes of the “policy
paradigm”, where rather than preventing flooding, the objective shifts to making
societies capable of living with flooding
Learning that leads to adaptation and shifts in the “policy paradigm” clearly necessitates
third order learning. However, there is currently little empirical evidence of deliberate policy
interventions succeeding in altering the core beliefs of targeted stakeholder groups. It would
therefore be relevant to question whether adaptation through recursive learning is a realistic
proposition given real world constraints.
Questions for the case studies
Taking into consideration the concerns outlined above, the analysis of the learning process
during the experimental project case studies will focus on answering the following questions:
1. Do actively involved stakeholders learn and gain new knowledge from project imple-
mentation?
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2. Is policy change only motivated by newly acquired knowledge? (E.g. outside factors
do not influence outcomes)
3. Do policies change as a result of knowledge gained from project interventions?
4. Is it feasible to have environmental conditions serve as the driving force behind policy
changes?
5. Has the project succeeded in fostering a “paradigm shift” in FRM in the case study
areas?
Data collection and sampling
Data for the case studies were taken from a combination of written reports and interviews
with relevant stakeholders, conducted in-person as well as over the phone. The review of
written reports is intended to provide a baseline understanding of the project specifications
that could inform pertinent questions to ask during the interviews. This allows the interviews
to focus on exploring the underlying motivations for various stakeholders, as well as contex-
tual factors (politics, finances etc.) that may have influenced project implementation. The
goal is to elicit better insight into whether these experimental projects could fulfil the criteria
of recursive learning, which in turn would hopefully provide clues regarding the feasibility
of the resilience approach.
The interviews were all conducted using a semi-structured (Bryman, 2004) format to
allow certain core questions to be answered, while allowing room for more exploratory
dialogue in order to gain insights that may not have previously been considered. They were
all held after completion of the pilot projects, in late 2016 and early 2017. The process of
selecting interview candidates was carried out using a snowball, or chain sampling, approach
where I initially browsed readily available policy documents and general media coverage,
identifying certain key individuals who were centrally involved in the projects. As I inter-
viewed these key individuals, I also asked each one to refer other individuals whose input
might be useful. The focus when selecting interview candidates was primarily on policy
practitioners and managers from Defra and the EA who are directly engaged with policy
implementation, either in a strategic or operational capacity. Some local stakeholders were
also interviewed to provide insights from the viewpoint of those that are affected by the
policies introduced in the pilot projects. A detailed list of relevant stakeholders that were
interviewed for each project can be found in Appendix A.
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Regarding the interpretation of the results from the interviews, it needs to be acknowl-
edged that establishing a strong degree of certainty can be challenging in qualitative research,
since reality is multi-dimensional and ever-changing, and finding objective phenomena (if
such a thing exists) is extremely difficult. Focussing on practitioners and managers directly
engaged with implementing policy obviously means that the results can only capture a
segment of the overall picture. The interviews do not give a full account of the perspectives
of other stakeholders such as local residents, academic researchers and other organisations
that were involved with the project. As such, the findings from this chapter should not be
interpreted as a complete representation of “reality”. I attempted to validate the replies given
by the interviewees from Defra and the EA by controlling that any information or opinion
is expressed by at least two individuals (preferably more), which is a common sampling
technique (Patton, 2005). This does not necessarily mean that the replies are wholly repre-
sentative of the two organisations however, or that the personal opinions of the interviewees
are completely filtered out. But it does at least remove replies that are wildly inaccurate.
With these limitations in mind, the interviews can still offer some useful insights since Defra
and the EA play such crucial roles in the FRM process. By identifying whether two core
FRM stakeholders in the UK encounter difficulties learning and changing according to inputs
and new knowledge gained the pilot projects, it may be possible to glean insights into the
feasibility of learning through experimentation.
3.5 Results and analysis of case study interviews
A summary of the core information gathered from the interviews can be found in Table 3.2.
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3.5.1 Holnicote
1. Do actively involved stakeholders learn and gain new knowledge from project implemen-
tation?
The interviews indicate that all three major stakeholders – Defra, the EA, and the NT –
have gained new knowledge, although this is less certain for the NT since only one individual
representing them was interviewed. While it appears that all three major stakeholders learned
from the pilot project, they do not necessarily agree on how this new knowledge should be
interpreted. For the NT, the key lesson learnt was that “Holnicote showed [the NT] what can
be achieved with very little money by simply working with nature”, and the insights gained
during project implementation have been diffused throughout the organisation through the
Land Choices programme. Knowledge acquisition at the EA and Defra on the other hand,
have been more nuanced. Even though all the interviewees acknowledged that the findings
from the project are promising, noting that “[Defra] sees NFM as an important part of [their]
strategy to protect the country from flooding”, both EA and Defra representatives were cau-
tious about not over-interpreting the results. One interviewee noted that there is wide-spread
appreciation within the EA that the project did have an impact on reducing peak flood flow
during the 2013/14 winter floods, and that NFM can make “contributions to reducing flood
risk”. However, they were unsure whether these natural measures would be effective under
all circumstances since “[the EA] only have rough estimates for how much the measures
helped” reduce peak flood flow, because of the unpredictability of water flow and run-off.
The sentiments expressed is that NFM “represents an extra element that can help slow down
the flow of water to key locations”, and is seen as complementary to conventional flood
defences. The reason for the cautious approach is that there is some lingering doubt whether
similar initiatives would be able to “deliver the numbers”, in, for example, the number of
properties protected, that traditional “big flood defences” can provide. One important issue
stressed by both EA and Defra officials is that “it’s just not possible to stop all flooding”,
and FRM is not simply a matter of choosing the most appropriate instrument, but is also
determined by “how much money ministers are willing to spend”.
2. Is policy change only motivated by newly acquired knowledge? (E.g. outside factors
do not influence outcomes)
Information from Defra suggests that this might not be the case. When the Holnicote
project was first conceived in 2009, Defra viewed it as an experiment for testing NFM
measures, where they wanted to see whether it can “deliver more benefits than just reducing
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flood risk, such as improving water quality and preventing soil erosion”. However, in 2011
the Government published a Natural Environment White Paper titled The Natural Choice:
securing the value of nature. This led Defra to set up a research fund intended to support
pilot schemes exploring the feasibility of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)1, specif-
ically how they can provide new sources of funding (Rogers et al., 2015). The Holnicote
initiative was selected as one of the projects included in the third round of pilot studies
(2014-2015) funded by the scheme. For Defra, using Holnicote as one of the pilot studies
was primarily driven by a desire to explore how useful PES can be for making NFM projects
“self-sustaining” by providing “its own source of funding”. Thus, Defra came to view the Hol-
nicote project not just as an experimental initiative exploring the viability of NFM measures,
but also as a test-case for finding alternative sources of funding that can help support a variety
of activities. The slight shift in focus on the part of Defra was motivated by the fact that
“flood management is only one of [Defra’s] responsibilities, and [Defra] saw an opportunity
to explore if [PES] could free up resources for other areas”. As such, Defra’s engagement
with the Holnicote project came to be defined as much by budget pressures and the search for
alternative funding sources, as the original objective of testing the viability of NFM measures.
3. Do policies change as a result of knowledge gained from project interventions?
It is unclear to what extent FRM policies have been affected by the Holnicote project.
This is in part because Pickering is by far the more widely recognised initiative of the three
Multi-Objective Flood Management Demonstration Projects, and therefore any changes
in national policies would most likely be attributed to the Pickering project. Also, as is
evident from the responses by the interviewees to the first question, there is a desire not to
prematurely change policies based on a limited sample of projects. The Holnicote project
has however, seemingly led to policy changes at the NT, where it “inspired a deeper ap-
preciation for the potential of ecosystem services”, and is regarded as a key catalyst for
the Land Choices programme. Land Choices is meant to change the way the NT manages
its land by adopting an ecosystems approach in order to better balance its aspirations of
landscape, wildlife, and architectural preservation. The “[NT] was interested in a wide range
of benefits from the outset” of the project, and the hope is that PES can be a feasible means
of generating income by “making public enjoyment a financially viable function” of land
the NT manages. To this end, the NT has partnered with the Green Alliance to develop the
1Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are market-based mechanisms intended to foster greater natural
resource conservation. They are incentives, usually in the form of conditional payments, offered to farmers
or landowners in exchange for managing their land to provide some sort of ecological service that benefit
communities.
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concept of Natural Infrastructure Schemes in order to explore the market potential for land
and nature that will be used to support its Land Choices initiatives (Rogers et al., 2015).
Furthermore, in 2015 the NT and the EA formed the Catchments in Trust strategic partnership
for developing catchment scale projects within NT land across England to further explore
synergistic opportunities between NFM and conservation goals (NT, 2015).
One interesting issue that came up during the interviews is how organisational structure
can affect learning. One interviewee mentioned that a potential issue that might have affected
the efficacy of the NRM initiatives implemented at Holnicote are river maintenance activities
above the Horner and Aller Catchment areas (where the pilot project was implemented).
“At one point during the project, we found out that some contractors were
undertaking river dredging activities in the areas upriver of the pilot project sites.
This could have undermined our efforts since it could have resulted in greater
flows downstream before the project initiatives had been put in place. . . It turned
out that they had been contracted by our local Operations team in the [Wessex
region]2 to carry out dredging on [the EA’s] behalf. Those of us involved in [the
pilot project] are part of the FCRM Allocation and Asset Management team, so
we were not aware of this until it was almost too late.”
The above quote suggests that the distinction between individual learning and organi-
sational learning may be highly pertinent. The lack of co-ordination and communications
hints at a siloed structure at the EA that raises the question of whether learning done by
an individual, or even a group, necessarily leads to overall policy change. In the case of
Holnicote for example, it is unclear whether the learning done by the FCRM team is mirrored
by the Operations team, and it is therefore unclear to what extent the EA – as an organisation
– has learnt from the pilot project.
4. Is it feasible to have environmental conditions serve as the driving force behind policy
changes?
None of the stakeholders interviewed see exposure to flooding as a feasible option of
gaining new knowledge to inform future policy choices. Interviewees at EA and Defra were
primarily concerned about the legal implications of such an approach and pointed out that,
even if it would be useful for gaining new knowledge, “[they] could probably not legally
2The EA underwent some organisational changes in April 2014, and as a result its regional offices changed
names. At the time of the pilot project, the Wessex region was referred to as the South West region
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conduct such an experiment” since they have statutory obligations under the Flood and Water
Management Act 2010 to prevent flooding and reduce flood risk. It was mentioned that to
implement an experimental initiative that allows areas to be flooded would require “a lot of
Government Acts to be temporarily suspended”, which they did not see as practicable. Also,
they pointed out that “it’s not even certain that these experiments would give conclusive
results”, which makes it extremely difficult to get any kind of support from “regular people”
and affected communities. One interviewee at the EA also mentioned that it would be “politi-
cally disastrous” for a minister to approve such an approach, and they would almost certainly
not be allowed to carry out such policies even if they thought there were potentially beneficial
outcomes. The NT’s objections meanwhile are more financially motivated. The Trust is
responsible for property insurance on their estates, and a policy of deliberately exposing them
to floods would have “dire consequences on [their] insurance costs”. Also, the Holnicote
estate is reliant on tourism as a significant source of income. Repeated flooding on the estate
would be “unnecessarily self-destructive” since it would likely diminish visitor numbers,
making them unable to fund other works they are obligated to carry out.
5. Has the project succeeded in fostering a paradigm shift in FRM?
Of the institutions involved, the strongest case for a policy paradigm shift appears to be
at the NT. The initial positive results from the Holnicote project in limiting flooding during
the 2013/14 Winter floods have been a key driver behind the organisation’s shift towards
emphasising catchment-wide initiatives and more diverse land management practices, as
proven by the new Land Choices and the Catchments in Trust partnership programmes.
However, it could be argued that these changes are more in line with Hall (1993)’s concept of
Second Order Learning rather than a true paradigm shift (i.e. Third Order Learning). While
the NT has indeed started emphasising the importance of NFM, this does not necessarily
deviate much from their overall organisational objectives since the NT has always had a
statutory obligation for landscape conservation. Thus, the true shift can be found in the
NT’s strategic approach towards funding its initiatives. For example, tenanted farmland
has traditionally been viewed as productive land that provides rental income that is used to
support the NT’s wider works (NT, 2015). The Holnicote project “inspired a partial rethink
[within the NT] of how land is managed”, and they are currently exploring whether providing
“public enjoyment” by expanding the water, wildlife, and landscape functions of the land, can
be as viable as productive farmland through for example PES schemes.
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While the interviewees from both the EA and Defra found the results of the Holnicote pilot
project to be promising, they still expressed some lingering skepticism regarding the viability
of NFM. The two primary concerns expressed during the interviews were the capability of
NFM measures to “deliver the numbers”, and the issue of how they can be “scaled up” for
larger geographic areas. The EA mainly seems to see its task as “using whatever resources
[they] have to provide as much flood protection as possible”, and while the interviewees
expressed optimism about the cost-effectiveness of NFM measures, they do not see the
project outcomes precipitating wider changes to FRM policies since there is still too much
“that [they] don’t know about the effectiveness of natural measures”. The Defra interviewees
meanwhile, were cautious about how pilot initiatives such as the one at Holnicote can be
scaled up to larger geographic areas. Since NFM relies on the interaction between various
natural processes (varying soil retention levels, water flowing through woodland, wetlands
etc.), the “level of planning and co-ordination required” to work across larger geographic
scales is “incredibly difficult” to achieve. This requires co-operation between Government
Departments (since transport, energy, and other sectors might be affected) as well as local
governments and other interested parties. They did not see a straightforward way to make all
the pieces fit together since “too many people are involved to make it a realistic option” in
comparison to traditional flood defences.
3.5.2 Pickering
1. Do actively involved stakeholders learn and gain new knowledge from project implemen-
tation?
Most interviewees in the case study represent either Defra or the EA, with three repre-
sentatives from the RDC, and one representative from the NYMNPA, the FC, and a local
community group respectively. As such, insights from the interviews will largely be focussed
on learning from the perspective of Defra, the EA, and the RDC. Like the findings from
Holnicote, the stakeholders have interpreted the project results differently, which could partly
be attributable to differences in their problem definition and motivation for participating in
the project. Since Pickering, like Holnicote, is one of three pilot projects funded under the
Multi-Objective Flood Management Demonstration Projects scheme, the knowledge gained
and lessons learnt by the EA and Defra are very similar for both projects. Interviewees from
both major stakeholders view the project outcomes as promising, noting that the measures
“made an effective contribution to reducing flood risk”, and see NFM measures similar to
those introduced in Pickering as possible future alternatives to be introduced in “low priority
areas” where more traditional flood defences are not cost-effective. Interviewees at Defra
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also expressed optimism towards the multi-objective elements of the project in that NFM
measures are viewed as “an effective way for [Defra] to meet multiple organisational objec-
tives” (such as habitat protection, water quality, ecosystem conservation etc.), which is not as
easily achieved with traditional flood defences. Their view is that as long as NFM measures
can provide “acceptable reductions in flood flow” that leads to lower flood risks, then the
ability to target multiple objectives would be of great value under specific circumstances.
Representatives from Ryedale District Council (RDC) were particularly pleased with
the project outcomes since the building of low-level bunds at Newbridge seemed to prove
effective in preventing flooding during the 2015/16 winter floods by reducing “peak flood
flow by up to 20%”. The RDC had originally vociferously supported more traditional flood
defence measures around Pickering since the town has a history of flooding (most recently
in 1999, 2000, 2002 and 2007) (Nisbet et al., 2015). When a cost-benefit analysis carried
out by the EA indicated that solid flood defences would be too costly, the “[RDC] had to
grudgingly accept that the [pilot project] was the only option left if [they] wanted any action
to be taken at all”. To have their “second choice” option achieve comparable results to
costlier alternatives was the deciding factor in accepting NFM as a viable option, and as one
interviewee put it: “[the project] has given evidence that there are alternative cost-effective
methods of protecting the area from flooding, other than just concrete walls”. However, the
RDC had three environmental managers in charge of co-ordinating with the pilot project
since its conception. During the interviews it was made evident that the turnover has had an
impact on knowledge transfer within the local authority. While the manager involved at the
planning stages of the project was familiar with all aspects of it, currently the RDC seems to
view the building of the Newbridge bund as the primary outcome of the pilot project. While
aware of the woodland planting, and building of wood debris dams, they do not associate it
with the objectives of the Pickering pilot project.
The two interviewees representing the NYMNPA and FC expressed that both organisa-
tions had similar goals for the project, which included water quality improvements, reducing
sediment loading, and improving ecological status and habitats (Nisbet et al., 2011). While
the NYMNPA have been largely happy with the outcomes, the FC was unable to meet
its woodland planting targets due to significant objections from local communities, many
of whom were “upset and strongly protested against any changes to the ‘iconic”’ moors
landscape. This has meant that it will be much more difficult to determine the efficacy
of woodlands as water retention mechanisms since the most sensitive parts of the project
catchment were discounted. Interestingly, the interviewee from the FC mentioned that one
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of the main lessons from project implementation was not of a technical nature, but rather
how influential past experiences can be for how the local community perceived the project.
Historical woodland planting in the National Park area (post-war through 1970s) had largely
been aimed at timber production, and most of the trees were not native species, which had
negative consequences for wildlife and landscape preservation efforts. One interviewee from
the FC speculated that “the ill-conceived efforts from the 1970s probably gave woodland
planting a bad connotation” for the local population in Pickering, and these experiences have
left them largely skeptical of the merits of such measures, which impeded the FC’s efforts for
the Pickering project despite modern woodland planting initiatives having “a much deeper
understanding of the need to balance various needs”.
2. Is policy change only motivated by newly acquired knowledge? (E.g. outside factors
do not influence outcomes)
Interviewees from the EA and FC were in agreement that one of the most difficult
challenges of the project was ensuring that local stakeholders remained interested and
engaged in the implementation. The delay of building the low-level bund at Newbridge
to 2014 posed a significant threat to the continuation of the project, because the RDC had
pledged a considerable amount of funding for its construction. Ensuring that this local
financing – which was essential for building the bund – remained available, became the most
important task for the project co-ordinators. One interviewee explained that:
“because the [Newbridge] bund is so big, construction couldn’t begin until
we obtained planning permission under the Reservoirs Act 1975 to ensure that
people’s lives would not be put at risk if the bund failed... this process usually
takes a long time and [meanwhile] a number of people in the local council felt
that the £950,000 they had pledged during phase I of the project would be better
spent elsewhere rather than just being kept aside... without the local financing
then the bund probably wouldn’t have been built, so I spent a considerable
amount of time simply making sure that the local funding would still be available
once [the bund] plans were approved”
Applications for permission to build the bund were submitted early 2011. At that point,
the total cost was expected to be £1.15m, with Ryedale contributing £950,000, the Yorkshire
Regional Flood and Coastal Committee (RFCC) providing £150,000, and the EA adding
£50,000 (Nisbet et al., 2011). By the time construction of the bund finally started in January
2014, the estimated cost had risen to £3.2m. While project co-ordinators had succeeded in
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ensuring that the funding from local authorities remained available, the extra costs resulted in
a steep shortfall of project financing. In the end, the missing funding was secured through a
combination of grant-in-aid3 provided by Defra and EA, as well as partnership funding made
available to the North Yorkshire County Council. Essentially, even if flooding is an important
issue in the area, there are also other matters that require the attention of the RDC. If the
funds had been spent elsewhere, then it is unlikely that the project would have proceeded. In
this case, its discontinuation would not have resulted from any new knowledge or information
gained through project implementation.
Interestingly, it became evident through interviews with Defra and EA officials that a key
individual involved in securing the additional funding for the bund was Baroness Macintosh,
then Chair of the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee.
She, in her capacity as the MP for Thirsk and Malton (the parliamentary constituency of
which Pickering is part of), had taken personal interest in ensuring that the Newbridge bund
was built. She had in fact been “highly vocal in her demands for the Pickering area to have
suitable flood defences after the latest flooding in 2007”, and was initially “not entirely
smitten” with the unfavourable outcome of the EA’s cost-benefit analysis. She became more
favourable to the project however, when told that “modelling suggested the bund would
reduce the risk of flooding in Pickering from 25% to 4%” in any one year. The interviewees
at the EA and Defra were in agreement that without the influence exerted by Baroness
Macintosh in securing “extra funding from the Government to supplement the additional
funds that the [North Yorkshire] County Council had pledged”, the completion of the project
would have been in doubt. In this case, the political influence of one individual seemingly
played a crucial role in achieving project objectives.
3. Do policies change as a result of knowledge gained from project interventions?
There is some evidence that the Pickering project has had greater success in influencing
policies than the Holnicote project. The interviewee from the FC suggested that the project
has “had an impact on how [it] shape[s] [its] water management initiatives” under the English
Woodland Grant Scheme, and the Countryside Stewardship Scheme. It has also been used as
inspiration for experimental NFM elements of the Derwent Catchment Strategic Plan and
the Cumbria Floods Partnership. Furthermore, in Defra’s Funding for Flood and Coastal
Erosion Risk Management report for 2016/2017, Pickering is mentioned as an example of
3Grant-in-Aid is funding that Defra provides to the EA for funding high priority investments. The EA is
able to pass on some grants to Local Authorities dependent on the public benefit that specific projects can
provide. The specific funding structure is outlined in Figure 3.4
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catchment-wide measures. Also, the Government has taken to using the expression “slowing
the flow” (the project title used for Pickering) as synonymous with NFM (EFRA, 2016).
When asked why the Pickering project has had more far-reaching impact on policies than
the other Demonstration Projects in Holnicote and Derbyshire, despite positive outcomes at
all three locations, the common response given was the influence of media coverage. The
Pickering project has received significant attention in national media discourse, where both
The Guardian and Independent newspapers have featured articles about the project. Sky
News and BBC TV News also featured it in their programming, and BBC 1’s Bang Goes the
Theory ran a full episode programme about the Pickering project as well. While it is clear that
the positive results, including preventing Pickering from flooding during the 2015/16 floods,
are the reason why the project has received so much media attention, its disproportionate
policy impact in comparison with the other two Demonstration Projects does raise interesting
questions about how much of the influence is actually attributable to the knowledge gained
through project implementation.
4. Is it feasible to have environmental conditions serve as the driving force behind policy
changes?
Similar to the opinions expressed by the interviewees for the Holnicote project, no
interviewee thought that reactive adaptation through exposure to flooding is a realistic policy
option. Aside from the same legal and political concerns mentioned before, representatives
from the RDC also pointed out that such initiatives would simply be too costly. Changing the
appearance/landscape of the town is not an option since the local economy is highly dependent
on tourism, and therefore the overall aesthetic of the area is highly important. Similar to the
Holnicote Estate, there was fear that repeated flooding would likely diminish visitor numbers,
which would have economic consequences for the local area. These sentiments can best be
summarised by the following quote from one interviewee:
“if by ‘accommodate for flooding’ you mean changing the infrastructure and
how the town looks, then I don’t think that is good policy. I don’t see how we
could get residents to agree to it... even if we could get residents to agree, it
would probably be bad for the local economy. Visitors to the North York Moors
National Park are one of the town’s main sources of income, and they stay here
because they like the rustic, market-town feel. I don’t think it would be worth it
to risk losing visitors by changing things”
Lastly, the interviewee from the FC mentioned that NFM measures might be different
in that the focus is on water retention and slowing down water flow, rather than “funneling
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water away” like in traditional flood defences, “the goal is still to prevent properties from
being flooded”. Hence, deliberately allowing flooding to happen would be “incoherent with
the purpose of using pilot projects to examine the effectiveness of natural measures”.
5. Has the project succeeded in fostering a paradigm shift in FRM?
As mentioned briefly above, the RDC seems to have indeed become more favourable to
“soft” FRM measures following the perceived effectiveness of the Newbridge bund during
the 2015/16 Winter floods.
But at least in Ryedale, the sentiment expressed during the interviews is that the greater
responsibility in FRM assumed by local authorities starting in 2011 was also critical to a
change in mindset. One interviewee from the RDC indicated that:
“we already knew from the failed cost-benefit analysis that the EA did in
2007 that there was little chance the Government would pay for flood defences
for the town, and the changes in 2011 made it even less likely. Our thinking
for phase II [of the Pickering pilot project] was that we had been given more
responsibility, but not more money, so going ahead [with the project] became
necessary because we would be left with nothing otherwise. With the new
Partnership Funding4 structure, measures like the [Newbridge] bund would be
the only affordable thing available”
Since the English flood funding structure changed in 2011 as a result of the Flood and
Water Management Act 2010 and the Localism Act 2011, the need for bespoke local flood
management arrangements have increased. The new funding structure (see Figure 3.4)
meant that the only reliable source of funding for Ryedale became the Settlement Funding
Assessment (SFA) and Local Service Support Grant (LSSG) paid to North Yorkshire County
Council (NYCC) as Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA), which would need to be shared
with other districts within NYCC, or via the Partnership Funding scheme. More specifically,
under the current funding structure, it is in Ryedale’s (and North Yorkshire’s) interest to
focus their efforts on securing less expensive NFM measures, since the area’s low population
density means that it is a low priority area, and would not be eligible for more expensive
4The Flood and Coastal Resilience Partnership Funding scheme allows FRM projects to claim limited
funding from the Government, but mainly expects funding to come from external sources such as local councils
and businesses. The idea behind this scheme is to encourage communities to take ownership, and manage their
own defences, which is said to help increase local involvement
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flood defence measures.
Fig. 3.4 FRM funding structure in England.
Source: CIWEM (2015)
Furthermore, the increased FRM responsibilities for local authorities can entail significant
difficulties for them, since they do not necessarily hold the required technical expertise that
EA staff have. The issue of relevant technical knowledge is summarised by one of the RDC
managers interviewed:
“Flood management is only one of my responsibilities. I also have to handle
other matters such as waste disposal, food safety, air quality and so on. Flooding
is obviously important for the area, but I’m no expert on [the topic].”
Essentially, while it is true that the RDC views NFM much more favourably following the
Pickering pilot project, they do not necessarily view it as a direct replacement for traditional
flood defences. They are also unlikely to be in a position to have opted for alternative
solutions, since the changing FRM structure in England means that such initiatives would
require significantly more local funding and technical capacity than at least the RDC currently
possesses.
It is unclear whether a paradigm shift has taken place within the FC, partly because
most of the woodland planting initiatives were not carried out, and the project provided
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little conclusive evidence about the effectiveness of such measures. Also, because only
one individual from the FC was interviewed, it is not possible to gauge the extent to which
the entire organisation has learned from the pilot project. The interviewee did however,
express optimism about the potential of LWD dams for flood management purposes, and
indicated that similar initiatives would be implemented elsewhere, particularly in the Derwent
Catchment area.
Finally, the EA and Defra expressed largely similar sentiments as for the Holnicote
project. The interviewees do not see the pilot projects as harkening any paradigm shifts in
FRM practices. In fact, based on the replies from the interviews, it would appear that the
projects were seen more as means of testing unproven methods, rather than exploring entirely
new ways of conducting FRM. For example, one interviewee from the EA involved with
implementing the Pickering project stated that:
“we approached the project with quite clear ideas of what tangible results
we wanted, which was to find out if [NFM] can be successful at preventing
flooding. It was about seeing if we could add to our management toolkit rather
than changing the way we conduct our work”
Concerning the issue of scale, some interviewees from the EA mentioned the ongoing
Derwent Catchment plans and Cumbria Floods Partnership as wider projects that can test
the effectiveness of NFM measures. They believe that successful implementation in these
larger projects would be a significant step towards alleviating some of the concerns about
the viability of NFM measures. However, they were also cautious about what results could
be deduced from these larger scale initiatives because it’s unclear “how modelling all the
processes can be done in practice”, and whether it would be possible to “isolate the effects of
the measures” from other natural processes at larger scales.
3.5.3 Other findings
There is general agreement among the interviewees that NFM can be effective for reducing
flood risks. Following an analysis conducted by the Environment Agency after the 2015/16
floods, those involved in project implementation at Pickering concluded that “some flooding
was avoided”, and the measures appeared to be “working as expected, and reduced peak flood
flow by up to 20%”. There is however disagreement as to the extent of their effectiveness,
with specific concerns regarding their capacity to “deliver the numbers” and efficacy across
larger geographical scales. Regarding the Pickering project for example, all interviewees from
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Defra and the EA generally agreed that the “measures installed have their limits” and would
be insufficient to “prevent flooding of a similar scale as 2007”. One interesting observation
pertaining to the issue of scale is that some interviewees, particularly from Defra and the EA,
consider land ownership to be equally important as the need to collect more detailed scientific
data on NFM. In fact, one interviewee from Defra acknowledged that: “the straightforward
ownership situation was a determining factor” for the approval of Holnicote and Pickering as
pilot project locations under the Multi-Objective Flood Management Demonstration Project
programme. The entire Holnicote Estate in which project works were carried out are under
the single ownership of the National Trust for example. While the land upstream of Pickering
Town has three primary landowners, the FC, the NYMNPA, and the Duchy of Lancaster
Estates. The interviewees from Defra and the EA expressed some skepticism regarding
whether similar NFM initiatives would be possible in areas with a more fragmented land
ownership structure.
One instance from the Pickering case study that seems to point toward the influence that
land ownership can have on the practicability of NFM measures, is how local farmers and
land owners responded to the initiative. Overall, there is consensus among the interviewees
that the local community has generally been pleased with the project outcomes and have
adopted a more favourable attitude towards NFM measures. However, there appears to be
some discrepancy between how town residents and land owners have reacted to the pilot
project, which might be due to financial reasons. For town residents, implementing NFM
initiatives incurs no extra costs, and they need only consider whether measures are effective
at flood management or not. For land owners and farmers on the other hand, initiatives such
as woodland planting or farm-scale improvement measures could incur a loss of income. An
example of their reluctance is that, of the six floodplain land owners that were canvassed
for their willingness to plant woodland, only two expressed interest, neither of whom ended
up agreeing to the arrangement. One interviewee mentioned that the two land owners who
initially expressed interest, but later declined to proceed, most likely did so because “they lost
all incentive to participate” in the project when possible compensation for loss of income was
reduced from £4598/ha to £2299/ha (NWRM, 2013) as a result of the closure of the Regional
Development Agency (Yorkshire Forward). Additionally, only 12 farmers signed up - and
received grants - for farm-scale improvement measures proposed by the project. To illustrate
the low uptake among local farmers, according to the latest figures from Defras Common
Agricultural Payments (CAP) database, 287 farmers in the River Seven and Pickering Beck
area (where the project is situated) received some payment for activities on their land. One
interviewee from the EA, who was a member of the Programme Delivery Group, noted that
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they “made a number of farm visits and set up multiple workshops, but very few people
showed up” to these sessions. Another interviewee from the EA mentioned that “some
farmers thought initiatives should be done within the national park since it is upriver from
their land, and effective measures there meant that [farm-scale] initiatives would not be
needed”. The difficulty in engaging land owners is in line with experiences from similar
initiatives, where resistance to these measures can be attributed to insufficient payments, loss
of income, and perceived reductions in capital value of the land (Nisbet and Huw, 2008).
Resistance among farmers on the Holnicote estate was minimal compared with the expe-
riences in Pickering (NT, 2015). The main contributing factor is likely that the Holnicote
project has a locally-based project manager - Nigel Hester - who knows all 14 tenanted
farmers on a personal basis, which led to good communication and involvement. With this in
mind, it is also likely that the low number of individuals and the land ownership situtation
also played a role. As the sole land owner, the National Trust is wholly in charge of insuring
properties and maintaining necessary flood defences. Therefore, the tenanted farmers did
not have to secure their own insurance, or pay for flood defence measures, which could have
been an additional contributing factor to their favourable attitude towards the Holnicote pilot
project.
Another issue that proved to be important to the pilot projects that receives little attention
in resilience literature is the effect that forced-choice mechanisms (Lodge and Hood, 2002)
have on policy choice. Empirical literature in policy learning have shown that public opinion,
party politics, and media discourse can have an inordinate effect on policy choices (Bohensky
and Leitch, 2014; Cairney, 2009). An example of forced-choice mechanisms at play is the
2013/14 winter flooding at the Somerset Levels, which interviewees from both the EA and
Defra agreed was essentially a “media flood”, where the discourse centred around political
considerations rather than any “real policy failures”. In the words of one interviewee:
“[the media] kept obsessing about dredging, but it wouldn’t have made any
difference [in the Somerset levels]. The area is below sea level, and when there
is heavy rainfall there is nowhere for the water to go. Dredging wouldn’t have
helped”
Indeed, despite receiving much of the national attention, the Somerset Levels comprised
only roughly 150-200 of the more than 6000 total flooded properties during the 2013/14
winter floods (Purseglove, 2015). In response to the public outcry over the inundated areas,
the Coalition Government, which had reduced FRM funding since it came to power in
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Fig. 3.5 Total FCERM Funding 2005/06 to 2014/15 (£m)
Source: CIWEM (2015)
2010, promptly pledged an extra £200m in FRM funding (see Figure 3.5), including more
than £20m set aside for river dredging, the favoured water management method amongst
residents in the Somerset Levels (Webster et al., 2014). One interviewee observed that it is
probably “not a coincidence that they miraculously found” extra funds that had hitherto been
unavailable. The Somerset Levels experience lends credence to the theory that forced-choice
mechanisms can indeed play a significant role as a driver for policy change by limiting the
options available for policy-makers.
3.5.4 Synthesis and further remarks
Findings from studying both the Holnicote and Pickering pilot projects seem to support
Sabatier (1999)’s theory that what is learnt during policy implementation is affected by
what the stakeholders’ original problem definition is. Experimentation and learning, as
envisioned in resilience, might be possible, but stakeholders’ learning can also be determined
by their motivations for engaging in the first place. Organisational goals and objectives can
be influential factors in how stakeholders perceive the problem definition of experimental
policies, and also act as guideposts for what they actually learn. One issue identified in these
case studies that is infrequently mentioned in resilience literature is the role that money plays
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in directing policy choices, and thereby affect policy change. The main source of lingering
skepticism within the EA and Defra for example, are doubts of whether NFM initiatives are
able to “deliver the numbers”, in terms of number of properties protected, that would justify
significant investments. The interviews also suggest that the engagement from the EA and
Defra was partly motivated by the desire to find cost-effective solutions of fulfilling their
statutory obligations, and maintain acceptable levels of flood protection given increasing
budget pressures. Evidence of acceptance of NFM measures by local stakeholders mean-
while, appears to be equivocal, with an influential factor being whether any financial costs
are incurred. Interviewees from the RDC are content that their “second choice” option was
effective in preventing flooding during the 2015/16 winter floods. Based on the interviewees’
accounts, it seems that local farmers and landowners are less supportive since many measures
could potentially result in a loss of income for them. These differences hint at what Anbarci
et al. (2005) have suggested is a major hurdle to policy change, namely that various groups
cannot settle on what “all parties perceive to be an agreeable distribution of the burden of the
necessary collective action”. Basically, the interviews suggest that policy change through
experimentation is not necessarily a straightforward process, and involves significantly more
political consideration than is acknowledged in existing conceptualisations of learning in
resilience literature
Another key finding from the case studies is that knowledge acquisition is not necessarily
the primary driver for policy change, even though it does seem to lead to stakeholder learn-
ing. Evidence from the interviews suggests that the overall policy context can be equally
influential as the knowledge gained during the policy implementation process. For example,
it is clear that all interviewees learned something from the “Slowing the Flow” project in
Pickering. However, their motivation for accepting the use of NFM measures is also driven
by external factors. The responses given in the interviews suggest that neither the EA nor
RDC have changed their fundamental opinions that traditional flood defence measures would
have provided the town with better flood protection. However, the changes in the national
FRM and funding structure brought on by the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 and
Localism Act 2011, and the increasing budget pressures put on the EA, led them to engage in
a mutual sense-making of the new policy landscape. The favourable view of NFM is partly a
reflection of these contextual changes that have affected both stakeholders, and the interviews
suggest that they have adopted NFM principles as a suitable means of meeting policy ob-
jectives. This is not to suggest that the knowledge acquired through project implementation
has not influenced policies, evidence from Holnicote and Pickering clearly indicate that they
have. The issues of budget pressure and Localism simply serve to emphasise that policies
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do not exist in a vacuum, and the larger political environment as well as the greater policy
context do play a role in the uptake of specific policy measures.
Additionally, findings from the interviews suggest that external factors, in particular
forced-choice situations, can also exert considerable influence on policy change. An example
of this is the “media-flood” in the Somerset Levels during the 2013/14 winter floods, where
sustained media coverage seemingly led to the Government to reverse course on funding
cuts to FRM (at least in the short-term). Another example of external factors driving policy
change is the political influence exerted by certain individuals. One notable instance of
individual political influence is that despite the positive results and lessons-learnt from phase
1 of the “Slowing the Flow” project, the extra funding needed in order to proceed with phase
2 (and the construction of the low-level bund at Newbridge) was secured in large part due
to the involvement of the Baroness Macintosh. Basically, both the influences of political
considerations, and outside factors (such as the media or new legislation) are likely to be
more substantial determinants of policy change than is currently acknowledged by those who
envision an experimental learning process for enhancing resilience.
Furthermore, an important matter that is left largely untreated in the resilience through
experimental learning literature, is that in a policy context, knowledge acquisition and learn-
ing does not necessarily lead to knowledge transfer. One example that illustrates the problem
of transferability, is the concern expressed by interviewees from the EA and Defra that NFM
measures similar to those from the pilot projects may not be implementable at larger scales, or
in locations with more fragmented land ownership structures. Given that the Government has
pledged continued funding for NFM measures in England, it would be interesting to explore
the extent to which initiatives like the ones in Holnicote and Pickering can be successfully
transferred to different contexts. Empirical studies from other policy fields suggest that policy
transfer can be very complex with equivocal results (Dolowitz, 2013; Oliver and Lodge,
2003). It would be interesting to see if the transfer of NFM measures can be successful
transferred and exceed the expectations of the EA and Defra.
In conclusion, the findings from the case study interviews suggest that policy learning in
a practical context bears little resemblance to the rational, experimental process envisioned
in SES literature. While experimental projects can indeed lead to knowledge acquisition and
stakeholder learning, evidence from the case studies suggest that their ability to impact and
change policies is ambiguous. Importantly, the influence of outside factors, and the effect that
the intents and motivations of various stakeholders, can be crucial factors that either drive (or
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prevent) policy change. It would therefore appear that a procedural process whereby policies
change through recursive experimentation and knowledge acquisition is not a particularly
feasible method, and thus offers equivocal added value for practical policy-making. Also,
the finding about how motivations can determine what individual stakeholders learn from
a project is particularly interesting, because resilience literature puts specific emphasis on
the importance of collaborative and participatory methods for engendering collective “social
learning” (Folke, 2006; Mees et al., 2016) that leads to more effective policies. If stakeholders
do indeed learn selectively from a project, based largely on their original motivations for
participating, then the ability to achieve collective “social learning” through participatory
approaches may be questionable. The issue of what added value participatory methods can




A corollary to learning through experimentation is the value that resilience literature puts into
participatory methods. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, together, experimentation
and participation form the procedural components of a resilience approach to policy-making.
The thrust of the argument for greater participation is that it supposedly leads to better
information-sharing and increased preparedness (Chang et al., 2014) by fostering “social
learning”. “Social learning” entails integrating diverse perspectives and promoting collective
actions that will result in greater cohesion in local decision-making (Adger et al., 2012;
Aldunce et al., 2014). It occurs when social memories and local knowledge are incorporated
into institutional processes and policies that alter the community’s ability to handle the next
perturbation (Cutter et al., 2008), which theoretically mobilises all levels of knowledge in
a society (Jabareen, 2013; Marshall et al., 2012). Essentially, the contributions of a par-
ticipatory approach are greater diversity of problem perception (Becker et al., 2015; Jha
et al., 2013), and allowing local communities to assume greater responsibility so that they do
not become dependent on government interventions (Schultz et al., 2011; Weichselgartner
and Kelman, 2015). These changes result in greater resilience by increasing the variety of
potential solutions for dealing with uncertainty (Gaillard, 2010; Wardekker et al., 2010), and
by inducing behavioural changes that lead to greater self-reliance (Lorenz, 2013; NRC, 2012).
Some scholars have pointed out however, that uncritically using local communities as
a starting point for promoting participatory decision-making can result in deeply flawed
outcomes, since it fails to take into consideration that there may be inherent contradictions
and conflicts within them that can prevent beneficial outcomes (Cannon, 2008). One issue
with uncritically engaging local stakeholders is potential “elite capture” (Dutta, 2009), which
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results in influential local individuals co-opting policy initiatives in a way that primarily
benefits themselves rather than the local population as a whole. “Who is involved and how
they are involved” (Aldunce et al., 2016) are crucial for determining whether participatory
practices lead to better outcomes for local populations affected by disasters such as flood-
ing. If delegating responsibility to local communities results in elite capture, then such an
initiative would amount to little change, since the outcome is still that a majority of the local
population have little say in what is decided.
Further complications arise from the fact that empirical studies of participatory methods
as means of enhancing resilience have been mainly limited to micro-scale initiatives in
developing countries, where communities have historically had minimal input in the decision-
making process (Coulthard, 2011; Sikder et al., 2015; Wrathall, 2012). This is not the case in
the UK for example, which has a long history of involving local stakeholders through public
consultations and hearings, and other forms of participatory methods (Jordan and Maloney,
1997; Taylor, 2003). Important questions that remain unanswered include: (a) Are stakehold-
ers able to freely engage in information sharing that leads to policy decisions, or are they
constrained by existing political and policy contexts? And (b), does participatory methods
necessarily lead to a greater range of problem perception, meaning, are the participants truly
diverse and representative of the community?
This chapter will explore these questions by studying existing participatory bodies
engaged in FRM in the area around Pickering, where the Slowing the Flow pilot project took
place. Here, the “community” will be defined as local residents who could potentially be
directly affected by the pilot project works in the Pickering area. Thus, “community” has a
more geographical delineation than cultural, or socio-economic. The study will be divided
into two sections, with one section focussing on the issue of potential political and contextual
constraints. This will be done through a desk study of meetings documents obtained from
existing participatory bodies in the Pickering area. A second section examines the diversity
and representativeness of the local stakeholders that are likely to participate in these local
bodies. This is done through a survey questionnaire sent to local residents around Pickering
who are either directly involved, or have expressed an interest in FRM matters.
4.2 Participation and resilience 61
4.2 Participation, collaboration, and resilience
4.2.1 What is meant by “participation”?
The inclusion of participatory decision-making in the resilience field is not an isolated
phenomenon. It is part of a recent broader revival of interest in stakeholder processes and
engaging the public in government decisions (Brannan et al., 2006; Cornwall, 2008). The bur-
geoning zeitgeist of participatory approaches sees it as a means to strengthen the legitimacy
and accountability of democratic institutions (Beetham et al., 2008), build social cohesion
(Foot, 2009), foster reform of public services (Jochum et al., 2005), and boost self-confidence
of citizens (Popay et al., 2007). Participation can be social, such as joining local association
activities or volunteering in community organisations (Pattie et al., 2004); individual, by
buying fair-trade products or voting (Ginsborg, 2005); or public, where communities engage
with public institutions to affect policies (Jochum et al., 2005; Mohan, 2007). Within this
wider context, resilience literature seems to fall within public participation, since it is implied
that participation occurs between stakeholders and institutions (Folke, 2006). Ideally, partici-
pation is in the form of “multi-layered committees and multi-level collaborative platforms”
(Boyd, 2012) that will empower local communities to influence policy decisions (Aldunce
et al., 2014).
Basically, what seems to be described in resilience research is a process where stakehold-
ers engage in an exchange of reason (Landwehr, 2010), where they communicate preferences,
and through deliberation come to an agreement on suitable actions. Since they take into ac-
count the diverse knowledge and experiences of all stakeholders, these decisions are expected
to be better informed and less self-interested (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Huitema et al.,
2007). Participation therefore arguably enables greater consensus-building by establishing
links and networks between stakeholders that can help overcome initial disagreements and
diverging interests (Reed, 2008). It is the preferred tool for dealing with cultural, economic
and political “barriers” (Moser, 2008) that prevent societies from increasing their resilience.
Using the International Association for Public Participation’s (IAPP) classification of
various forms of participation (see Table 4.1), the format envisioned in resilience literature
falls in the higher end of the spectrum where participation is collaborative or empowering.
Since the IAPP’s classification systems is based on Sherry Arnstein’s work on the
“participation ladder” (Arnstein, 1969), the practical implication is that participatory bodies
in resilience literature are afforded high levels of political mandate. While there may be
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Table 4.1 IAPP classification of participation
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intuitive appeal (i.e. more inclusive, relevance to local context) in granting stakeholders more
direct power, doing so is not entirely unproblematic, as will be discussed in the next section.
4.2.2 Factors that complicate participation
Participatory bodies are not always inclusive and representative
In resilience research, the policy process is frequently conceptualised in binary terms, where
decisions are either made through deliberations among stakeholders in a participatory forum,
or made by policy experts in government ministries with little local input. In this conceptual
framework, participation is depicted as a mostly positive process, where collective decisions
act as drivers for beneficial social and structural change. But the reality is much more
nuanced. Participatory processes can be exclusionary and divisive (Field, 2003), and they
are equally likely to be formed to advance “nefarious as well as worthy ends” (Carothers,
2000). Participatory bodies are not always representative of local populations, and it is not
always clear who is accountable for decisions made by these bodies (Bulkeley and Mol,
2003; Campos and Heilman, 2005). Stakeholders can also advocate reactive ideas that resist
proposed changes rather than enabling them (Beetham et al., 2008). Additionally, empirical
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studies on the effectiveness of participatory approaches in reaching consensual decisions
remains inconclusive (Bosher, 2014; Lin and Erickson, 2008; Marshall, 2010; Marshall et al.,
2011; Mozumder et al., 2011). As such, in order to determine how beneficial participatory
processes can be in practice, there needs to be clarity regarding the type of stakeholders
involved, how interactions take place, and what specific decisions are sought (Fung, 2006).
Perhaps the most important consideration for resilience research is that participatory
approaches exhibit value pluralism (Kekes, 1993) since the point of engaging stakeholders is
to diversify the knowledge-base for decision-makers. This diversification is achieved either
by the stakeholders directly participating in the decision process, or that their contributions
are incorporated by decision-makers. If however, there is a high degree of connectedness
and shared values among stakeholders, this could be an indication that decisions might not
reflect what the overall population wants (Pfefferbaum et al., 2008). Some have argued
that the reason why community participation cannot achieve desired effects is due to state
dominance of governance (Stark and Taylor, 2014); however, as mentioned earlier in the case
of elite capture, the “community” itself may be part of the problem. In reality, participation
in local decision-making is frequently dominated by the “usual suspects” (Taylor, 2003).
They are usually politically engaged individuals, or even active protesters, who tend to have
very strong opinions about particular topics relevant to their local context (Harrison and
Singer, 2007). The influence of these “usual suspects” is augmented because decisions in
participatory bodies are not “one-off” affairs (Beetham et al., 2008), but require continuous
engagement for a lengthy period. As such, there is significant risk that participation becomes
an exercise in attrition, in that only those with enough time and interest in the topics attend
and make decisions in the end (Thompson, 2008). For example, Pickering is held as a
good example of how local participation can lead to better outcomes (EA, 2016; NFRR,
2016); however, browsing through project reports for Slowing the Flow reveals that local
stakeholders all come from two local bodies: the Pickering Flood Defence Group (PFDG)
and the Pickering and District Civic Society (P&DCS). This puts to question whether a) they
in fact represent a group of "usual suspects" as formulated by (Taylor, 2003), and b) whether
“elite capture” is taking place (Dutta, 2009).
If participatory bodies comprise exclusively the most politically active, then there would
be little to distinguish them from “policy communities”, where policies are determined by
those most affected, most interested, most expert or most sentimentally attached to the issue
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Cigler, 1990). Ideally, such policy communities function as
a consensual body that can respond to issues in a flexible and effective manner. But they
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can also be exclusionary gatherings that make decisions of political consequence without
having any democratic accountability (Hay, 1998). Policy communities in the UK for
example have historically tended to be stable coalitions, with substantial agreement between
participants, that allows little room for dissenting perspectives (Jordan and Maloney, 1997).
If participatory bodies were to show similar isolation, then there is potential that decisions
would be the result of “group-think” and systematic bias from the participants (Baron, 2008),
rather than the integration of diverse knowledge-sources. It is therefore important to establish
clarity on who is engaged in these local participatory bodies, because care needs to be taken
not to confuse public participation with political activism.
Participatory bodies do not exist separately from the overall political system
In addition to specifying who participates, it is also important to make clear where the
participatory body fits into the overall political and policy system. Why the question of con-
textual fit matters can partly be inferred from experiences in a particular field of participatory
decision-making known as participatory budgeting (Wampler, 2012). Participatory budgeting
first surfaced in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre when the local Worker’s Party won the
mayoral election in 1988. The core idea behind the introduction of participatory budgeting
was to give ordinary citizens the ability to make direct decisions on public budgets that affect
them (Baiocchi, 2005). It took the form of open, government-sponsored meetings where any
citizen could deliberate and (more importantly) vote on specific policies (Wampler, 2012).
This approach differed from other participatory methods in that it required citizens to actively
deliberate over trade-offs and the allocation of resources to competing needs (Baiocchi,
2005). In this process, technical expertise and inputs from policy practitioners were “made
subservient to the popular mandate” (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014) so that final policy im-
plementation truly reflected the participants’ vote rather than the opinions of technical experts.
Participatory budgeting is in many ways an ideal representation of the participatory
process envisioned in resilience literature. It is theoretically a platform for social learning,
where diverse opinions can be voiced and local knowledge is included in final decisions.
Since participatory budgeting is open to all, it can also hypothetically lead to more collective
actions that allow local stakeholders to assume greater responsibility over their lives and
have more ownership of the decisions affecting them. However, reviews of participatory
budgeting in Porto Alegre and other Brazilian cities show that the institutional context in
which these meetings operated had greater effect on the final policy outcomes than the in-
creased citizen awareness it generated (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014). One determining factor
was that the participatory open meeting was the only forum through which stakeholders
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could access government resources (Melgar, 2014). When the Worker’s Party was removed
from power in 2004, these meetings were no longer as relevant since there were alternative
methods for individuals to tap into government resources without having to go through
the open meetings, where they might meet resistance or have their demands watered down.
Another important factor was that the citizens’ meeting had a direct “conveyor belt” channel
to the municipal executive body that was protected from ministry interventions (Baiocchi
and Ganuza, 2014). This ensured that decisions from these open meetings would be put
into practice without government officials having an opportunity to give different inputs.
When this direct channel was removed, decisions more strongly reflected institutional needs
and preferences than those of the citizens, and the participatory body’s usefulness diminished.
In general, participatory decision-making is meant to “spread political empowerment and
democratisation” (Cleaver, 1999), and resilience literature clearly envisions participation as a
forum where technical expertise and lay knowledge should be used for the co-production
of policy decisions (Jochum, 2003). However, participatory processes can also be used
as a tool to advance political agendas. For example, governments could potentially use it
as a way to improve their cost-efficiency and redistribute responsibilities to participating
stakeholders and other beneficiaries (Mees et al., 2016). If this were the case, it would be
debatable whether participatory bodies are actually conducive to effective policy-making
(Newig et al., 2014) since it isn’t clear whether local stakeholders alone have the requisite
technical knowledge needed to formulate informed opinions about complex problems (Foot,
2009). Detailed understanding of technical issues can be crucial for effective participation
in certain policy fields such as flooding, which straddles the boundary between politics
and science (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Reber, 2007). If there is no source of expertise
among the participants, and technical language isn’t made explicitly understandable, then it is
doubtful whether participatory processes can deliver straightforward decisions to guide policy
implementation. Basically, there is currently no acknowledgement in resilience literature that
the purpose of a participatory body is crucial for its added value to practical policy-making.
They can be effective tools for securing needed stakeholder buy-in and ensure that decisions
reflect actual needs of of the local population; however, their ability to deliver effective policy
recommendations is far more equivocal.
Furthermore, if the objective of participation is truly to allow stakeholder inputs to be in-
corporated into final policy decisions, then it should also be made explicit what happens when
participants’ choices differ from those of technical experts. This is highly relevant because
experiences in participatory budgeting have shown that these bodies do not necessarily make
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decisions that reflect what researchers and technical experts consider to be the most useful or
needed (Franklin et al., 2009; Lerner and Secondo, 2012; Stewart et al., 2014). Resilience
literature seems to assume that participatory decisions will always result in desirable out-
comes due to knowledge-sharing and improving social links that help bridge disagreements.
However, should there be disagreement between practitioners and the community, but the
implemented policy ends up reflecting the technical experts’ preferences rather than the partic-
ipants’ choices, then the community will essentially have been informed of potential policies,
without contributing any impactful input in their formulation. Under such a scenario, it would
be fair to question what the added value of a participatory method is, since an equivalent out-
come would have been just as easily achieved through a standard public consultation exercise.
Basically, a more nuanced perspective of participation is needed because resilience
research often depicts a somewhat simplistic picture of the policy process. Rather than a
binary choice between collaboration or central control, the reality of FRM in the UK is
that a multitude of actors, both local and national, are involved in some capacity (NAO,
2011). Most of them take part in participatory forums that fully or partly fulfil the criteria set
forth in resilience literature. These are local bodies where multiple actors, operating across
several scales, come together and deliberate and make decisions about issues relevant to
FRM (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013). All of these interactions have not necessarily made
FRM less fractious however (Nye et al., 2011), or led to significant changes in strategy.
4.3 Study of local participatory bodies around Pickering
4.3.1 Method
This section will study if institutional and political context influences the role and functioning
of local participatory bodies. This is done by providing an overview of the various participa-
tory bodies that fulfil some role in FRM of the area in which the Slowing the Flow project
was implemented. This was done through desk studies of board and/or committee meeting
agendas and minutes from each local body from January 2014 through February 2016. This
period coincides with the concluding phase of the Slowing the Flow project and also takes
into account the 2015 winter floods that affected the project area. Some of these documents
are available online, whereas others were obtained by submitting Freedom of Information
(FOI) requests to the relevant host organisations. The goal of the desk study was to answer
the following questions:
1. Who are the active participants?
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2. What are the main issues discussed, and what decisions are made?
3. Is there information and knowledge diffusion from other bodies and initiatives relevant
to FRM such as the Slowing the Flow project?
Finding out who the participants in these local bodies are serves the dual purpose of
determining whether the assemblies can be categorised as participatory by the specifications
in resilience literature. It also serves to check if there is any overlap in membership between
the assemblies that might facilitate knowledge-sharing.
Analysing the discussions and decisions helps determine whether policies are aligned be-
tween the various participatory bodies. Importantly, it serves to give an idea of whether these
committees share similar perspectives on how to handle FRM, or whether they are largely
guided by the institutional and legal frameworks in which they operate. Legal frameworks
can be particularly pertinent since many participatory bodies are created to fulfil legislative
stipulations. Meaning they are obliged to operate within certain constraints put on them
through statutory obligations. As such, the nature of their deliberations, and the decisions
that are taken, might reflect these considerations more than the ideas and knowledge provided
by the participants.
The third question ties in with the previous ones in that the point is to assess whether
cross-pollination of ideas occurs. Since there are already a number of participatory bodies in
the case study area, if there is little synchronicity between these bodies, then the claim that a
participatory process will automatically lead to greater cohesion and better incorporation of
diverse knowledge would be questionable.
Also, as has been mentioned in previous chapters, the issues of scale and finding suitable
definitions for what is meant by “local” (or “community”) affect both the structure, and the
findings of the study. The definition of “local” used in this study is largely guided by the way
in which FRM is structured in the UK, where the lowest level of “granularity” is essentially
at the county district level. Therefore, the local population – or community – is defined as
residents who live within Ryedale district. This is obviously an imperfect definition since a
single flood event can cross over multiple districts for example. However, it has been chosen
because of it being the lowest level of granularity for policy implementation, and thus the
most immediate level at which residents and local populations can engage with policy makers
and practitioners.
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4.3.2 Analysis
The main participatory bodies involved with FRM in the area around Pickering are:
• Ryedale District Land Drainage Liaison Group (LDLG)
• Vale of Pickering Internal Drainage Board (IDB)
• North Yorkshire County Council (NYCC) as LLFA
• Yorkshire Derwent Partnership Board (YDPB)
• Yorkshire Regional Flood and Coastal Committee (RFCC)
The IDB and LDLG perform virtually identical functions. The difference being that the
IDB is a self-governed public body with its own board, whereas the LDLG is hosted by
the local Environment Agency office, and only serves to co-ordinate drainage and channel
maintenance activities in Ryedale District.
IDBs are only established in areas of special drainage need, and are given permissive
powers by the Environment Agency to provide land drainage and water level management
within their local areas (ADA, 2013). It is via these responsibilities that they also deal with
matters affecting flood risk. They fund these activities by charging a drainage rate from
local agricultural properties and land owners, as well as from a special levy issued to district
or local authorities located within their district. Since IDBs are self-governing, they are
managed by a board consisting of elected members of the public that are local drainage rate
payers, and members appointed by the local authorities (ADA, 2013).
The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 created LLFAs, which are either unitary au-
thorities or county councils. LLFAs are responsible for developing, maintaining and applying
an overall strategy for local flood risk management in their areas and for maintaining a regis-
ter of flood risk assets. As such, theirs is a more strategic and co-ordinating role than other
local FRM bodies. The NYCC is the LLFA for the area in which Pickering is situated. They
do not have a special committee for handling FRM matters, but rather performs their duty
by being represented at various bodies that carry out direct maintenance and work. Within
the NYCC, the committee most responsible for FRM matters is the Transport, Economy and
Environment Overview and Scrutiny Committee (TEEC).
YDPB is probably the entity that most closely resembles a participatory body as described
in resilience literature. The Partnership is co-hosted by the East Yorkshire Rivers Trust and
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Yorkshire Wildlife Trust, and membership consists of experts and policy officers from local
water management bodies. The Partnership does not have its own source of funding, and
therefore serves mostly a co-ordinating and information-sharing capacity.
The Yorkshire RFCC is one of eleven such bodies created through the Flood and Water
Management Act 2010. They are responsible for ensuring that coherent plans are in place
for managing flood and coastal erosion risks across catchments and shorelines in England.
Perhaps their most important role however, is their capacity to raise local levies used to
fund targeted investments in FRM initiatives. As such, they are both a co-ordinating body
capable of linking local initiatives with wider national actors, as well as an important source
of funding for local FRM projects.
Table 4.2 shows an overview of the characteristics of each body.
Ryedale LDLG and Vale of Pickering IDB
The two local drainage groups – Ryedale LDLG and Vale of Pickering IDB – made almost
no mention of the Slowing the Flow project during the time period studied. The pilot project
was mentioned once at a LDLG meeting in early 2015 when construction of the low-level
water storage bund at Newbridge was nearing completion. This is somewhat surprising since
the Ryedale LDLG is hosted by the Environment Agency, which was also heavily involved in
the implementation of the pilot project, and contributed funding to build the low-level bund.
Furthermore, the two drainage bodies had members who were also part of the Slowing the
Flow Delivery Group and therefore would have personal knowledge of the pilot project plans.
This would suggest that while the participants were likely to be aware of the pilot project,
they did not consider it relevant for carrying out their responsibilities.
The discussions, particularly in the Vale of Pickering IDB, centred primarily around
questions of an operational nature such as adjustment of drainage rates or carrying out of
scheduled drainage and maintenance work. This is understandable since the raising and
expenditure of levies is likely to be an issue of great interest to the local farmers and land
owners. It is likely that such matters are of interest to the board members as well since they
have a statutory obligation to carry out such works, and the elected members are themselves
local farmers or land owners. Also, the fact that the IDB is the only local participatory
body with elected members of the public is particularly interesting. Board members on the
IDB are elected on an annual basis by individuals who pay drainage rates, so mainly local
landowners and farmers. By having these elected members, it could be argued that the IDB
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Table 4.2 Summary characteristics of participatory bodies
LDLG Pickering IDB NYCC - TEEC YDPB YRFCC
Category Collaborative Collaborative Consultative Consultative Collaborative
Operating
scale
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Acronyms: Ryedale District Council (RDC), Environment Agency (EA), National Farmers’ Union (NFU),
Scarborough District Council (SDC), Forestry Commission (FC)
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is the participatory body whose deliberations and decisions are the most representative of the
views held by the local population it serves. The habitual nature of the meeting discussions
appear to suggest that simply including local representatives does not necessarily lead to
diverse problem perceptions and information-sharing. Rather, those who participate seem to
be those most interested in ensuring that the IDB continues to operate in largely the same
manner as it has always done. In short, participants from the local community appear to
behave more like vested interests, rather than the proactive partners who support policy
change, envisaged in resilience literature.
Additionally, an issue that is worth noting is the funding structure of IDBs, which can
perhaps give a partial explanation for why it can be difficult to convince farmers and land
owners to sign up for NFM schemes like the initiatives proposed in Slowing the Flow. If
their land is situated within the management area of a local IDB, farmers/landowners are
automatically obliged to pay an annual drainage levy. This levy still gets charged even if they
implement NFM measures on their land. Essentially they would be required to pay a charge
in order for their land not to be flooded, even while implementing measures so that it can be
flooded.
North Yorkshire County Council – TEEC
NYCC TEEC meetings held during the relevant time period did not mention the pilot project
at all. In fact, the only time any issue relevant to FRM was brought up was in October
2014, when the committee discussed work on drafting the North Yorkshire Local Flood
Risk Management Strategy. As an LLFA, the NYCC is required to provide such a strategy
document by the Flood and Water Management Act of 2010. Based on the paucity of FRM
matters raised before the committee, it appears that it is not a prioritised issue for the NYCC.
The overwhelming majority of matters raised concerned road maintenance and other
relevant infrastructural issues. It was clear that road works were the most highly prioritised
part of the committee’s work given that the local FRM strategy only received cursory
comments from the councillors, whereas discussions about roads went into minute details
of costing and operational issues. Interestingly, while committee meetings are always open
to the public, the only times members of the public were actually in attendance were when
the reduction of bus service subsidies was discussed. The potential of raised bus fares was
clearly a very visible issue for many local residents since they would have to pay for higher
fares out-of-pocket. This is in contrast to FRM related costs, which are mostly hidden, and
not considered by the public until their homes are flooded (Bosker et al., 2014; Wright et al.,
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2011). A possible question to ponder then, is if this reflects Harrison and Singer (2007)’s
argument that those who are actively engaged in technical issues like FRM will also be
those who are already politically active and have formed very strong opinions about the
topic. If this is the case, then a participatory forum might not be conducive to informed,
open discussions, since participants are likely to approach such meetings with entrenched
positions.
Yorkshire-Derwent PB
The YDPB is probably what resilience researchers have in mind when they envision a partici-
patory process. The Partnership consists of a multitude of actors who operate across multiple
spatial scales. The meetings comprise mostly of information-sharing of different experiences
from the participants, and serve as a platform for establishing links and networks between
these actors. The individual goals for each participant seem to consistently be about gaining
more knowledge in order to become better at performing their responsibilities. However,
while FRM initiatives such as Slowing the Flow are regularly discussed, the main focus of
discussions centre around habitat preservation and wildlife conservation measures. In fact,
FRM is almost exclusively discussed in relation to the usefulness of NFM measures for
advancing habitat preservation objectives.
It is probably because it does not raise its own funds, or have any statutory obligations to
carry out, that the YDPB can be used for information-sharing purposes rather than for making
decisions on recurring agenda items. Since it does not fund any initiatives or works, the YDPB
is essentially free from outside forces exerting pressure on their decisions. Also, because it
is free from performing statutory operational duties, the Partnership is able to function in a
less structured format that is conducive to greater deliberation and more knowledge-sharing.
Also worth noting is that despite having members from the Environment Agency, NFU and
NYCC, there was no cross-pollination of ideas between the YDPB and the more local bodies
mentioned above. Aside from the Slowing the Flow project, nothing that was discussed in
the Partnership during this time period was ever mentioned at the meetings of the more local
participatory bodies. It is unclear why this is the case, but one possible explanation could be
that the other local participatory bodies do not provide an obvious platform to discuss these
more conceptual issues. The meeting objectives for these participatory bodies are primarily
aimed at finding appropriate and feasible ways to carry out their obligations, which leaves
little room for the intellectual exchange of ideas envisioned in resilience literature.
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Yorkshire RFCC
The meetings of the RFCC mainly concern allocating funding for various FRM initiatives
within its jurisdiction. This is unsurprising since the RFCC, with its ability to issue local
levies, is the main source of funding for FRM projects aside from the Environment Agency
and Defra. While there is occasional discussion about the progress of projects like Slowing
the Flow, deliberations are mainly limited to funding matters and deciding on what projects to
finance. Interestingly, even though the RFCC is meant to serve the dual purpose of ensuring
coherent FRM plans as well as providing targeted investments for FRM, it is the second
objective that occupies the vast majority of time at meetings. One possible explanation for
this could be that unlike at the Environment Agency or Defra, proposed FRM initiatives
do not have to compete with other projects across the country for funding. As such, the
RFCC is a useful source of financing for smaller local initiatives that have little chance of
securing national funding. Consequently, although the RFCCs were conceived as a group
that provides more strategic oversight and guidance of local FRM issues, the reality seems
to be that the acute funding demands have resulted in the committee shifting focus towards
more operational matters.
Cross-cutting issues between local participatory bodies
Based on the meeting minutes of the participatory bodies that were studied, only the Yorkshire
RFCC had a demonstrably informed knowledge of some of the activities at other local bodies.
This is despite the fact that there is membership overlap between almost all of them (with
the NYCC-TEEC being the notable exception). The Environment Agency is represented in
almost all the groups for example, and representatives from the NFU participate in three of
the five groups. For some organisations, such as the Environment Agency, Ryedale DC, and
Vale of Pickering IDB, it is even the same individuals that participate in the different groups
(specifically, LDLG, Vale of Pickering IDB, and YDPB). The lack of co-ordination between
these local participatory bodies is most likely because their objectives, and therefore the
purpose for holding meetings, vary greatly. The YRFCC is well informed of activities at other
bodies because their purpose is to provide funding for some of these activities, and being
informed about them is part of the regular functioning of the body. The other local bodies
do not need this knowledge to perform their tasks. So even though there may be overlap
in participants, knowledge-sharing is not essential for them to perform their designated
obligations.
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The contrast between the YDPB and the other participatory bodies suggests that their
functioning is highly dependent on political and institutional frameworks. The Vale of
Pickering IDB and the Yorkshire RFCC for example, have very structured meetings because
their function within the institutional framework is to raise funds and carry out (IDB), or
finance (RFCC), water management works. There is very little room for deliberations at
their meetings because they are primarily concerned with matters related to these obligations.
Similarly, FRM is only one of the policy areas in which the NYCC-TEEC has to have
oversight. They are therefore primarily concerned with issues that require the most local
spending and grab the most regular public attention, which happens to be road maintenance.
By contrast, the YDPB has no statutory obligations to perform, nor does it need to concern
itself with allocating funding to competing interests. It is therefore free to adopt a much more
deliberative process that is less structured and formulaic than the other participatory bodies.
4.4 Survey of local community members
4.4.1 Method and sampling process
The second part of this study is intended to find out whether elite capture, and the possibility
that local participation is simply an exercise in involving the usual suspects is indeed an issue.
The study was carried out using a survey questionnaire that was designed in the Qualtrics
Research Suite tool. The specific sample of respondents were collected by initially reaching
out to suitable contact persons given by Environment Agency and Forestry Commission
officers who were involved in the project. I then asked these contact persons to distribute to
their members via group mailing lists. The members were free to reply on a voluntary basis
by simply clicking on a link to the questionnaire provided in the email that was distributed.
There was also a free-form comment section included at the end of the survey, where respon-
dents could write down thoughts or input that was not included in the survey questions, if
they wished to do so.
The sampling process is somewhat unique in that the targeted population is specifically
those who live in area surrounding Pickering, where the Slowing the Flow project took
place. As such, the survey uses a targeted method that involves non-probabilistic sampling
(Patton, 2005), which unlike probabilistic sampling, does not assume to have a response
that is representative of the overall population (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). The choice of a
non-probabilistic sampling method is motivated by two factors:
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1. Practical limitations on the possibility of conducting probabilistic sampling of the
target population
2. The objective is to gain insight of possible existence of elite capture and so-called
usual suspects
In terms of the practical limitations, the main issue was identifying and surveying a sufficient
number of people that were suitably representative of the local population, as to allow gen-
eralisation of the survey results. This challenge proved insurmountable given the funding
and time constraints of my study, which is a strong contributing factor for choosing targeted
sampling. This approach obviously limits the kind of inferences that can be drawn, and they
will also need to be carefully considered.
Additionally, since the objective of the survey is to identify the possible existence of
usual suspects that could lead to problems with elite capture, non-probabilistic sampling is
arguably more useful (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016). A non-probability sampling method is
useful because the data is not used to extrapolate information about characteristics of the
general local population, but rather to discover and gain insight about specific cases at the
local level. The survey focusses on individuals who are active in local community groups
and charities, and attempts to find out what their views on certain key issues surrounding
FRM are. This may then inform if there is a risk that participants in these local initiatives
may offer biased views of policy initiatives such as NFM. It should be stated here that this
type of non-probabilistic sampling assumes that membership in certain groups is extendable
to engagement with policy initiatives. This means that individuals involved in local civic
societies or charities, for example, are more likely to be actively engaged with government
policy initiatives than individuals who participate in a local football club.
While the PFDG and the P&DCS were the two local groups that were intimately involved
with the Slowing the Flow project, they do not necessarily constitute the only local organ-
isations that are engaged and have input in local policy initiatives. Limiting sampling to
these two organisations could then potentially result in the sample population consisting of
individuals who are interested in Slowing the Flow in particular, rather those with a general
interest in local policy initiatives (which is the targeted sample population). Therefore, as a
referencing exercise to see if any other groups could be engaged in policy-related activities
in the Pickering area, I also browsed through the local Community Directories (consisting of
registered local charities and community groups) maintained by North Yorkshire Council,
Ryedale District Council, and Pickering Town Council. This search returned no other reg-
istered community group that are engaged in policy-related activities. As such, while the
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survey sample is not necessarily representative of the overall local population, it is likely
to be fairly representative of local stakeholders who are actively interested and engaged in
policy-relevant processes.
Overview of survey
1. How did you hear about the Slowing the Flow project?
(a) I participated in project meetings
(b) By word of mouth or council newsletters
(c) Through local or national news
(d) I don’t know about the project
2. Do you think the natural flood management measures implemented through the Slowing




3. Do you think the area around Pickering needs solid flood defences (dikes, flood-walls,





4. Who do you think should be responsible for funding flood risk management and flood
defence measures?
(a) National Government
(b) National and Local Government
(c) Local Government through levies
(d) Private citizens
5. Have you taken measures to flood-proof your home (flood shields, cavity sealing,
moving electrical sockets etc.)?
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(a) Yes
(b) No, but I intend to
(c) No, I don’t intend to, or I can’t afford it
(d) My home is not at risk of flooding
6. In what order would you rank these political issues in terms of their importance for
your community?
(a) Affordable Housing
(b) Abolition of District Councils
(c) Flooding
(d) Fracking
(e) Road and other infrastructural improvements
7. Which political party do you support or identify with the most?
(a) Conservative Party
(b) Liberal Party
(c) Liberal Democratic Party
(d) Labour Party
(e) Other, or no party affiliation
8. Are you a member of an environmental organisation such as the National Trust, RSPB,
Wildlife Trust, Friends of the Earth etc.?
(a) Yes
(b) No




The survey questions were kept deliberately short and general enough as to not require
detailed technical knowledge. This was done to avoid any specification error in the responses,
meaning a respondent selects an answer that does not reflect their actual opinions because
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they did not fully understand the question. Another consideration in designing the survey
was putting the political affiliation question towards the end in order to avoid reference group
effects, where a respondent selects answers they think corresponds with their given political
affiliation (Saris and Gallhofer, 2014). Also, the political party options in question 7 are a
reflection of the local political context, where for example, the Liberal Party has a much
stronger presence than they do nationwide. The stated political parties are the ones that
managed to secure a seat on the Ryedale District Council at least once over the past three
local elections in North Yorkshire (2017, 2013, 2009)1.
Questions 1-5 are intended to gauge whether local problem perceptions have aligned
more with those of FRM experts as a result of the Slowing the Flow project. The point
is to ascertain if potential new knowledge makes local residents more inclined to favour
different methods and practices for FRM. If opinions do not change, and there is lingering
disagreement on how best to approach FRM in the Pickering area, then arriving at consensual
decision-making through participatory processes may be more difficult than envisioned in
resilience literature.
Questions 6-9 are meant to give an idea of whether elite capture, and the risk of partici-
pants consisting of the usual suspects is a potential risk in the Pickering area. As mentioned
earlier in this chapter, continuous engagement with policy practitioners necessitates sufficient
time and interest on behalf of the participants. Therefore, those most likely to participate are
probably also those in the community with the most personal interest in the topic. If their
participation constitutes a risk for potential elite capture, then it would be fair to question
whether these participatory bodies are suitable mechanisms for getting useful local input for
decision-making.
4.4.2 Analysis
The total number of respondents to the survey was 19, which is roughly the expected figure
since the survey was sent out to the mailing lists of two local community groups. Knowing
that the respondents comprise a relatively small sample size, and specifically represents a
sub-group of the local population, care must be taken to avoid drawing inferences that are
too broad to be supported by the data obtained. Keeping this in mind, the findings from the
survey can still be potentially very useful since both the Pickering Flood Defence Group and
1It is worth noting that an “Independent” or “Other” affiliation in Ryedale more than likely indicates that
the person in question normally self-identifies as “Conservative”. Their “Independent” status is likely caused
by a political rift in the local Conservative party, which occurred in 2013.
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the Pickering Civic Society had representatives involved in the Slowing the Flow project,
meaning it is likely that their members are more inclined to be interested in FRM issues.
Therefore, the results could offer an indication into whether local participants indeed are
self-selecting, and part of a group of usual suspects suggested by empirical research on
participation in other policy fields. This in turn can help determine if participatory processes
indeed can strengthen local awareness of and influence on policy decisions as theorised in
resilience literature, or whether they are used as forums for political activism.
Another issue to keep in mind for the analysis is that the response rate is somewhat
unclear. The PFDG did not provide any figures on the total number of members in their
mailing list. The P&DCS indicated that they have 43 members in their mailing list, but only
roughly half of those are active on a regular basis. It is also possible that there is some degree
of cross-pollination between the two groups, meaning one individual can be a member of
both groups. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the actual membership numbers of both
bodies, it is difficult to determine what the response rate of the survey was. By extension,
there is also some ambiguity regarding how representative of the sample population (e.g.
local population actively interested in local policy initiatives) the survey is. These issues also
need to be taken into consideration during the analysis.
Questions relevant to social learning and information-sharing
One of the questions of this study is whether any learning takes place through local com-
munities participating in the policy implementation process. Linked with this question is
whether community perceptions are then aligned with those of technical experts and policy
officers involved in FRM, in particular the Slowing the Flow project. Regarding the issue
of learning, it is evident from the replies that the pilot project has been very successful in
raising local awareness. All 19 respondents knew about the project and had heard about it
either through personal involvement or been informed by someone they knew or a regular
community newsletter.
An issue that became apparent while studying policy documents and conducting inter-
views with involved practitioners for the Slowing the Flow case study in chapter 3, is that a
potential flood alleviation scheme for the Pickering area was rejected by the Environment
Agency in 2007 due to the project not fulfilling cost-benefit criteria. Hence, when the Slow-
ing the Flow project was proposed in 2009, the local reaction was that they were offered
a “second-best option”, as one local stakeholder put it. It is unclear whether their reaction
reflected actual doubts about NFM measures, or whether it was due to disappointment that
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the costlier option had been rejected. Results from the survey suggest that it may be a mixture
of both sentiments. Twelve of the respondents think that NFM measures are effective at
preventing floods, while seven are undecided, and none think that they are not effective.
Meanwhile, 15 respondents also think that the area needs more flood defence measures
installed in addition to the pilot project NFM measures, with the four remaining people
undecided on the issue. Based on the replies, it would seem that respondents are largely
in favour of NFM measures, perhaps as a result of the bund successfully preventing the
town from being flooded in the 2015/16 Winter floods (EA, 2016). However, they still have
lingering doubts about how effective they can be in preventing floods. One comment left a
by survey respondent encapsulates this lingering ambivalence:
”We like the bund. Especially because it doesn’t change the local landscape
much. This is important for the local tourism industry. But it only prevents a one
in 25 year flood. We are still not protected against larger floods.”
While opinions about the efficacy of NFM measures may potentially have aligned as a
result of the pilot project, a possible divergence in opinion between respondents and policy
practitioners can be gleaned from the responses regarding the issue of funding. To the
question of who respondents think ought to be responsible for funding FRM measures, an
overwhelming majority (15 people) thought that the National Government should do so, and
the remaining four thought that the National Government and Local Government should
have shared responsibility. None were of the opinion that Local Government or private
citizens should be responsible for FRM funding. The question of funding is of fundamental
importance since one of the main reasons why the pilot project at Pickering was approved
was due to the desire to explore more cost-effective options for FRM. For policy practitioners,
Slowing the Flow was meant to provide concrete evidence whether NFM measures could
be satisfactory alternatives to traditional FRM methods in sparsely populated areas, where
“hard” flood defences simply did not satisfy cost-benefit analyses. Therefore, the pilot project
was meant to provide input for necessary trade-off calculations.
The respondents obviously do not make these trade-off calculations in their approach
to the problem. In believing that it is the National Government’s responsibility to provide
funding for FRM, they evidently do not see flooding as a local problem for which they
need to take “ownership”. With this in mind, they would appear to act more like a special-
interest group rather than partners engaging in dialogue and knowledge-sharing with FRM
practitioners in order to co-produce policies. From the perspective of the respondents, FRM
appears to be a matter of getting as much funding from the Government as needed in order
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to make their area completely protected from flooding. If the respondents’ sentiments are
shared by the overall community, then they would be merely one among a plethora of groups
competing for a share of the Treasury pot. As such, the structure for a participatory process
between the local community and policy practitioners never truly goes beyond a transactional
stage, where the Government is the provider, and the community are the recipients of FRM
measures. In such an arrangement, mutual dialogue can be productive, but would still be
limited to one side asking for as much as is realistic, and the other side giving as little as
would be acceptable.
Questions of elite capture and possible usual suspects
The question about flood-proofing homes is interesting because it is an indication of how
likely a respondent is to be personally affected by flooding. As the Environment Agency
flood zone map of Pickering in Figure 4.1 shows, only properties in the immediate vicinity
(highlighted in blue) of Pickering Beck are actually at risk of flooding. Therefore, only a
minority of residents in the community would even need to install such measures. With this
in mind: (1) eight respondents indicated that they have flood-proofed their homes, (2) three
intended to do so, (3) five suggested that they did not need, or could not afford to do so, and
(4) only three respondents said their home is not at risk of flooding. These results suggest
that the group surveyed may not be entirely representative of the community as a whole,
since the flood zone map shows that a majority of the town is not at risk of flooding. If the
groups are indeed disproportionately affected by flood risk in comparison with the general
local population, then it would also be relevant to question how reflective their input is of the
overall opinion in the community if they were to contribute to local FRM policies. There
would be little point to organising a participatory process with the objective of obtaining
local inputs, if it turns out that the potential participants might not be speaking for the entire
community.
Another indication of the potential risk that respondents from the PFDG and P&DCS may
represent a group of usual suspects can be deduced from their membership in environmental
organisations, as well as their party affiliations. Fifteen of the people surveyed replied that
they were members of an environmental organisation. This is an eye-catching number, since
according to a report published by the Environmental Funders Network, about 4.5 million
people in the UK are members of an environmental organisation (Cracknell et al., 2013).
This number may be slightly higher today, since the National Trust indicated that they alone
had membership numbers totalling 4.5 million in 2016 (NT, 2016). However, the total
number of people in the UK who are members in an environmental organisation is unlikely
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Fig. 4.1 Pickering Flood Zone Map
to exceed 10% (6.5 million) of the overall population. By contrast, fifteen out of nineteen
survey respondents are members of an environmental organisation. While Pickering, as a
rural tourist destination in close proximity to a national park, probably has higher relative
membership figures than the general population of the UK, it is highly unlikely that they
would differ so drastically from national numbers. A more plausible explanation is that
members of the two community groups are more likely to have an interest in environmental
issues than the general local population. This could possibly mean that their interest in FRM
issues is part of a wider engagement in environmental matters, making them more similar to
Taylor (2003)’s usual suspects, rather than the local partners envisioned in resilience literature.
Further indication of possible differences between the members of the two community
groups and the overall local population can be gleaned from the charts in Figure 4.2 detailing
party political affiliations. The two most noticeable results are that the Liberal Democrats
are overrepresented among respondents compared with the general local population, and the
Conservatives are somewhat under-represented. Part of the discrepancy in support for the
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Liberal Democrats may be due to practical factors, such as the party not having a candidate in
the Pickering West ward for the 2017 local elections. As such, voters who otherwise would
normally vote for them may have cast their ballots for the Liberal Party candidates instead.
However, it is unlikely that this explanation would account for such a large discrepancy.
Also, this would not explain why the Conservative vote is under-represented among survey
respondents. The relatively low support for the Conservative party among the community
groups’ members is particularly glaring when compared with Ryedale District Council seat
allocations following the 2017 local elections. Since flooding is a district-wide concern
rather than an issue unique to Pickering town, a local participatory body ought reasonably be
representative of the affected area as a whole. Given the information summarised in Figure
4.2, it remains unclear whether members of the two community groups involved with the
Slowing the Flow project can be considered representative.















































































































Another issue that is linked with the difference in political leanings between Pickering
Town and Ryedale District in general is that none of the respondents works in the agricultural
sector. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Slowing the Flow project had apprecia-
ble difficulties engaging local farmers and land owners. Only 12 out of 287 farmers, and none
of the private land owners, signed up for NFM initiatives supported by the project. Since none
of the survey respondents work in the agricultural sector, they would benefit from any NFM
measures put in place without incurring any personal costs. For farmers and land owners
however, implementing NFM measures also entails potential income losses. As such, even
if they supported such initiatives, deciding whether to approve of NFM measures requires
making realistic cost-benefit calculations. Because of their different perspectives, the survey
respondents and the farmers and land owners would likely provide very different inputs to any
participatory process. While the lack of local landowner representation is not necessarily a re-
flection of local economic and political imbalances, the issue of elite capture is still pertinent.
In addition to providing potentially biased input that can be misinterpreted as representing
the overall local viewpoint, there is risk that a small group of people take ownership of the
FRM issue, and force decisions that may even be to the detriment of certain local populations.
Finally, even though the respondents clearly have an interest in flooding related issues,
it might not necessarily be their most pressing concern. For example, in the recent 2017
local elections, the issues that were brought up the most during political campaigning were
fracking, road improvements, housing, and abolishing district councils. Flooding was men-
tioned regularly, but only in conjunction with other environmental concerns like fracking.
The question about ranking political issues was therefore included in the survey to gauge
whether there is a similar spread in priorities among the respondents. Figure 4.3 summarises
how respondents ranked different political issues in order of perceived importance. As can be
seen, while flooding may be highly prioritised, it is actually not the most important issue for
a majority of the respondents. Fracking is the issue that the highest number of respondents
considered the most important for their local community2. Combining the results of this
question with the earlier question about membership in environmental organisations, it would
be pertinent to ask whether the common denominator for the groups is truly a concern for
flooding. Perhaps what the respondents actually have in common is a shared concern for
environmental issues. This is a meaningful distinction because it also puts into question
whether the respondents’ support for Slowing the Flow is due to its perceived effectiveness
in flood defence, or if they are actually in favour of these measures because they also help
2Fracking is included as a choice because it is an issue of particular concern in North Yorkshire, where
in the local election in April 2017, three parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Liberal Party) set banning
fracking as a prioritised issue in their campaigning
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environmental preservation, which could be interpreted as a form of elite capture.
Fig. 4.3 Political issues in order of perceived importance
In summary, the results from the survey suggest that the question of “who participates”
can be a tricky matter. The survey specifically targeted the two local community groups who
were engaged with the Slowing the Flow project. While the members of these two groups
seem to consider the pilot project as a success, the survey results also suggest that the issues
of elite capture and lack of representativeness (usual suspects) may be present in Pickering.
The absence of members active in agriculture, their political affiliations, and the general
leaning toward environmentalism all point toward a lack of representativeness. Additionally,
evidence from the survey suggest that there does seem to be a genuine acceptance of NFM
measures as a result of project engagement. However, the respondents still appear to act more
like special interest groups rather than true participants as envisioned in resilience literature,
since they still strongly believe that FRM is the responsibility of the National Government
rather than local stakeholders.
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4.5 Findings
The main finding from this chapter is that the use of participatory methods is not a “magic
bullet” that can provide diverse interpretations, and informed arguments useful for solving
complex problems. While participatory methods may confer clarification, and sometimes
even change participants’ views, by increasing awareness of complex issues, they do not
necessarily deliver clear guidelines for policy implementation. One example from the sur-
vey is the contrasting view of FRM funding, where the respondents’ answers indicate that
they still view the relationship with FRM practitioners as largely transactional. Although
the Slowing the Flow project had led to a mutual exchange of views, that helped the local
community partly adjust their problem perception, they quite obviously still consider the
Government to be the main responsible party on FRM matters. Furthermore, it is not evident
how local stakeholders might act, were they to be made responsible partners co-responsible
for policy decisions, similar to the participatory budgeting examples. The survey suggests
that there are a myriad of issues that the local community consider to be important, and
they do not necessarily agree on the order of priority. As such, a participatory process that
offers local populations impactful input into policy decisions may not deliver more clarity
than a more centralised structure. Basically, participatory bodies can be highly effective at
collating information and exchanging ideas when used in a strictly deliberative capacity, as is
the case of the YDPB for example. However, they will not magically lead to more effective
policies, since this is also dependent on the political and institutional context in which these
participatory bodies exist.
Additionally, it would be pertinent to ask whether participatory methods are truly a
necessary component of policy-making for resilience, or whether their inclusion is merely
an exercise in ticking off another box in the good governance checklist. If participation is
indeed a core component of the resilience concept, then the functions of participatory bodies
need to be more clearly specified so that it remains a procedural tool used to inform decisions,
rather than becoming a means to circumvent the normal democratic process (Howlett, 2011).
There is awareness in resilience research that political accountability of decisions made by
participatory bodies can be problematic, in the case of elite capture for example. However,
there remains a notable lack of practical detail about how effective and just local participatory
bodies can be set-up in practice. There is especially a knowledge gap in how to balance local
viewpoints with input from elected public officials in a manner that improves legitimacy and
accountability. Meeting documents from the Vale of Pickering IDB for example, suggest
that local participants may resemble vested interests more than proactive partners working
for policy change. The point is that if a participatory body is given real power to make
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policy decisions, and it only has participants who are politically active usual suspects, then
those who might disagree with their decisions would have minimal means of holding the
participants accountable, the way that they could of elected public officials.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise the influence of the policy context on the func-
tioning of a participatory body. The differences between the Yorkshire RFCC and the YDPB
serves to illustrate the impact of institutional and policy contexts. While the Yorkshire RFCC
is responsible for having oversight and co-ordinating FRM initiatives in their region, because
it is also responsible for raising levies for targeted initiatives, its role has essentially become
that of a funding agency. This is because changes to the FRM policy context in England have
made the Yorkshire RFCC’s capacity to raise local levies far more valuable to other local
authorities than its co-ordinating capacities. The YDPB on the other hand, has no statutory
obligations to carry out, and is consequently not as constrained by the policy context. As a
result, its members can be far more deliberative, and are free to engage in knowledge-sharing
than members of the Yorkshire RFCC. Basically, it is possible that the role of a participatory
body can be shaped as much by the policy context in which it exists, as by its participants, or
even its original intended purpose.
The findings from this chapter reflect those from the previous one on learning and
experimentation, in that participation, as conceptualised in resilience literature, is currently
lacking in specific details to be fully practicable in an actual policy setting. Consequently, it
seems that neither of the procedural components of a resilience approach provide unequivocal
added value for practical policy making. Having dealt with the procedural practicability of a
resilience approach in chapters 3 and 4, I will focus on questions of substance, and examine
whether phenomena highlighted in resilience literature are useful, and provide new insight,
for informing policy decisions.
Chapter 5
Added-value of a holistic approach to
resilience - Methods
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have focussed on the procedural practicability of a resilience approach
to FRM, and whether the policy process envisioned in resilience literature resonates with
actual practices. Perhaps more important than procedural matters, however is the issue of
substance, meaning the information upon which policies are based. In order to make better
(i.e. more effective) policies, it is important that the information being used is relevant for
the task at hand, and gives policy-makers a better understanding of the underlying issues
that are being addressed. One method for conveying pertinent information to policy-makers,
that has been widely embraced in resilience literature (Bergstrand et al., 2015; Birkmann
et al., 2013; Winderl, 2014), is the creation of a single measurement of resilience to act
as a decision support tool. Measuring resilience is considered useful because: (a) it can
be used as a benchmark for performance to determine how effective initiatives are, and (b)
help decision-makers identify areas of concern that need to be strengthened (Kotzee and
Reyers, 2016). Despite widespread agreement of its necessity, finding appropriate metrics
for resilience has proven elusive, and it is frequently stated in the literature that resilience
“is notoriously difficult to measure” (Bene, 2013). But part of the difficulty in finding
appropriate metrics may be because it is trying to be too many things at once. Current
methods for measuring resilience all adopt a holistic approach, and define it as a multi-hazard
property, meant to represent a capacity to deal with any contingencies that may occur. It is
difficult however (if not impossible), to create a single measurement that can incorporate
complexity, interdependence, and uncertainty into its scope as is sought by current methods
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(Linkov et al., 2014). By making resilience a multi-hazard property, it becomes necessary
to incorporate a wide range of variables that may be either unrelated, or only cursorily
related to natural disasters such as flooding. With this in mind, it is pertinent to ques-
tion whether the measurement difficulties are in fact a problem derived from the manner in
which resilience is currently conceptualised, rather than an implicit vagueness of the property.
Keeping in mind the challenges of measuring resilience as a multi-hazard property, the
following two chapters will explore the use of socio-economic indicators in existing measures
of resilience, and whether these measurements necessarily need to be as complex as current
methods suggest. This will be done through statistical modelling, by comparing the efficacy
of a socio-economic indicator model, to a control model consisting of various modern FRM
measures. Statistical modelling allows for testing and verifying of the links between various
indicators and resilience, rather than assuming that such a relationship is self-evident, as is
being done in existing indexing methods. By doing this, it may be possible to streamline
resilience measurements and make it more practicable for informing policy choices. Using
FRM measures as parameters of the control model is motivated by the fact that there is
significant overlap between these measures, and those included in current resilience measure-
ments (Sharifi, 2016). In fact, the similarity is so strong that the inclusion of socio-economic
indicators is arguably the only meaningful way in which a resilience approach differs from
existing FRM practices. More on this issue will be discussed in the overview of the two
statistical models in sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4.
This chapter focusses on the methodological aspects of statistical modelling. Issues that
will be addressed include: (a) finding a metric of resilience that is suitable for statistical
modelling, (b) determining appropriate subjects to include in the study, and (c) specifying
what the parameters of each model will be. The results of the statistical modelling, and the
corresponding analysis, will be presented in chapter 6.
5.2 Measuring resilience
5.2.1 Problems with current measurements of resilience
I will not give a comprehensive summary of existing measurement methods, as Cutter (2016)
and Sharifi (2016) already provide thorough reviews. Broadly speaking, resilience mea-
surements have tended to fall under three categories: indices, scorecards (or checklist), and
self-assessment tools (Cutter, 2016). Almost all of these measurements are intended to be
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used by practitioners and local stakeholders, which has meant that they are primarily con-
cerned with community factors, rather than infrastructural or institutional ones. Furthermore,
existing measurements strongly favour a multi-hazard conceptualisation of resilience, and are
designed under the assumption that resilience entails the capacity to prepare for and respond
to any disaster that may occur (Sharifi, 2016). Keeping this in mind, despite a growing
set of literature, and continued widespread interest in resilience metrics, there have been
limited attempts at implementing and testing these measurements to assess their adequacy
(Prior and Hagmann, 2013; Winderl, 2014). This paucity of empirically proven data is
especially problematic for the composite methods (i.e. indices and scorecards) favoured
in current measurements, since they are essentially weighted aggregate scores of whatever
component indicators are included. Should it turn out that individual indicators do not have
a noticeable effect on resilience, then the entire index could be invalidated. What seems to
be forgotten in this process is that the end product (i.e. the index) is supposed to be useful
for informing policy decisions, by telling policy-makers what needs to be done to improve
resilience. In the case of flooding, this requires that the indicators included in a resilience in-
dex actually add value by improving the ability to manage and recover from floods effectively.
Additionally, it is unclear why indexing is considered the most appropriate method for
measuring resilience. Ideally, any measurement of a phenomenon requires it to be observable,
and amenable to systematic attribution of values (Hinkel, 2010; Klein et al., 2003). However,
this is unrealistic under current conceptualisations of resilience. Consider the currently most
widely used definition of resilience mentioned in chapter 2:
“(Resilience is) the ability of a system, community or society exposed to
hazards to resist, absorb, accomodate to and recover from the effects of a
hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and
restoration of its essential basic structures and functions”.
Creating a measurement that can systematically attribute values across spatial scales
(individual to country level), while simultaneously representing disparate properties such as
absorptive ability and efficiency is very challenging. Not to mention that it is unclear how
to define "accommodation" of natural hazards, or what is included as essential structures
and functions that need to be preserved. Simply put, it appears that indexing is the favoured
method for measuring resilience, not because of particular requirements of the property itself,
but because it is the only option that allows widely disparate factors to be incorporated into a
single measurement. The issue of indicator relevance is highly germane to indexing methods
in particular, because - as was mentioned in chapter 2 - social vulnerability has become an
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integral component in current conceptualisations of disaster resilience. For example, it is
asserted that deprived communities are disproportionally affected by flood risk (Escaleras
and Register, 2008; Lindley et al., 2011), and therefore any measurement of flood resilience
needs to include social justice as a key criterion (Thorne, 2014). Because of the emphasis on
social vulnerability and justice, current resilience measurements all include a multitude of
socio-economic indicators. This emphasis on social justice, and abundance of such indicators,
is quite clearly attributable to the hypothesised correlation between socio-economic status
and vulnerability to hazards. However, if the goal of measuring resilience is to inform policy-
makers what actions need to be taken to improve resilience (Burton, 2015; Sherrieb et al.,
2010), then current indexing methods seem somewhat counterproductive. By uncritically
including various indicators without first confirming and testing their relevance (to flood
resilience for example), the usefulness of these indices is undermined, since their values
can be distorted by unrelated indicators that obscure information from the truly relevant
indicators. While promoting social justice and improving socio-economic conditions for
deprived communities is doubtlessly a worthwhile goal, attempting to address these issues
should not result in choosing indicators that are too general, and may not even be relevant for
the task at hand.
Furthermore, the criticism that resilience literature has directed at the field of FRM in
particular has centred around a supposed over-emphasis on engineered solid flood defence
measures, rather than adopting a more holistic approach (Liao, 2012; Toubin et al., 2014).
This criticism is not entirely justified however, since modern FRM has mostly embraced
“softer” measures such as whole-catchment planning, wetland creation, and floodable land
(measures that are espoused in resilience literature) to complement more traditional methods
(Gober et al., 2015; Penning-Rowsell et al., 2013). Given these changes, the truly distinguish-
ing element of a resilience approach is tied to the efficacy of socio-economic factors. If it
becomes apparent that these socio-economic factors do not in fact have any noticeable effect
on the ability to overcome a disaster like flooding, then the added value of current existing
resilience measurements would be negligible.
The prevalence of indices also appears to reflect the surprising lack of acknowledge-
ment in resilience literature that while the goals of policy-making may be numerous, the
instruments available to policy-makers to achieve these goals are limited to four categories
(Howlett, 2011):
• Information (information campaigns, educational initiatives etc.)
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• Legislation (making laws that regulate actors’ behaviours)
• Taxation (financial (dis)incentivisation)
• Organisation (create public bodies/agencies/committees to directly provide services)
Basically, current measurement methods are wholly focussed on identifying what factors
can improve resilience, without sufficiently reflecting upon whether the policy instruments
needed to achieve such objectives are even available to policy-makers. It is debatable how
an index, with indicators as disparate as a population’s education level and building code
standards, can be useful for helping policy-makers narrow down specific policy options.
For instance, building code standards clearly fall under the legislative instrument category,
and improving them can be done through a straightforward (relatively speaking) process of
changing relevant legislature. Improving education levels however, is patently a far more
complicated endeavour, that necessitates a multitude of initiatives from all of the policy
instrument categories above. A policy-maker who is informed that a low resilience index
score is attributable to poor building code standards has a clear pathway to improving the
resilience of the area they are responsible for. If the same policy-maker is told that they need
to improve the local population’s education level however, then they would probably be no
better off than had they not been aware of the resilience index score in the first place.
5.2.2 Recovery time as a measurement of resilience
One important issue to consider when using statistical modelling to measure resilience is
choosing a suitable definition that is both amenable to measurement, and is also straightfor-
ward to monitor so that practitioners and stakeholders can easily identify whether particular
initatives are having an effect or not. Having this in mind, the choice comes down to either
using a strongly adaptive definition of resilience, such as Manyena et al. (2011)’s concept of
"bounce forward", or a conventional "bounce back" definition. I have chosen to use "bounce
back" as it is more straightforward to assess. The challenge in creating a measurement based
on "bouncing forward" is that the benchmark lies not in monitoring and maintaining chosen
parameters, but rather in achieving change (preferably positive). This means that in order to
measure the resilience of a system, one would first need to clarify what constitutes positive
change, which can be highly subjective and dependent on one’s priorities. While the concept
of "bounce forward" offers valuable insights, it is also unclear how to differentiate between a
system that is resilient (e.g. experiencing positive change), and one that is changing to more
strongly reflect a researcher’s (or whoever choses the metrics) preferences. Thus, selecting
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“bounce forward” metrics likely involves a political decision-making process that needs to in-
volve as many of the affected stakeholders as possible, which is beyond the scope of this study.
An interesting dilemma when attempting to measure resilience is that researchers have
tended to treat the properties of “bouncing back” and “persistence” as interchangeable prop-
erties that jointly define resilience. While both terms can used to describe the capacity to
overcome perturbations, there are subtle differences between them that pose significant prob-
lems when attempting to create measurements for them. Bounce-back metrics for example
look at the speed at which a system can return to its original state prior to the disturbance,
with quicker returns signalling better performance; whereas persistence metrics focus on
the ability of a system to maintain its existing state over time, where longer time horizons
signal better performance. Basically, “bounce back” emphasises speed whereas “persistence”
values longevity. This has not been an issue for previous efforts to measure resilience because
indexing eliminates the need to have one single measurement for resilience. In statistical
modelling however, a choice needs to be made in order to enable testing of the significance
of the relationship between the chosen metric for resilience, and hypothesised explanatory
factors/parameters.
Since the goal of measuring resilience is to guide policy-making, whatever metric is
employed needs to fulfil the criteria of being useful for informing practical policy choices.
As such, it must be possible to (a) specify what is being measured, (b) decide particular
points when a system is resilient and non-resilient, and (c) assess how resilient the system is
at a specific time. A well-specified measurement needs to be uncomplicated, and it should
be easy to identify how changes in the measurement will correspond to potential outcomes.
It should also be autonomous, meaning it should be possible to determine how resilient a
system is without relying on outside data or comparisons with other systems. This is because
a measurement will only be useful if it gives information that is actionable by the target
audience (i.e. policy-makers). If policy-makers are unable to act upon the information, for
example because the political/legal system is too dissimilar from places where the indicators
are derived from, then the measurement has not been useful for guiding policy decisions.
Given these requirements, the more suitable property to represent resilience is “bounce
back” (or recovery) ability. Recovery speed is clearly the more straightforward property to
measure when compared to longevity. Measuring “persistence” would require both a longitu-
dinal study that observes the constancy of a system throughout multiple perturbations, as well
as an estimation of what time-frame is relevant to be examined. It would be unreasonable to
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argue that a system ought to persist for a million years (to take an extreme example), since it
is impossible to make reliable predictions that far into the future. By contrast, “bounce-back”
can be measured using single events, with recovery speed giving a good indication of system
resilience. Additionally, empirical studies have shown that slow recovery times, known as
“critical slowing down”, is a reliable and good indicator of decreasing resilience in natural
systems (Dai et al., 2012; Scheffer et al., 2009).
Furthermore, particularly in the case of flooding, using recovery time makes it easier
to determine specific points at which a system is resilient or non-resilient compared to a
“persistence” metric. For example, it is not clear whether the Netherlands or Bangladesh
could be said to be more capable of “persisting” during flooding. Both systems continue
functioning during times of high water levels; the Netherlands through maintaining an
intricate (and expensive) water management system, and Bangladesh by having infrastructure
that is functional both when dry and while inundated. If the goal is simply to persist, then the
Netherlands and Bangladesh are basically equally resilient, making it difficult to decide what
indicators are relevant. For a “bounce back” metric - like recovery time - on the other hand,
the more resilient system would be one that can recover quicker from flooding. Accordingly,
any indicator that helps determine recovery speed would be considered a leading indicator of
system resilience. Assessing system resilience would then be a straightforward exercise of
identifying critical indicator levels that can predict significant slowing down (or speeding up)
of recovery times (Biggs et al., 2009; Boettiger and Hastings, 2013; Bruneau and Reinhorn,
2007). Also, assuming that flooding will indeed become frequent due to climate change
(CCC, 2015; NFRR, 2016), then recovery is also arguably a more feasible method for dealing
with the inevitability of flooding than persistence. Faster recovery from flooding entails
that the event passes quickly and people can carry on with their normal lives, whereas
persistence (as conceptualised in resilience literature) requires people to adjust their lives to
accommodate for possible extended periods of flooding. The first option is likely to be far
more attractive for policy-makers who have to consider the political consequences of their
decisions.
5.2.3 Survival Analysis
The most commonly used statistical modelling technique to predict the relationship between
a variable of interest, and its explanatory factors/parameters is the ordinary least squares
(OLS) method (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2012). However, the OLS method suffers from two
drawbacks that make it unsuitable for the purposes of this study. Firstly, the variable of inter-
est is recovery time, or in other words, the amount of time that passes until an event (flood
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recovery) takes place, which can be complicated to measure using OLS methods. Secondly,
OLS assumes that the variable of interest (time until an event) has a normal distribution,
whereas the distribution of event times are often far from normal (Allison, 2014). Given
these drawbacks, a more suitable modelling method would be survival analysis. Survival
analysis is a modelling technique that can be used when the variable we are interested in is
time, and we wish to determine what parameters help explain the time it takes until an event
occurs. OLS and survival analysis differ when modelling for time, in that an OLS model
estimates how the explanatory parameters affect the likelihood that an event takes place at
a given time, while survival analysis examines how the parameters help explain the rate at
which an event takes place. For example, an OLS estimate will tell us whether an area with
higher average educational attainment levels is more/less likely to recover from flooding at
any time compared with areas with lower average educational attainment. Survival analysis
estimates on the other hand, tell us if higher average educational attainment leads to faster or
slower recovery times than lower average educational attainment. More importantly however,
is that unlike OLS, survival analysis does not assume that the dependent variable (time) is
normally distributed (Mills, 2011), which reduces the risk that the modelling will result in
biased parameter estimates.
The core output of a survival analysis model is the hazard function. The hazard function
gives the potential that the event of interest will occur at a specified time. The term hazard
function is used mainly because survival analysis originates from the fields of engineering
and medicine, where the variable of interest is usually the “failure event” (Kleinbaum and
Klein, 2005), such as time until a cancer patient dies, or time until a light bulb fails. The
hazard function can also represent a positive event however, such as time until a person finds
employment. For the purposes of this study, the hazard function also represents a positive
event (flood recovery), which is somewhat unfortunate since flooding also happens to be a
natural hazard. As such, in order not to cause undue terminological confusion, the hazard
function will be referred to as the “recovery function” for the remainder of this study.
Another issue to consider when using survival analysis is that the standard model tests
for differences in survival times between two or more groups, which are usually divided
into a control category and a treatment category (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005). This means
that in its basic application, survival analysis only allows for one explanatory variable to
be included in a model, which can be anything, from gender, to a drug, or even a type of
material. The survival model simply estimates if there is a statistically significant difference
in survival time between the control group and the treatment group(s). A single-parameter
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model would not work for this study however, since the intent is to model flood recovery time
against multiple explanatory factors. To account for this issue, the specific method used in
this study will be the Cox regression model. Unlike standard survival analysis methods, the
Cox model allows for multi-variate analysis, making it very useful for gathering information
on the relationship between recovery time and a number of explanatory factors.
All the statistical modelling is done with the R language environment, a widely used
statistical software. Techniques unique to survival analysis are handled using the “survival
package”, which comes standard with the software.
5.3 Model specifications
Firstly, only inland flooding will be included in the study. This is because coastal flooding
tends to be more unpredictable, since they are mainly caused by severe storm surges that
have highly stochastic impacts (EA, 2009). While inland floods can also be somewhat
unpredictable, there is normally sufficient time-lag between the cause (usually heavy rainfall)
and the event to enable more accurate forecasting of whether flooding will actually occur.
This should, at least theoretically, give practitioners and residents more opportunity to take
necessary precautions (NFRR, 2016). The existence of a time-lag is particularly important
because resilience is not just meant to represent the ability to react to disruptions, but also
entails the capacity to act on information in order to avoid, or mitigate, events like flooding
(Galaz et al., 2011). What is important in this study is finding out how much of the variability
in recovery time is attributable to the indicators/parameters being studied. The greater
predictability of inland flooding should theoretically make the observed variation in recovery
time less influenced by underlying stochasticity than for coastal flooding, thereby allowing
greater certainty in identifying whether the indicators actually do have an effect on recovery
time.
5.3.1 Baseline recovery as dependent variable
The metric of resilience used in this statistical study is flood recovery time, as measured in
number of days. Faster recovery time is equivalent to greater resilience, whereas slower
recovery times indicate less resilience. In order to categorise and compare the recovery speed
of various locations systematically, it is necessary to define what constitutes recovery. There
are a number of ways to define when recovery has occurred, and the one that will be used in
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this study is baseline disaster recovery (NDRF, 2012). Baseline recovery is achieved when
the following criteria are met:
• Infrastructure
– Water and sanitation services restored and reliable
– Power and utilities services restored and reliable
• Transportation
– Roads and bridges are safe and operational
– Public transportation services back to pre-disaster capacity
• Services
– Government Administrations are open
– Educational facilities are open
– Health care can be accessed by everyone, demand returned to normal levels
• Livelihood
– Local businesses back to normal trading
Sources: Brown et al. (2010); HMG (2013); NDRF (2012)
Choosing baseline recovery over other definitions is mostly based on measurability, and
the availability of data. Some researchers have argued that resilience should encompass
the ability for affected areas to go back to normal pre-disaster states (Cutter et al., 2010;
Pfefferbaum et al., 2013). But it is unclear what going back to normal means in practice. If it
entails a return of psychological well-being for example, then recovery may never occur if
the disaster is severe enough (White et al., 2015). Not to mention that it would be extremely
difficult to track the mental and emotional state of a large number of individuals consistently
over an indeterminable period of time. Another possible way to define recovery time that
is favoured by policy-makers and residents alike is the ability for people to move back into
flooded homes (Whittle et al., 2010). Under ideal conditions, this is also likely the most
suitable definition for recovery, since the ability to move back into homes would theoretically
bring about a sense of “closure” for those affected, and allow everyone involved to move on
from the disaster. However, in reality, the ability to move back into flooded homes is not
simply attributable to FRM policies, but is also greatly determined by the particularities of the
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flood insurance system, and the speed at which insurance claims can be settled (Chatterton
et al., 2016). It is therefore not a straightforward matter to determine recovery time using this
definition, since this would involve gathering insurance claims data, which is not information
that is publicly available. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to obtain insurance claims
data to see if this could be included in the baseline recovery criteria for flood recovery time.
However, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) does not collect disaggregated data from
its members regarding filing and settling of insurance claims. Furthermore, among individual
insurers, only two companies were willing to share such information. Since together, these
insurers do not provide sufficient insurance coverage of all the flooded areas included in this
study, insurance claims had to be excluded as a baseline recovery criterion.
It is worth noting that connected to the ability to return to flooded homes is the capacity
of a locality to accommodate affected households in temporary housing and shelters. This
proved not to be an issue for the locations included in this study, but this may be because the
2013/14 and 2015/16 winter floods mainly affected areas that are not very densely populated,
and it was therefore a relatively minor challenge for relevant authorities to find suitable
temporary accommodations when needed. The densely populated areas that were flooded
- such as Bradford, Leeds, Reading, and York - did not have any households that required
temporary housing. However, it is clear that the problem of temporary accommodation is
likely to be an important concern for FRM practitioners, especially in densely populated
areas like, for example, London. I mention this because the choice of excluding household
indicators from the definition of baseline recovery is not intended to trivialise its relevance,
but simply reflects the paucity of reliable and representative data on the issue. It would
probably be worthwhile to include some form of housing indicator in future iterations of a
statistical model, provided suitable data can be collected.
Another issue worth contemplating is when the starting point of flood recovery time
should be. Since the metric of interest is recovery time, it is reasonable that measurement
starts when the flood has receded and recovery initiatives have begun. However, since
contingency planning includes flood response efforts during the actual flooding period, it
could be argued that the starting point ought to be when flooding initially occurs. As can be
seen in the chart comparison in Figure 5.1, choosing whether to include the flood period or
not can potentially have a significant impact on measuring recovery time, and also how well
various indicators will fit with the data.
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Fig. 5.1 Plots comparing baseline flood recovery times
(a) Post-flood recovery times (b) Recovery times incl. floods
Since including the flood period as part of recovery time requires no additional data
collection efforts, both versions will be included in the statistical analysis. One model counts
recovery time without including the actual flood period, meaning the start of the recovery
period takes place after visible flooding has receded from the affected area, and ends when
baseline recovery has taken place. The other model has recovery time starting when flooding
first happens, and also ends once baseline recovery occurs.
5.3.2 Areas included in the study
The two major flood events that will be studied are the 2013/14 and 2015/16 Winter Floods.
Importantly, the floods were of comparable magnitude, in terms of area affected and overall
damage caused (NFRR, 2016). Both events also resulted from heavy, sustained rainfall,
meaning the potential for severe floods was foreseeable (HC, 2014, 2016). Due to these
similarities, both events would require similar preparation and response efforts, making
direct comparisons of FRM initiatives between affected areas more pertinent. Additionally,
new institutional frameworks were put in place with the Flood and Water Management
Act 2010. Choosing flood events that took place after the Act came into force serves to
limit any potential biases resulting from differing FRM policies. Furthermore, both flood
events happened after 2011, when the most recent Census was taken. Since almost all
socio-economic indicators that are used in the statistical modelling are based on Census data,
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having compatible information is pivotal for making a reliable statistical model.
The sampling process for choosing the locations to be included in the statistical analysis
consisted of canvassing all areas that were affected by either the 2013/14 or 2015/16 Winter
floods in England, by going through the Environment Agency’s Historical Flood Map
database. The database contains detailed records of the locations and dates for all flood
events that have taken place in England since 1946, and therefore offers a comprehensive
overview of areas that were affected by the two flood events. The sample was then narrowed
down to include only areas that are designated as at least towns or civil parishes, with a
2011 Census population exceeding 5000. This process yielded a sample total of 68 locations,
which is and exhaustive list of areas in England that were affected by either the 2013/14 or
2015/16 Winter floods that also fulfill the indicated town designation and population criteria.
For each location, determining the appropriate baseline recovery time was done using the
following stepwise method:
1. Analysis of LLFA Flood Investigation Reports
2. Analysis of Structured Debrief Reports from local Fire & Rescue Services
3. Incidence reports from Highways England, local bus services, and/or National Rail
4. Local news reporting
The most reliable method for collecting information on baseline recovery is by analysing
Flood Investigation Reports. Section 19 of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010
requires that local authorities, in their capacity as LLFA, carry out and publish these reports
in the event of flooding in their area. These reports give detailed accounts of the impact of
flooding, and also list relevant actions taken by any risk management authorities involved.
Flood Investigation Reports were produced for roughly half (32 of 68) of the areas affected
by the two relevant flood events1.
For the remaining locations where the LLFA did not conduct investigations, best estimates
for baseline recovery were obtained by cross-referencing debriefing reports from local Fire
& Rescue Services with incidence reports from Highways England, local bus services or
National Rail. The Structured Debriefing Reports are intended for identifying experiences
and providing practical lessons for future co-ordination of emergency response services. In
1Some LLFAs had multiple flooded locations within their jurisdiction, but they did not necessarily produce
Flood Investigation Report for all locations
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the absence of LLFA reporting, they are also serviceable documents for establishing flood
recovery times since they provide a detailed timeline of incident responses. The drawback of
these Structured Debrief Reports is that they only deal with emergency response activities,
and therefore do not give an exact date for when baseline recovery takes place. Hence,
the reports have to be cross-referenced with potential incidence reports from infrastructure
providers such as Highways England, National Rail and local bus services. For locations
where the Structured Debrief Reports indicated that emergency services were required, but
where no other incidence reports exist, local news reporting was used as a referencing tool to
ensure that flooding had not continued after emergency services withdrew. The reason why
telecom, utilities, or water companies were not contacted is that, quite interestingly, both
flood events had negligible impact on these services. There was therefore no need to include
this information since it would not have impacted baseline recovery times.
5.3.3 The control model - modern FRM measures
To reiterate, the motivation for undertaking the statistical analysis is to find out what the added
value of current resilience measurements is. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, almost all
of the “soft” institutional and structural measures espoused by resilience literature already
exist in modern FRM. Examples of such measures include: contingency plans, land-use plan-
ning, building codes, ecosystem monitoring and protection, early warning systems, effective
communication infrastructure, insurance coverage etc. Given the significant overlap, the only
truly consequential way in which resilience measurements can provide added value, is if the
socio-economic indicators can help explain differences in flood recovery time better than a
model or measurement exclusively made up of FRM measures. At the least, socio-economic
indicators need to offer some information and insights that FRM measures do not (or cannot),
in order to have contributed added value.
In order to determine the added value of current resilience measurements, it is necessary
to first establish a control model, with FRM measures as its parameters or variables, and
study how well it can explain flood recovery time. Then a resilience model, consisting of
socio-economic indicators, will be studied and compared to the control model. The results
from the individual modelling, and the comparison, is used to identify what added value a
resilience approach can provide for policy practitioners. An ancillary aim of the modelling
is to identify specific indicators, and potential corresponding policy choices, that can be
effective for reducing flood recovery time.
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Table 5.1 FRM indicators
Indicators Data source
Risk prevention Management of watercourses Environment Agency
River restoration projects RESTORE
Surface water management plans (SWMP) LLFAs
Flood defence Presence of solid flood defences Environment Agency
Flood mitigation Urban green infrastructure LLFAs
Environment Agency planning objections Environment Agency
Flood preparation No. of households on early flood warning system Environment Agency
Local Resilience Forum (LRF) flood group meetings LRF
Multi-agency flood response plan (MAFP) LLFAs
FRM model indicators
The indicators in the FRM model are those shared by resilience measurements and modern
FRM practices, and are chosen based on the availability of data sources. These indicators
will be categorised using the classification set by Hegger et al. (2013) in Figure 5.2.
Fig. 5.2 Modern FRM practices
As mentioned earlier, there was insufficient information about flood insurance since only
two insurers were willing to share data, and the ABI does not collect disaggregated data.
Because of this, the Flood recovery category is not included in the FRM model.
Risk Prevention
“Management of watercourses” is a binary variable, where 0= watercourse maintained by local
bodies (Local Authority or IDB), and 1= watercourse maintained by Environment Agency.
Watercourses are the main sources of water feeding into a town/urban area, and are therefore
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important sources of potential flooding. Watercourses that are designated main rivers, such as
the Thames for example, are maintained by the Environment Agency. Ordinary watercourses
on the other hand are managed by other bodies such as a Local Authority or an IDB. Ordinary
watercourses can be rivers, streams, drains, dikes, and any other passage through which water
flows (EA, 2012).
“River restoration projects” is a binary variable, where 0= no upstream restoration
projects, and 1= ongoing or completed restoration projects. River restoration is a typical
example of a more integrated spatial planning approach that not only takes into consideration
immediate flooding threats, but also attempts to reduce upstream contributing factors. Exam-
ples include changing from rivers from a straight flow profile to a more meandering course
by rearranging river banks, and restoration of riparian vegetation. Data are collected from the
RESTORE partnership’s online database of ongoing and completed river restoration projects
in Europe. The database is partially funded by the Environment Agency and is maintained
by the River Restoration Centre (RRC).
“Surface water management plans (SWMP)” is a binary variable, where 0= no detailed
SWMP in flooded area, 1= flooded area has detailed SWMP. The 2007 Pitt Review found
that surface water flooding was one of the main causes of the severity of the 2007 summer
floods in the UK, and recommended that all local flood authorities develop SWMPs with
long-term action plans for handling the risks of surface water flooding. However, despite the
critical nature of this issue, very few authorities have developed such a plan thus far (CCC,
2015). The data are collected from relevant LLFAs.
Flood defence
“Presence of solid flood defences” is a binary variable, where 0= no solid defences, and 1=
presence of solid flood defences. Assets that count as solid flood defences for the purposes of
this variable are: embankments, flood-gates, flood-walls, raised earth-banks, and revetments.
Only flood defences protecting against river floods with a 1 per cent (1 in 100) chance of
happening each year are included. Data are collected from the Environment Agency’s map
of Spatial Flood Defences, which not only documents the location of the defences, but also
assigns relevant categories.
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Flood mitigation
“Urban green infrastructure” is a binary variable, where 0= no guidance plans for Sustainable
Urban Drainage System (SuDs) or Green Infrastructure, 1= has guidance plans. SuDs include
permeable ground surfaces (gravel, dirt etc.), green roofs, swales etc. Green infrastructure can
include green pathways along roads, canals and rail corridors. They can also be allotments,
gardens and public green spaces. Local authorities that publish guidance plans for developers
and planners can arguably make it easier for them to incorporate these measures in urban
spaces and thereby mitigate the effects of flooding. Plans are collected from relevant LLFAs.
“Environment Agency planning objections” is a categorical variable, where 0= 10 or
fewer objections, 1=11 to 30 objections, and 2= more than 30 objections. The Environment
Agency is a statutory consultee for planned developments in areas at risk of flooding, and can
object to development plans that do not sufficiently meet flood risk assessment requirements.
The variable tallies the total number of objections for each district between 2013 to 2015.
Data are collected from the Environment Agency’s annual list of planning objections. It
should be pointed out that number of planning objections is technically a numerical variable.
The categorisation of the variable is motivated by the fact that it tends to be highly clustered,
where locations either have very few objections over the relevant time period, or have in
excess of 30 objections, with very few locations falling within the 11 to 30 bracket. Changing
the nature of the data in this manner will undoubtedly lead to some information being lost in
the conversion process, which needs to be accounted for when doing the analysis.
Flood preparation
“Number of households on early flood warning system” is a categorical variable, where 0=
less than 50%, 1= 50-70%, and 2= higher than 70%. The Environment Agency provides
a free flood warning service to homes and businesses located in areas at risk of flooding.
The service is voluntary and those who want to sign up for the service need to create an
account with the Environment Agency. Flood warnings can be issued via email, phone, or
text message. The variable indicates the proportion of eligible properties in an area that are
actually signed up for the service. Data are collected from the Environment Agency’s internal
database, which was obtained through a Freedom of Information request.
“Local Resilience Forum (LRF) flood sub-group meetings” is a categorical variable,
where 0= no flood sub-group, 1= has sub-group but only meets once per year, 2= sub-group
meets more than once per year. LRFs are partnerships made up of Category 1 and Category
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2 responders as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. These include organisations
ranging from emergency services to public utility companies. The geographical areas that
LRFs cover are based on police areas, therefore the relevant police force is usually the
organising body, although Fire & Rescue services can also serve in this capacity in some
cases. Each LRF is constructed differently, and some have flooding sub-groups/committees
specifically created to co-ordinate and plan flood response activities. Data are collected
by contacting relevant LRFs, and where applicable, submitting a Freedom of Information
request for meeting agendas.
“Multi-agency flood response plan (MAFP)” is a categorical variable, where 0= no local
plans, 1= has either Local Flood Risk Management Plan (LFRM) or MAFP, 2= has both
LFRM and MAFP. The Flood and Water Management Act 2010 requires all LLFAs to draft
a Local Flood Risk Management Plan (LFRM) highlighting the local strategy for handling
flood risks in their area. Meanwhile, LRFs are also encouraged to develop MAFPs detailing
how they intend to provide comprehensive and sustained response to potential flooding.
Having both plans could potentially indicate that the local organisations highly prioritise
flooding, and therefore might be better prepared. Documents are obtained from the relevant
LLFAs and LRFs.
5.3.4 The resilience model - socio-economic indicators
Since the purpose of the socio-economic model is to determine the added value of a resilience
approach, the explanatory variables in the model will closely mimic those indicators that have
been included in existing resilience measurements. Extrapolating from Cutter (2016); Sharifi
(2016), an overwhelming majority of current resilience measurements contain the following
categories of indicators: Community connectedness, educational equality, economic activity,
access to healthcare, income levels, population demographics (age, ethnicity etc.), social
capital. The exact metrics may differ slightly, for example some indices use doctors per
1000 residents to represent healthcare access, whereas other (primarily American) indices
use percentage of population with health insurance. However, there is broad consensus and
overlap between the various resilience measurements regarding the categories of indicators
included in the literature.
Indicators used in this model
The most commonly recurring indicators identified in the previous section can broadly be
put into four main categories: health, economic, social, and community indicators. This
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Table 5.2 Socio-economic indicators
Indicators Data source
Health Proportion of residents living in hospital establishments 2011 Census
Proportion of population providing unpaid care 2011 Census
Economic Education attainment level 2011 Census
Hourly earnings ONS annual survey
Jobs densitiy ONS annual survey
Social Proportion of population giving to charity DMCS annual survey
Level of trust within the community ONS 2012 survey
Community Proportion of ethnic minorities 2011 Census
Number of businesses per 1000 residents ONS annual survey
Number of voluntary organisations per 1000 residents NCVO report
categorisation is used to guide selection of the socio-economic indicators that will be included
in the statistical model. These can be found in Table 5.2. All the indicators are chosen based
on how closely they mimic the most widely-used indicators in existing measurements of
resilience. Some, such as Education attainment level or Proportion of ethnic minorities
are virtually identical across the different measurements. Others, such as Proportion of
residents in hospital establishments and Number of businesses per 1000 residents, are chosen
because they are metrics that can represent the relevant capacities, while reflecting local data
constraints. Additionally, some resilience measurements may be intended for places where
economic indicators cannot be disaggregated to the same level that the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) is capable of. Basically, where the indicators in Table 5.2 might diverge
from those used in existing resilience measurements, the rationale for such differences is
purely motivated by the quality of data available.
Health indicators
“Proportion of residents in hospital establishments” measures the number of usual residents in
hospital establishments as a proportion of the total population in the district according to the
2011 Census. Residency implies longer-term arrangements, and therefore overnight stays at
general hospitals or similar do not count. The definition of hospital establishment include:
NHS General hospitals, NHS mental health hospitals/units, Other hospitals, Local Authority
established care homes, and care homes with nursing.
“Proportion of population providing unpaid care” tracks the number of respondents who
indicated that they provided at least 1 hour of unpaid care per week according to the 2011
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Census. This can include for example caring for elderly, people with disability, or those with
mental health issues. It does not include parental care for children.
Economic indicators
“Education attainment level” measures the proportion of the total population that has a Level
4 qualification or higher as of the 2011 Census. The ONS defines a Level 4 qualification as
a post-secondary degree or equivalent. Examples include: Degree (for example BA, BSc),
Higher Degree (for example MA, PhD, PGCE), NVQ Level 4-5, HNC, HND, RSA Higher
Diploma, BTEC Higher level, Foundation degree (NI), or Professional qualifications (for
example teaching, nursing, accountancy).
“Hourly earnings” is taken from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE),
which is conducted in April each year to obtain information about the levels, distribution and
make-up of earnings and hours worked for employees. The ASHE is based on a sample of
employee jobs taken from HM Revenue & Customs PAYE records. Information on earnings
and hours is obtained from employers, and the ASHE does not cover the self-employed, nor
does it cover employees not paid during the reference period. Since this is an annual survey,
the earnings numbers correspond to the relevant flood year, meaning if a location was flooded
in 2013/14, then the 2013 figures were used.
“Job density” is the number of jobs in an area divided by the resident population aged
16-64 in that area. For example, a job density of 1.0 would mean that there is one job for
every resident aged 16-64. The total number of jobs is a workplace-based measure and
comprises employee jobs, self-employed, government-supported trainees and HM Forces.
As with Hourly earnings, the values used correspond to the preceding year in which each
location was flooded.
Social indicators
In general terms, social capital represents social connections and all the benefits they generate.
Social capital is also associated with civic participation, civic-minded attitudes and values
which are important for people to cooperate, such as tolerance or trust. “Social capital is the
glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or
human well-being” (Grootaert, 1998). The reason why social capital is included in resilience
meaxurements is that social connections that link people arguably lead them to exchange
resources and form co-operative norms of behaviour. It is argued that without these networks,
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society would be less cohesive, and therefore less capable of dealing with unforeseen changes
or disruptions (Lindley et al., 2011).
“Proportion of population giving to charity” is taken from the Department for Culture,
Media & Sports’ (DCMS) annual Taking Part Survey. The survey is a continuous face
to face household survey of adults aged 16 and over in England. The specific question
that the variable is based on is the percentage of respondents who indicated that they had
donated money to a DCMS sector in the 12 months prior to being interviewed. As before,
the percentages are taken from the surveys immediately preceding the relevant flood event.
“Level of trust within the community” is taken from the ONS study “Measuring National
Well-being – An analysis of social capital in the UK” released in 2015. Specifically, the value
included is based on “Proportion of respondents who feel that people in their neighbourhood
can be trusted”. Social trust, rather than other ways of measuring social capital was chosen
because it is considered the most important social indicator in multiple measurements of
resilience (Bergstrand et al., 2015; Leykin et al., 2013).
Community indicators
It isn’t entirely clear why existing resilience measurements tend to separate community
indicators from the social indicators. Most likely, social indicators are intended to be more
micro/individual scale factors, whereas community level indicators are supposed to be more
reflective of the collective characteristics.
“Proportion of ethnic minorities” measures the proportion of the total population in
an area that self-identified as an ethnic minority in the 2011 Census. Minority groups in-
clude: Irish, Gypsy or Irish Traveller, Mixed/multiple ethnic groups, Asian/Asian British,
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British, and Other.
“Number of businesses per 1000 residents” is compiled from the Inter Departmental
Business Register (IDBR) recording the number of enterprises that were live at a reference
date in March each year. An enterprise is generally identified using VAT and/or PAYE
records, and operates either fully independently, or has a certain degree of autonomy within
an enterprise group. As before, the number of businesses corresponds to the year in which
the flooding occurred.
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“Number of voluntary organisations per 1000 residents” is obtained from the National
Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) UK Civil Society Almanac for 2014/2015. Vol-
untary organisations can be active in the following areas: Culture and recreation, Education,
Playgroups and nurseries, Research and Grant-making foundations, Health, Social services,
Scout and youth groups, Environment, Village Halls, Employment and training, Law and
advocacy, Umbrella bodies, International organisations, and Religious groups.
5.3.5 Similarities between resilience measurements and indices of hu-
man welfare
An important concern, that has received no mention in the literature, is that the socio-
economic indicators in resilience measurements nearly completely overlap with existing
indices of human welfare and well-being. For example, with the OECD Better Life Index,
overlapping indicator groups include: civic engagement, community connectedness, eco-
nomic activity, education, healthcare, housing, and income. While overlapping indicator
groups with the English Index of Multiple Deprivations (IMD) include: economic activity,
education, healthcare, housing, income, and social capital. Not only is it not self-evident that
socio-economic factors should be included as metrics of resilience, it is also unclear why –
given the obvious overlap – current resilience measurements have their own indicators rather
than simply making use of such pre-existing indices. There appears to be little added value
to incorporating a comprehensive set of socio-economic indicators, since it is doubtful that
they can offer insights that cannot already be gained by looking at for example the IMD or
the OECD Better Life Index.
With this in mind, it is also interesting to model flood recovery time against the IMD,
as a comparison to the previous socio-economic indicator model derived from resilience
literature. Considering that the IMD is already a weighted aggregate index, it is essentially a
fully constructed version of a socio-economic indicators index as envisioned in resilience
literature. Modelling the IMD would therefore serve as an additional means of testing the
added value of socio-economic indicators for explaining flood recovery time.
The IMD was compiled in 2015, and is the official measure of relative deprivation for
small areas/neighbourhoods in England. The index divides England into a total of 32,844
areas that are ranked from least to most deprived. It is also divided into ten equal sized
deciles, with an area assigned to a specific decile depending on their overall deprivation rank.
For example, if an area is ranked 5,000 out of 32,844, where 1 is the most deprived, then
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this means that the relevant area is amongst the 20 percent most deprived in the country. The
index is composed of several domains, with each domain consisting of a basket of indicators
that are intended to represent the general well-being of an area. The domains of the IMD are
weighted in the following manner:
Income deprivation (22.5%), Employment deprivation (22.5%), Education, Skills and
Training deprivation (13.5%), Health deprivation and disability (13.5%), Crime (9.3%),
Barriers to housing and services (9.3%), Living Environment deprivation (9.3%).
Taking into consideration how well it represents the social vulnerability aspects empha-
sised by resilience literature, modelling the IMD can be highly useful for determining the
overall added value of a holistic, multi-hazard perspective of disaster management. If it turns
out that the IMD does not explain flood recovery times for example, then this would be an
indication that a holistic approach might not be useful for identifying effective FRM policy
choices.
5.3.6 Level of detail of the data and related issues
One issue to keep in mind when analysing the statistical models is the level of detail of
the data, particularly pertaining to spatial scale. The issue of scale is especially pertinent
because a significant element of my research deals with questions about local vs. central
decision-making (participatory approach) and community (community resilience and cohe-
siveness). Issues of scale can be problematic for statistical analysis due to the granularity
of data, in that it is crucial that the data for different models is measuring the same thing.
For example, using average household income for Greater London might not be at the right
level of detail if we are interested in analysing questions about a specific neighbourhood
or borough, since average incomes are likely to be quite different between Newham and
Richmond upon Thames. A list of model parameters, along with the level of detail at which
the data is collected, and be seen in Table 5.3. Looking at the table, care should be taken not
to draw strong conclusions when doing a comparison between the FRM and socio-economic
models since most parameters in the FRM model are at a higher level of detail (county). This
does not necessarily mean that no comparisons can be made, but it does indicate that the FRM
model may not be able to capture significant variables because the effects are manifested at a
lower level of detail.
In terms of matching the level of detail at which the dependent variable (recovery time)
is measured, the closest approximation is in the IMD model, since the selection criteria (a
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Table 5.3 Data level of detail
Model Parameter Level of detail
FRM Management of watercourses County
River restoration projects County
SWMPs County
Solid food defences County
Urban green infrastructure County
EA planning objections District
No. of households on early flood warning system District
LRF meetings County
Multi-agency flood response plan County
Socio-economic Proportion of population residing in hospitals District
Proportion of population providing unpaid care District
Education attainment level District
Hourly earnings District
Job density District
Proportion of population giving to charity County
Social capital (Level of trust) District
Proportion of ethnic minorities District
No. of businesses per 1000 residents District
No. of voluntary organisations per 1000 residents County
IMD Neighbourhood
town or civil parish, with at least 5000 residents) is at a lower granularity than both the FRM
model (mostly County level) and the socio-economic model (mostly District level). The IMD
is in fact at an even lower level of detail than the dependent variable since each area in the
IMD is a neighbourhood2, meaning one can potentially have multiple IMD areas. Again, this
does not mean that the IMD model will be better at explaining differences in flood recovery
time, or that the FRM model and socio-economic model cannot yield useful insights. It
simply means that the IMD model is least likely to miss any potentially significant effects
because of data having been aggregated to a higher level of detail.
2Defined as small areas (or neighbourhoods) in England that are classed as Lower-layer Super Output Areas,
based on the 2011 Census
Chapter 6
Added-value of a holistic approach to
resilience - Analysis
6.1 Introduction
The goal of the statistical analysis is to determine what potential added value a resilience
approach can offer for practical policy-making in the field of FRM. The study uses flood
recovery time as the measurement for resilience, and the subjects (individual observations)
included in the statistical models consist of cities and towns in England that were flooded
during either the 2013/14 Winter floods, or the 2015/16 Winter floods. There are two main
models in the analysis: a control model (or FRM model), which has existing FRM measures
as its parameters, and the resilience model (or socio-economic model), which has various
socio-economic indicators as its parameters. The results for the models are compared to
find out how well each can explain differences in flood recovery time for the flooded areas,
which should provide relevant insights useful for determining the added value of a resilience
approach.
An important issue to keep in mind is that interpreting the coefficients for each param-
eter is not entirely straightforward in survival analysis. In a survival analysis model, the
coefficient denotes the ratio between two successive values of the parameter (explanatory
variable), and is an expression of the proportional change in the dependent variable (flood
recovery time) that can be expected with each unit change in the variable. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, the core output of a standard survival analysis model is the hazard
function, which indicates the likelihood that an event will occur at specific times. Given that
the topic of analysis in my study is flooding – a natural hazard – it is important to clarify that
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hazard function in survival analysis is not used descriptively, but is simply an expression
of the likelihood that an event happens at specific points in time. Keeping this in mind, the
coefficients in survival analysis give information about how each parameter affects the hazard
rate of an event (e.g. the rate – or likelihood – at which an event takes place). Coefficients
with values above 1 denote an increase in hazard rate (the likelihood of an event increases),
and values between 0 – 1 denote a decrease of the hazard rate (likelihood of event decreases).
Counter-intuitively, for this study, coefficient values above 1 (i.e. increasing hazard rate) are
a good thing because higher values indicate that the rate at which recovery takes place is
increasing, meaning it is more likely that baseline recovery is achieved in a short time than a
long time.
The reason for the confusing terminology is that survival analysis was originally devel-
oped in the engineering and medical fields (Allison, 2014). In these fields, survival analysis
tends to be used to determine time to a failure event, such as material breakage or time of
death. In these cases, prolonging the time to an event would be considered a good thing.
This is not necessarily the case in other fields, such as social sciences, where shorter event
timelines can be good. In order to prevent any potential confusion caused by the terminology
in survival analysis, the hazard function will be referred to as the recovery function in this
chapter. Similarly, recovery rate will be used instead of hazard rate.
The significance (i.e. its usefulness, or “added value”) of a statistical model is determined
through hypothesis testing, which is done to establish the validity of a claim that is made
about a topic of interest. This is done by assigning a p-value for each parameter coefficient,
which indicates their statistical significance. Diez et al. (2015) give a more thorough overview
of hypothesis-testing and the meaning of significance in statistical analysis. For the purposes
of this study, the p-values essentially indicate whether each explanatory variable exerts an
observable effect on flood recovery time. The lower the p-value, the more confidently we can
claim that the explanatory variable has an effect on recovery time. Generally, it is assumed
that p-values below the 0.05 threshold indicate a reliable level of statistical significance for
the variable (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2012).
6.2 Control model - FRM measures
One detail about the FRM model that affects how the results are interpreted, is that all the
parameters are either binary or categorical. This means that each parameter can only take on
a limited number of fixed values. For binary (or dummy) variables, the possible values are 0
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and 1, whereas categorical variables can take on more (to a limited extent) values. This is
because these parameters are grouped based on qualitative properties, and have been assigned
numerical values in order to enable statistical modelling. The binary variables in the FRM
model are: Critical watercourses, River restoration, Surface water plan, Green infrastructure,
and Flood defences. Drawing inferences from these binary variables is straightforward since
the parameter coefficient estimate is a direct representation of any change in the recovery
rate between the “control group” and the “treatment group”. For categorical variables on the
other hand, the same parameter may be included more than once in the model to determine
how each category of the parameter differs from the baseline value. These parameters will
have an accompanying number to denote which specific category is being compared to the
baseline. Categorical variables in the FRM model are: Flood warning system, LRF flood
group, Multi-agency flood plan, and EA planning objections.
6.2.1 Standard FRM models
As mentioned in the methods chapter earlier, I will be performing the statistical analysis
using two different measurements for recovery time, which means that two regressions are
used in the analysis. The first regression has recovery time measured as “time to baseline
recovery, excluding the flood period”. And the second regression measures recovery time as
“time to baseline recovery, including the flood period”. The results of running the regressions
of the standard FRM model are summarised in Table 6.1. The numbers in brackets are
the corresponding standard-errors of the coefficients for each parameter. Any significant
(p-value) parameter coefficient is indicated by an asterisk (*), with numbers of asterisks
meaning greater significance.
Looking at the results in Table 6.1, is seems that only Flood warning system is consistently
significant (has a p-value below the 0.05 threshold) for both regressions, with Surface water
plan and Multi-agency flood plans being significant for only one of the regressions. The two
categories of Flood warning system are significant for both the “No flood period” and “With
flood period” regressions, with higher sign-up proportion (category 1 is 50-70%, category 2
is >70%) in the population corresponding to faster recovery times. In the “No flood period”
regression, locations with 50-70% sign-up and >70% sign-up have coefficients of 1.215 and
1.527 respectively, while in the “With flood period” regression the corresponding values are
1.988 and 2.022. A coefficient of 1.215 indicates that having 50-70% of the population signed
up for the EA flood warning system leads to a 21.5% (1.215 - 1 = 0.215 = 21.5%) increase in
the recovery rate compared with areas where fewer than 50% of those eligible are signed up.
In practice, this means that time to baseline recovery for areas with 50-70% sign-ups is faster
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Table 6.1 Estimations of FRM models
No flood period With flood period
Watercourse 0.209* 0.200*
(0.820) (0.827)
River restoration 0.764 1.022
(0.391) (0.376)
Surface plan 0.868** 1.097
(0.304) (0.338)
Warning system (1) 1.215*** 1.988
(0.184) (0.184)
Warning system (2) 1.527*** 2.202***
(0.189) (0.192)
LRF flood grp. (1) 0.496 0.480
(0.181) (0.191)
LRF flood grp. (2) 0.762 0.513
(0.199) (0.217)
Multi-agency FP (1) 2.455* 3.721***
(0.191) (0.199)
Multi-agency FP (2) 0.632 1.149
(0.212) (0.241)
Green infrastructure 0.855 1.461
(0.395) (0.367)
EA objections (1) 1.826* 1.464
(0.222) (0.216)
EA objections (2) 0.806 0.598
(0.251) (0.267)




Likelihood ratio 42.46*** 46.29***
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
by 21.5%. With this in mind, the modelled results for Flood warning system appear to be
consistent with expectations, in that higher percentages of households and businesses signed
up for the EA flood warning service also correspond to faster flood recovery times.
In the case of Surface water plan, the estimated coefficient for the “No flood period”
regression is somewhat counter-intuitive. A coefficient of 0.868 indicates that having local
Surface Water Management Plans (SWMPs) would lead to a 13.2% (1 - 0.868 = 0.132
= 13.2%) decrease in the recovery rate, meaning time to baseline recovery for areas with
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SWMPs is slower by 13.2% compared with those without SWMPs. With this in mind, it
is unclear what potential inferences can be drawn from this result since the parameter is
only significant for the “No flood period” regression. It is similarly difficult to draw any
conclusions for Multi-agency flood plans since it is also only significant in one instance.
However, unlike for Surface water plan, Multi-agency flood plans is borderline significant
(p-value of 0.071) in the “No flood period” regression. Coupled with the fact that the coeffi-
cient estimates are eye-catchingly high, 2.455 and 3.721 respectively, it would be a highly
interesting parameter to examine. The magnitude of the coefficient values is interesting
because of the distinction between statistical significance and substantive significance (or
effect size). Statistical significance (i.e. low p-values) is simply an indicator of whether the
null hypothesis, that the parameter does not explain variations in the dependent variable, is
true or false. Knowing the statistical significance of a parameter does not tell us whether
its effect on the dependent variable is practically meaningful. This is where interpreting
the substantive significance, or effect size, of a parameter becomes relevant. Analysing the
potential effect size of a parameter helps determine how important the modelled results are
for answering the core research question. As such, despite being borderline statistically
significant, the magnitude of its coefficients necessitates further examination of Multi-agency
flood plans, due to its potential impact on recovery time.
With this in mind, it is notable that it is the middle category of Multi-agency flood plans
that has significant values. As mentioned in the parameter descriptions in the methods
chapter, the middle category consists of flooded locations that have produced either a LFRM
or a MAFP, but not both. If both categories of the parameter were significant, it would
be possible to infer that having a LFRM and/or MAFP helps significantly reduce flood
recovery time. However, with only the middle category being significant, it is possible that
some other characteristic, shared by locations with fast recovery times, strongly coincides
with the location only having one of either a LFRM or a MAFP. One possibility is that
Multi-agency flood plans is interacting with another parameter in the model, which can affect
coefficient estimates and standard errors. The ramifications of interaction effects between
model variables is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.2.
Model diagnostics
In addition to finding out whether individual parameters are significant, it is also important
to determine how well the overall model fits the data. For this study, the “goodness-of-fit”
of a model indicates how much of the observed variation in flood recovery time that can be
explained by the chosen parameters. Since the goal of the statistical analysis is to find out the
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added value of a resilience approach to FRM, ascertaining the goodness-of-fit of each model
is important, because it allows for a direct comparison between the control (FRM) model and
the resilience (socio-economic) model. If the resilience model has a better goodness-of-fit
(i.e. greater explanatory power), then this would be a possible indication that a resilience
approach does offer added value.
A general goodness-of-fit measure used in regression analysis is R-squared (R2), which
determines how much of the total variation in the dependent variable (flood recovery time)
can be explained by the model. A more thorough discussion of the measure can be found in
Diez et al. (2015). The problem with R2 however, is that while it may be useful, it does tend
to overestimate goodness-of-fit, and can be increased simply by adding more explanatory
variables into the model (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2012). A better way to assess model fit in
survival analysis is through a Log-likelihood ratio test (Mills, 2011). The test compares two
statistical models, one being the model that is analysed, and the other is a null model. For
this study, the null model simply assumes that none of the variables have an effect on flood
recovery time. The Log-likelihood ratio test analyses whether a difference can be observed
between the two models, and also whether this difference is statistically significant. The
higher the ratio, the more likely it is that at least some of the parameters in the model can
help explain the variations in observed flood recovery times. The goodness-of-fit indicators
of the standard FRM model regressions can be found at the bottom of Table 6.1.
The model diagnostics indicate at least some of the parameters in the FRM model can
help explain variations of flood recovery time, since both regressions are significant (p-values
below 0.05) according to the Likelihood-ratio test. These variables are most likely the ones
that were found to be statistically significant in Table 6.1, meaning Flood warning system,
Surface water plan, and Multi-agency flood plans.
An additional way to assess the goodness-of-fit of a model is through residual analysis,
and specifically residual plotting. A residual (e) is the difference between the observed
value of the dependent variable (y), and the predicted value (yˆ), i.e. e = y− yˆ. Residual
analysis is done to make sure there are no noticeable trends in how model-estimated values
for recovery time differ from actual measured recovery times. Should there be any trends
in the residuals, then this would be an indication that the model may be misspecified and
therefore not suitable. Residual testing in survival analysis for multivariate regressions is
usually done by using the “Martingale” method or the “Deviance” method. The mathematical
differences between the two methods are explained in detail by (Allison, 2014). For the
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purposes of this study, the differences between the two methods can be summarised by the
fact that “Martingale” residuals are asymmetrical. A “Martingale” residual has a maximum
upper value of 1, but has no limit on its lower value (i.e. it can approach−∞). To explain why
they are asymmetrical, we first need to recognise that residuals in survival analysis represent
the discrepancy between the actual time until a “failure” event, and the predicted time until
“failure” event. Therefore, positive residual values mean that the “failure” event (for example
patient death) occurred sooner than expected; whereas negative values mean that the “failure”
event happened later than expected. “Martingale” residuals can therefore potentially have
extremely large negative values because the “failure” event may not take place, for example
because a machine part may not break down, or a cancer patient does not die.
Considering the asymmetrical nature of “Martingale” residuals, using the “Deviance”
method may be more suited for this study, since all locations included in the analysis do
experience the “failure” event (baseline recovery). Additionally, unlike for other studies,
where longer than expected times to the “failure” event are of most interest, both positive
and negative residuals are relevant for the purposes of this study. Both longer, and shorter
than expected flood recovery times can offer relevant information for the analysis. As such,
all residual analysis in this chapter will be done using the “Deviance” method. The residual
plots for the standard FRM model regressions can be found in Figure 6.1.
Fig. 6.1 Residual plots for the FRM model regressions
(a) No flood period (b) With flood period
As can be seen, there are no observable trends in the residual plots. This means that there
is unlikely to be any systematic error in the model that can lead to biased estimates of flood
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recovery time. The residual analysis therefore suggests that the model is generally suited for
purpose, and any parameter found to be statistically significant most likely does have a valid
effect on flood recovery time.
6.2.2 Model parsimony and assessing individual parameters
Another issue worth mentioning is that the regression results in Table 6.1 suggest that, since
most of the parameters do not have significant p-values, they could potentially be removed
without affecting the overall explanatory power of the model. One key reason for paring
down the number of parameters is to achieve greater model parsimony. Model parsimony is
important for correctly balancing the goodness-of-fit of a model (R2) with the specific data
used to generate said model, and the need to be able to make meaningful inferences from the
model. As mentioned earlier, adding more parameters into a model will generally lead to
greater goodness-of-fit. This is because the statistical model is fitted to the specific dataset
used as input, irrespective of whether the results make sense. Consequently, the greater the
number of explanatory variables, the likelier it is that the modelling has generated a forced-fit
where the model fits the input data very well, but fails at accurately predicting outcomes for
other datasets (Berk, 2004). Achieving model parsimony is therefore important for finding a
model that has strong explanatory power, that is also applicable to a wider context.
Model parsimony is also important as it is one way to avoid over-specification of the
model, which occurs when one or more variables are redundant. Redundant variables can
lead to inflated standard errors for the parameter coefficients that can affect the overall
goodness-of-fit of a model (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2012). Looking at Table 6.1, there may
be an issue with over-specification as the standard errors for Management of watercourses ap-
pear to be disproportionate to the parameter coefficients. Furthermore, since Flood warning
system is the only consistently significant parameter in the FRM model, it would be useful
to test the significance of each explanatory variable independently to ensure that there is no
forced fit at play. In survival analysis, this is done by modelling each parameter with the
dependent variable separately in order to determine their model-isolated significance, which
can be done using the Kaplan-Meier method.
The Kaplan-Meier method estimates the hazard function (recovery function) for each
observation (flooded location) over time (Mills, 2011). More importantly, it can be used to
calculate the recovery functions of observations under baseline conditions (null condition),
and cases where an intervention (parameter) exists. These functions can then be compared
using a log rank test, which yields a chi-squared value. The chi-square can be used to
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determine whether any differences between the recovery functions for the intervention and
baseline cases are statistically significant. Higher chi-squared values correspond to greater
statistical significance, and a significant chi-squared value indicates that the parameter does
exert an effect on flood recovery times independently from the overall FRM model.
Table 6.2 Chi-squared values for Kaplan-Meier estimates
No flood period With flood period
Watercourse 0.911 3.201*
River restoration 0.223 0.152
Surface plan 8.341*** 3.452*
Warning system 13.141*** 16.145***
LRF flood grp. 0.642 1.531
Multi-agency FP 14.634*** 15.421***
Green infrastructure 0.242 1.711
EA objections 4.932* 8.817**
Flood defences 1.021 2.081
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
The results of Kaplan-Meier estimates for each parameter is summarised in Table 6.2. As
can be seen, Flood warning system and Multi-agency flood plan are both highly significant.
While Surface water plan and EA planning objections are significant for one regression,
and borderline signifcant for the other. These results generally mirror the ones found from
the standard FRM model regressions. With these results in mind, it would appear that the
FRM model could be pared down to only include these four parameters, and not lose much
goodness-of-fit and explanatory power. It is worth noting that the chi-squares for all four
variables fluctuate appreciably when comparing different baseline recovery models. Coupled
with the notable spread in the residual plots in Figure 6.1, this suggests that the model
estimates have significant standard errors, which reduces the reliability and explanatory
power of the models. The implication of the high standard errors in the FRM models, and
potential ways to correct this issue, will be discussed further in the findings section.
6.2.3 Simplified FRM model
Taking into account the results from the previous section, Table 6.3 summarises a simplified
FRM model using only the parameters that were found to have significant Kaplan-Meier
chi-squared estimates. Looking at the model diagnostics, it does not appear that the goodness-
of-fit of the model has been affected much, with both regressions having significant Log-
likelihood ratios. An interesting result from the simplified FRM model regressions is that
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Table 6.3 Estimations of simplified FRM model
No flood period With flood period
Surface plan 1.115 1.228
(0.312) (0.293)
Warning system (1) 1.230** 1.803
(0.568) (0.711)
Warning system (2) 1.811*** 2.397***
(0.544) (0.781)
Multi-agency FP (1) 0.786 1.421***
(0.211) (0.270)
Multi-agency FP (2) 0.762*** 0.754
(0.185) (0.179)
EA objections (1) 1.201 0.912
(0.276) (0.229)




Likelihood ratio 36.73*** 36.10***
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1
the significance of all variables apart from Flood warning system appears to be reduced in
comparison with the standard FRM model. Surface water plan in particular has switched
from borderline significance to practically insignificant. It is unclear why this might be the
case, but the high variation of the estimates do point towards low model reliability, since
higher variance also makes it more difficult to determine if a variable is significant or not. A
possible explanation for these results is that there may be some interaction effects between
them. Interaction occurs when the “main effect”, meaning the effect on the dependent
variable (recovery time), differs from what would be expected based on the individual inputs
of each explanatory variable. An oft-cited example is the effect that smoking and alcohol
consumption have on throat cancer (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Individuals that either smoke
or drink heavily have increased risks of throat cancer. Individuals who do both are particularly
at risk however, and this is because of an interactive effect between drinking and smoking.
Basically, interaction indicates that the effect of one parameter on the dependent variable
is different at different values of the other parameter. For this study, the possible cause of
potential interaction effects may be the Local Authorities, who as LLFAs, are responsible
for most of the outputs that are used as explanatory parameters in the FRM model. As such,
differences in flood recovery time could potentially be better explained by which specific
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LLFA is affected, than the specific FRM measures. The ramifications of a possible “Local
Authority” effect will be discussed in the findings section.
Other model specification considerations
In addition to interaction effects, another issue to consider is the possibility of a confounding
factor (or omitted-variable bias) of the FRM model. A confounding factor is a variable that
influences both the explanatory variable and independent variable, which can result in a “bi-
ased” model since the model compensates for the missing factor by over- or underestimating
the effect of one of the included factors (Allison, 2014). One potential confounding factor for
the model is linked to the “Local Authority” effect mentioned previously, which is connected
to the issue of spatial scale mentioned in Section 5.3.6. Most of the model parameter data are
collected at the county level, whereas it is possible that a flood event affects areas within a
single county unequally, thereby resulting in the model possibly omitting significant effects.
For example, in chapter 4 it became clear that despite being the LLFA responsible for co-
ordinating local FRM in North Yorkshire, meeting documents suggest that the NYCC TEEC
was primarily interested in transport issues because it is of greater concern for the county as a
whole. As such, decisions taken at county level may not accurately reflect circumstances at a
smaller scale. Unfortunately, data for most of the parameters in the FRM model do not exist
at a lower level of detail, which means that the risk of having omitted significant variables
needs to be considered when presenting the findings.
Another interesting issue that was briefly touched upon in chapter 4, is the allocation of
resources for FRM. A potential confounding factor could be that LLFAs that are allocated
more resources also have faster recovery times because they can afford to put more attention
to FRM matters. If so, then the real predictor for whether an area can recover faster from
flooding would not necessarily be the effectiveness of individual initiatives, but how much
resources are poured in to FRM. There is no direct statistical test for confounding variables
in survival analysis. One method for verifying suspected confounding factors is to simply
include the variable in the multivariate analysis and observe if it changes the p-value and
standard error of the other explanatory variables (Mills, 2011). To control for the possibility
that the magnitude of resources available to each LLFA is a confounding factor, I have run
separate Cox regressions that includes LLFA funding as one of the explanatory variables. The
funding metric used is Defra direct grant allocations to each LLFA for the years 2012-2013
and 2014-2015. The years were chosen because they correspond to the financial year im-
mediately preceding each flood event (2013/14 and 2015/16), which should theoretically
account for spending that has already been made rather than ongoing initiatives. While there
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are other funding sources available to LLFAs (notably local levies and partnership funding),
these are all project-specific and are not used at the discretion of each LLFA. Defra direct
grant allocations are assigned based on a start-up funding assessment (SFA) of the LLFAs
needs, and serves as a general source of funding, which enables more straightforward direct
comparisons. The results of including LLFA funding in the model can be found in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Estimations of LLFA funding stratification model
No flood period With flood period
LLFA funding 1.101 1.236
(0.350) (0.332)
Surface plan 1.215 1.128
(0.299) (0.313)
Warning system (1) 1.330* 1.403*
(0.588) (0.611)
Warning system (2) 1.711** 2.227**
(0.644) (0.789)
Multi-agency FP (1) 0.841 1.321**
(0.311) (0.369)
Multi-agency FP (2) 0.862* 0.854
(0.195) (0.191)
EA objections (1) 1.281 0.999
(0.296) (0.279)




Likelihood ratio 35.01*** 33.72***
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
As can be seen in Table 6.4, it does not appear that LLFA funding is a confounding factor
for the FRM model, since there is no great change in the p-values and standard errors of
the parameters, and the effect size of the overall model does not change noticeably, after
including funding as an explanatory variable. This does not necessarily mean that there are
no omitted variables in the model. It simply means that it is unlikely that LLFA funding
significantly affects flood recovery times in the areas studied. Although resource allocation
seems not to influence flood recovery time, it is still possible that there are omitted variables
that lead to model bias, which will be considered when the findings are presented.
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6.2.4 The impact of railway incidents
An interesting observation from studying flood recoveries is that rail network failures seem to
have had an inordinate effect on flood recovery times for certain areas. As can be seen from
the first scatter plot in Figure 6.2, failures in the rail network seem to dramatically increase
flood recovery times. By discounting rail incidents from baseline recovery requirements in
the second scatter plot, the variability in recovery time is smoothed out significantly.
Fig. 6.2 Plots comparing baseline recovery times
(a) With rail incidents (b) No rail incidents
Keeping in mind the potentially inordinate influence that these outlier cases can have
on the general goodness-of-fit of the data, it would be worthwhile to explore what possible
effect the removal of rail network repairs as a baseline recovery criterion might have on
modelled parameter estimates. While it is part of critical transportation infrastructure that
ought reasonably be included in any measurement of an area’s capacity to recover from
flooding, there is also possibly an element of luck involved. Part of the problem is that these
locations were the only ones where the rail networks were exposed to flooding. It would
therefore be interesting to see how robust the modelled parameter effects are, considering the
possible skewness resulting from the rail network failures.
Table 6.5 summarises the results of running a regression on the full FRM model from
section 6.1.1, with rail incidents discounted. The locations where the railway incidents
occurred are still included in the model, their recovery times have simply been adjusted to
126 Added-value of a holistic approach to resilience - Analysis
account for the removal of rail network repairs as a baseline recovery criterion.








Warning system (1) 4.597***
(0.838)
Warning system (2) 5.759***
(0.806)
LRF flood grp. (1) 0.609
(0.180)
LRF flood grp. (2) 0.660
(0.190)
Multi-agency FP (1) 1.899
(0.539)
Multi-agency FP (2) 0.573
(0.341)
EA objections (1) 1.553
(0.879)








As with the previous models, Flood warning system is still significant, whereas Surface
water plan, Multi-agency FP, and EA planning objections no longer have significant p-values.
The results suggest that rail network failures may in fact skew the modelled effects somewhat.
However, it is notable that Flood warning system still is highly significant, which likely
indicates that its modelled effect on flood recovery times is robust. Examining the goodness-
of-fit of the “No rail incident” model, the Likelihood-ratio test is significant, meaning the
model has parameters that have an effect on flood recovery time. The R2 of the model is
also very similar to the other models, and the residual plot has no observable patterns. Given
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Fig. 6.3 Residual plot for no rail incident model
these results, it would seem that the only useful conclusion that can be drawn is that the
effect that Flood warning system exerts on flood recovery times is very robust, having proven
to be significant in all the regressions that have been done using the FRM model. As such, it
is safe to assume that the proportion of residents signed up for EA’s flood warning system
almost certainly helps explain flood recovery times to some extent.
6.3 “Resilience” model - socio-economic indicators
Having analysed the control model, I now turn to the resilience model. A technical detail
that needs to be considered in the regression analysis is that, unlike in the FRM model,
the parameters in the socio-economic model are all continuous. Therefore, the parameter
coefficients in the socio-economic model do not indicate differences between a baseline
group and a treatment group. Rather, the coefficients estimate how each unit change in the
parameter affects the recovery rate. As is the case for the FRM model, coefficient values
above 1 indicate that the parameter increases the recovery rate (speeds up recovery), while
values below 1 indicate that the parameter decreases recovery rate.
6.3.1 Standard socio-economic model
Results from running regressions on the socio-economic model are summarised in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6 Estimations of socio-economic models
No flood period With flood period
Proportion residing in hospital 1.028*** 1.035***
(0.815) (0.863)
Proportion providing unpaid care 9.846* 1.996
(3.954) (1.323)
Jobs density 0.324 5.1x10-4
(0.130) (0.320)
Hourly earnings 1.021* 1.044**
(0.197) (0.232)
Educational attainment 4.283 3.050
(0.853) (1.052)
Proportion ethnic minority 0.707 0.001
(0.376) (0.108)
Proportion giving to charity 3.012 3.521
(1.243) (1.625)
Social trust 0.999*** 0.999***
(0.237) (0.289)
No. of businesses 0.983** 0.985*
(0.422) (0.582)




Likelihood ratio 43.42*** 84.48***
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Looking at Table 6.6, only Proportion of residents living in hospital establishments,
Hourly earnings, Social trust, and Number of businesses are statistically significant param-
eters since they all have p-values below the 0.05 threshold. While Hourly earnings and
Number of businesses may both be borderline significant, it is safer to include them rather
than erroneously discounting them at this stage of the analysis. Interestingly, the coefficients
for these parameters reflect somewhat contradictory results. For example, the coefficients
for Social trust in both regressions are below 1 (0.999 and 0.999 respectively). This means
that, according to the regression, each unit increase in Social trust would lead to a 0.1%
(1 - 0.999 = 0.001 = 0.1%) decrease in the recovery rate from flooding. Or more to the
point, more social trust in an area corresponds to slower recovery times. This result does
not make intuitive sense, and is counter to what is proposed in resilience literature. Intu-
itively, more social trust ought to mean more preparedness and greater capacity to deal with
emergency situations, such as flooding. During the 2013/14 and 2015 winter floods however,
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the opposite seems to have been the case. Similarly, Number of businesses (0.983, 0,985)
also had coefficients below 1, suggesting that more business establishments within an area
corresponds to longer recovery times. Unlike for the two parameters above, Proportion of
residents living in hospital establishments (1.028, 1.035) and Hourly earnings (1.021, 1.044)
both have coefficient values that support the arguments made in resilience literature. Both
coefficients are greater than 1, meaning they both increase the recovery rate from flooding.
Intuitively, it makes sense that the higher the ratio between total residents to hospital residents
in an area, the more capable it should be in coping with emergencies. Likewise, higher
hourly earnings ought to mean that more resources are available for both flood mitigation
and recovery measures.
There can be a number of reasons why the coefficients give contradictory results. For
example, Number of businesses could potentially be a misleading indicator since it does not
distinguish between a charity shop from a car manufacturing plant. These two businesses
clearly have different impacts on local prosperity, both in terms of overall economic contri-
butions (employment, local suppliers etc.), as well as generating more resources useful for
flood recovery. Also, greater Social trust may lead to more willingness to help each other
in times of need, but it does not necessarily mean that there is capacity to do so. Social
trust may be indicative of a more homogeneous population, such as rural areas with older
populations, in which case the greater levels of trust may be counteracted by less resources
and lower capacity to cope with flooding. While the modelled effect may be small, the
negative relationship between social trust and flood recovery times is of particular interest
because it contradicts assumptions made in resilience literature. Expanding on the idea of
population homogeneity, Social trust is essentially meant to measure social capital, which
can arguably be interpreted as an amalgamation of social norms and networks (Woolcock,
1998). In resilience literature, it is assumed that more social capital corresponds to more
shared values and goodwill, that manifests in greater community cohesiveness. The problem
with assuming that shared values and community cohesiveness will lead to greater capacity
to deal with perturbations, is that norms are not always conducive to positive social outcomes
(Chung and Rimal, 2016). Sharing social norms and values is of little use if such norms do
not lead to behaviours and actions that directly contribute to improving disaster response
capacity. For example, if a community’s shared norms and values lead to greater awareness
and interest in the environment and natural processes, such as for example floods, then it
is likely that these norms will contribute positively to flood response capacities. If sharing
norms simply means that members of the community prefer playing football over rugby on
the other hand, then it is doubtful that these shared values will result in greater flood response
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capacity.
Additionally, it needs to be mentioned that the modelled parameter coefficient for Social
trust (0.999) is very close to 1, which means that even though it is statistically significant, its
substantive significance (effect size) appears to be negligible. It is unclear why the modelling
has returned these estimates for the parameter, but one possible explanation is that the relative
intra-variable variance differs significantly for Social trust compared with Flood recovery
time. The Social trust parameter is recorded at county level (the smallest geographical unit
that the ONS maintains data for), and the highest level of social trust measured in the sample
is 68.25%, whereas the lowest measured level is 65.06%. Flood recovery times in the sample
on the other hand, varies from 3 days to 90 days. Extreme differences in intra-variable
variance could potentially skew the parameter estimates by making them either close to 0
(as appears to be the case with Social trust), or make them exceptionally large. Since the
relative variance in Flood recovery time is much greater than for Social trust, the parameter
estimate ought reasonably have been skewed towards extremely large values (since very
small changes in Social trust could correspond to large changes in Flood recovery time),
but the reverse seems to have taken place. Given these issues, it is not possible to make any
robust inferences about the effect of Social trust on recovery times. Keeping this in mind, it
is still interesting that (a) the parameter estimate for social trust has the opposite effect on
flood recovery than is assumed in the literature, and (b) the overall variation in social trust in
the areas studied is minimal. Essentially, at best the modelled results suggest that Social trust
has negligible effect on flood recovery time, and at worst they contradict the assertions made
in resilience literature. The negligible effect size and unexpected coefficient value motivates
a deeper analysis of the “Social trust” variable.
Alternative measurements for social capital
Given the unexpected results for “Social trust”, it would be interesting to see if it might
not be the most appropriate metric to represent social capital. Since the ONS has multiple
measures that approximate social capital in its Measuring national well-being – An analysis
of social capital in the UK survey, a side-by-side comparison of different metrics would be
beneficial to determine the significance of the modelled results for “Social trust”. The other
metrics of social capital that will be used for the comparison are:
• Percentage who agreed or agreed strongly that they felt they belonged to their neigh-
bourhood
• Percentage who volunteered more than once in the last 12 months
6.3 Socio-economic model 131
“Sense of belonging” is in a similar broad group of metrics as “Social trust”, and relates
to individuals’ sense of place and their sentiments about where they live. “Volunteering”
meanwhile, is more representative of the level of activity in an area, and assumes that higher
levels of volunteering activity is indicative of greater social capital because it improves social
good in an area. These three parameters are modelled separately (e.g. each parameter is the
only explanatory variable included in the modelling), using the “No flood period” model, to
determine which measurement is most significant, and whether the results for “Social trust”
in the socio-economic model represent an outlier case. The results are presented in Table 6.7
Table 6.7 Estimations of social capital indicators
Social trust Sense of belonging Volunteering
Coefficient 0.999*** 1.001*** 1.144*
(0.391) (0.462) (0.374)
Observations 68 68 68
R2 0.191 0.206 0.182
Likelihood ratio 19.28** 19.71** 16.13*
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
“Sense of belonging” seems to yield somewhat similar results to “Social trust”, albeit with
more an expected effect (higher sense of belonging corresponding to shorter recovery time).
While “Volunteering” also yields an expected parameter coefficient, although with noticeably
less statistical significance (p<0.1). While these results seem to indicate that the sense of
place metrics may not be best suited to represent social capital, they do not yield any definitive
insights. One potential explanation for the lack of solid results could be an unsuitable level of
detail of the data, in that the metrics are not sufficiently capturing the relevant effects because
it is only measured at county level. This is because even though average “Social trust” could
be quite high in a county, it may be significantly lower in individual areas. One possible way
to account for this is to use data that represents a lower level of detail, preferably comparable
to the scale at which the dependent variable is measured. This will be explored in Section
6.3.4 on the Index of Multiple Deprivations (IMD).
Model diagnostics
Log-likelihood ratio test results for the standard socio-economic model can be seen at the
bottom of Table 6.6. The socio-economic model has very similar goodness-of-fit as the FRM
model analysed in the previous section, with comparable R2 values and Log-likelihood ratios.
The one distinguishing feature being that the estimates for the “With flood period” regression
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of the socio-economic model has a slightly higher Log-likelihood ratio, suggesting that it
may have better explanatory power than the other regressions.
Looking at the residual plots for the socio-economic model regressions in Figure 6.4,
there are no observable trends in the residuals. As with the FRM model, the socio-economic
model appears to be generally suited for purpose, and any parameter found to be statistically
significant most likely does have a valid effect on flood recovery time.
Fig. 6.4 Residual plots for the standard socio-economic models
(a) No flood period (b) With flood period
The initial analysis and diagnostics of the socio-economic indicator model seem to
suggest that it has similar explanatory power for predicting flood recovery times as the FRM
model. This suggests that a resilience approach may indeed provide some added value for
practical FRM, since at least a few socio-economic indicators appear to exert an effect on
flood recovery time. Most of the indicators seem to have no effect on flood recovery time
however, meaning the model can probably be made more parsimonious.
6.3.2 Model parsimony and multicollinearity
As was noted in the previous section, the parameters in the socio-economic model all have
continuous numerical values, which means that it is not possible to compare treatment effects
against baseline values of flood recovery time. This also means that the Kaplan-Meier
method cannot be used for determining the significance of each individual parameter, since
the method compares the recovery functions of two or more groups. As such, for the socio-
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economic model, the significance of each individual parameter will instead be verified by
checking for possible multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is a phenomenon in statistical
modelling where two or more model parameters are correlated with each other, meaning
the values for one parameter can be linearly predicted from another parameter (Mendenhall
and Sincich, 2012). In practice, multicollinearity can result in coefficients that are highly
variable, and lead to regressions that do not provide reliable predictions of the dependent
variable. Multicollinearity could possibly explain the unusual fluctuations in the coefficients
for Number of businesses observed in the standard socio-economic model regressions. The
consequence of multicollinearity is that it can affect the overall significance of the model,
making it difficult to draw useful inferences.
Furthermore, as with the FRM models, the socio-economic models can also potentially
be over-specified, which is another motivating factor for testing for multicollinearity and
ensuring model parsimony. The socio-economic model used in this study is based on a list of
the most commonly used metrics (as referenced in (Cutter, 2016; Sharifi, 2016)), and there-
fore represents current theoretical research fairly comprehensively. However, considering
that some existing measurements of resilience include over 70 indicators, it is quite likely
that some over-specification has taken place - something that has already been pointed out by
for example (Burton, 2015). Testing for model parsimony is therefore also a way to ensure
that the analysis is robust.
One method of testing for multicollinearity is to construct a Pearson’s correlation ma-
trix, which describes the bivariate relationship between individual parameters, and indicates
whether their correlation can be attributed to the randomness of the data. The matrix
summarises the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all parameters. The Pearson’s
coefficient is a measure of the strength of the association between the two variables, and can
take on any value between -1 to 1. A value of -1 means that the two variables are perfectly
negatively correlated, while 1 means that the variables are perfectly positively correlated.
Perfect correlation means that each unit change in one variable results in a commensurate
change in the other. If multiple parameters have significant Pearson’s coefficients, then this
would be strong evidence of multicollinearity in the model. A Pearson’s correlation matrix
of the socio-economic model parameters can be found in Table 6.8.
As can be seen in Table 6.8, most of the explanatory factors are highly correlated with
each other, indicating that it is possible to pare down the number of indicators significantly.
More importantly, of the four variables found to be significant in the earlier regressions,
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Table 6.8 Pearson correlation matrix for socio-economic indicators
unpaid care job density hour earn. education ethnicity charity soc. trust business vol. org
res. hosp. -0.5123 0.2133 -0.0266 0.0291 0.4329 -0.2306 -0.1475 -0.2395 -0.1995
(0.000) (0.081) (0.829) (0.814) (0.000) (0.059) (0.230) (0.049) (0.103)
unpaid care -0.4556 -0.6349 -0.6392 -0.5783 -0.1713 -0.3711 -0.2664 -0.1066
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.152) (0.002) (0.028) (0.387)
job density 0.5394 0.7785 -0.1954 0.3336 0.5059 0.7271 0.2473
(0.000) (0.000) (0.110) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042)
hour earn. 0.8075 0.1386 0.5933 0.6692 0.7175 0.4070
(0.000) (0.523) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education 0.0789 0.4909 0.7164 0.7954 0.3931
(0.523) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ethnicity -0.2614 -0.0429 -0.2733 -0.2622
(0.031) (0.728) (0.024) (0.031)
charity 0.8007 0.5436 0.9029
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




Note: In the Pearson matrix, a low p-value (0.05 or below) indicates that the correlation is significant, meaning
the variables are likely to be strongly correlated.
only Proportion of residents living in hospital establishments is not significantly correlated
with the other variables. This puts into doubt how reliable the observed significance of
Hourly earnings, Social trust, and Number of businesses actually are. Furthermore, since
the socio-economic indicators have been chosen because they closely mimic those found in
current resilience measurements, these results seem to suggest that there are high degrees of
redundancy in these measurements. This puts in further doubt the potential added value of
current resilience measurements for informing policy choices.
Due to the high degree of correlation, it would appear that a simplified socio-economic
model is needed to assess whether the remaining variables remain significant after adjusting
for multicollinearity. Since three of the four variables that are significant in the earlier
regressions are highly correlated, the most appropriate choices for the simplified model
would appear to be Proportion of residents living in hospital establishments and Social trust.
The latter is chosen over Hourly earnings and Number of businesses because it is the most
consistently significant variable of the three.
6.3.3 Simplified socio-economic model
The most important information from Table 6.9 is that both Proportion of residents living
in hospital establishments and Social trust remain significant in both regressions of the
simplified model. This seems to suggest that they were correctly chosen, and that most
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Table 6.9 Estimations of simplified socio-economic models
No flood period With flood period
Proportion residing in hospital 1.014*** 1.126**
(0.362) (0.327)




Likelihood ratio 27.28*** 53.71***
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,* p<0.1
socio-economic indicators in existing resilience measurements do not help explain variations
in flood recovery time. However, given the issues surrounding Social trust discussed in
section 6.3.1, it is difficult to draw any substantive inferences about it despite the parameter’s
statistical significance. A second result worth mentioning is that the “No flood period” and
“With flood period” regressions have quite different goodness-of-fit (Log-likelihood ratios
of 27.28 and 53.71 respectively) in the simplified model. Also, it is somewhat surprising
that the simplified “With flood period” regression has a higher R2 than its “full” counterpart.
Generally speaking, goodness-of-fit tends to decrease with fewer parameters, but this is
clearly not the case for the simplified “With flood period” regression. What this implies isn’t
entirely clear, but it would appear that both parameters are strongly related to the length of
time that a place is inundated in some way. This does not mean that high proportions of
hospital residency and greater levels of social trust lead to lengthier flooding. It simply means
that some characteristics shared by locations with higher proportions of hospital residents and
social trust, make them coincide with longer inundation periods. It is not within the scope of
this study to theorise on what such characteristics could possibly be, but it is certainly an
interesting line of query for future research.
6.3.4 Index of Multiple Deprivations (IMD) model
The findings from the previous section put into focus the debatable added value of existing
resilience measurements. I have already noted in the methods chapter that there is substantial
overlap between the socio-economic indicators in resilience measurements, and existing
indices such as the OECD Better Life Index and the English Index of Multiple Deprivations
(IMD). Given the equivocal results for the socio-economic model, it would be interesting
to see if a measure such as the IMD might do better for predicting flood recovery times.
Additionally, the IMD is also a potentially useful measurement to account for the level of
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detail issues mentioned in the previous section as well as in chapter 5. Because the IMD
is measured at neighbourhood level, using it should also offset the issue of a mismatch in
spatial scale between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.
Since the IMD is already a weighted index, it has to be treated as an ordinal variable
(data that have natural ordered categories) for regression analysis purposes. The IMD model
will therefore be very similar to the FRM model in that the coefficients are comparisons of
each level of the parameter to a baseline value. For the IMD model, the baseline value is 1,
meaning the 10% least deprived areas. The model then compares each subsequent level of
the IMD to be baseline value, and determines if there is a statistically significant difference
in flood recovery time between them. If a statistically significant difference is found, then
as with the FRM model, the coefficient indicates the ratio of the recovery rate between the
relevant level and the baseline. For example, a coefficient of 1.361 (for the Tenth decile in
the “No flood period” model) means that an area that is among the 10% most deprived in
England would have a 36.1% higher recovery rate, thereby experiencing a faster recovery
time, than an area among the 10% least deprived. The results for IMD model regressions,
and their corresponding model diagnostics can be found in Table 6.10.
Based on the regression results, it appears that the deprivation level of an area does not
have a significant effect on flood recovery times. The coefficient values are not significant,
the explanatory power is low, and neither regression passes the Likelihood-ratio test. These
results mirror those of the earlier regressions to a degree in that most socio-economic
indicators seem not to have a noticeable effect on recovery time. The main difference
between the IMD and the socio-economic model, is that the statistical significance of the
latter can largely be attributed to two individual factors, Proportion of residents living
in hospital establishments and Social trust. Since the IMD is a weighted aggregate, the
regression models would not be able to pick up potentially significant individual variables.
These results should not be over-interpreted; however, they do raise relevant questions
regarding what potential added value social-economic factors actually offer for informing
FRM policies. While getting a comprehensive and holistic overview may be important for
understanding complex phenomena, it is fair to ask how useful current methods of using
comprehensive indices are for identifying specific policy actions that need to be taken. These
issues are discussed further in the findings section.
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Table 6.10 Estimations of IMD model
No flood period With flood period
Second decile 0.379 1.157
(0.115) (0.163)
Third decile 0.724 0.866
(0.549) (0.523)
Fourth decile 0.937 1.065
(0.310) (0.320)
Fifth decile 1.179 1.494
(0.719) (0.732)
Sixth decile 0.685 0.682
(0.358) (0.352)
Seventh decile 1.268 1.487
(0.637) (0.708)
Eighth decile 0.902 1.432
(0.625) (0.701)
Ninth decile 3.426 5.801
(1.237) (1.829)




Likelihood ratio 10.72 11.63
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
6.4 Findings
6.4.1 Findings for core questions
Findings from the statistical modelling should be considered bearing in mind the issues
surrounding the level of detail of the data that have been mentioned throughout the analy-
sis. As has been mentioned, data for the FRM model are mainly collected at County level,
while data for the socio-economic model are mostly at District level. Neither model has
data that consistently matches with the level of detail of the dependent variable, which is
at town/civil parish level. The difference in granularity could potentially have resulted in
some significant effects being lost due to the data being aggregated. With this in mind, the
statistical modelling suggests that that there is equivocal evidence for the added value of a
resilience approach to policy formulation in the field of FRM. The resilience model consisting
of socio-economic indicators does not noticeably explain variations in flood recovery time
better than the control model of FRM measures. Proportion of residents living in hospital
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establishments and Social trust are the only variables in the socio-economic model that have
consistently significant effects on flood recovery time. These two variables alone accounted
for most of the socio-economic model’s overall explanatory power (R2). The FRM model
had similar results, where only Flood warning system, and to a limited extent Multi-agency
flood plan, are the consistently significant variables across all iterations of the model. These
results suggest that there are socio-economic factors that can offer new insights for practical
policy-making; however, the holistic approach espoused in resilience literature is unlikely to
be very useful.
The holistic approach to resilience is motivated by the belief that the interactions between
natural disasters and societies are too complex to be manageable through targeted policy
solutions. While the premise that societies are complex systems is reasonable, the insistence
on espousing holistic methods is less so. What seems to be forgotten is that while there may
be countless overlapping and interlinking relationships within a social system, not all of
them will be equally relevant for specific problems that need to be solved. Even in systems
dominated by interconnectedness, there are still variables (leading indicators) that signal
future events, while others are simply background “white noise”. Furthermore, there is a
general tendency in current methods of measuring resilience to assume that the value of
incorporating “social vulnerability”, through the use of various socio-economic indicators, is
self-evident. The result has been that there is little justification and evidence for why such
indicators are important for resilience. An example is the case of social capital, which is
widely assumed to have a positive effect on resilience in the literature. However, modelling
in this study has yielded equivocal results, where the effect of social capital on flood recovery
time may depend on how the concept is defined for example. Additionally, as seen in the
comparison between the socio-economic model and the IMD model, using different methods
to measure social capital and collecting data at different scales can also impact findings.
While there may be room to debate whether “recovery time” is the best metric for resilience,
it is clear that much work still remains to ensure that there is also empirical support for any
factor that is theorised to enhance resilience.
At the core of the “added-value” question is that it should be possible to logically connect
decision parameters to policy objectives, in that they are supported by empirical evidence and
also make practical sense. A socio-economic indicator such as Jobs density is a good example
to illustrate the matter concerning parameters needing to make practical sense. Does it truly
follow logically that in order to increase flood resilience, the Government should implement
policies that create more jobs? It is most likely correct that economically deprived areas are
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less able to cope with the consequences of flooding than more affluent areas, and therefore
the issue is at least tangentially related to FRM. But is economic equality better addressed
through FRM policies, or fiscal policies? Simply put, in trying to make the property holistic,
current resilience research seems to have put little consideration to ensuring that the tools
match the task.
A more effective approach for dealing with complexity and uncertainty is then to be
more specific rather than general when defining resilience. It would not be far-fetched to
assume that many of the economic, health, and social phenomena identified in resilience
literature are in fact manifestations of the same root issues. As such, in order to provide
better information for policy decisions, a more effective approach would be to focus efforts
on identifying the most relevant factors rather than incorporating as many as possible. By
specifying, and limiting, what is meant by resilience, it becomes easier to identify pertinent
factors that influence it. Specificity does not mean oversimplifying however. Oversimplifica-
tion implies insufficient understanding of the relationships between various factors, which
is what resilience literature criticises traditional command-and-control policies of doing.
Specificity on the other hand, means that the objectives of interventions are clearly stated
and understood, which does not preclude acknowledging the complexity of potential tasks.
Defining resilience as a specific – rather than general – property makes it easier to connect
decision parameters to policy objectives, which in turn will help narrow down the specific
instruments needed to effectively manage flood resilience.
One method for achieving greater specificity of resilience is to identify the pertinent
factors that are useful for achieving a policy objective through statistical modelling, as has
been done in this study. Despite the overall FRM and socio-economic models being insignifi-
cant, several individual parameters can potentially be highly useful. Flood warning system
and Multi-agency flood plan for example can provide important insights for practitioners. It
is clear that a higher proportion of residents signed up for the EA’s flood warning system
corresponds strongly to faster flood recovery times, and having a Multi-agency Flood Plan
also seems to help explain faster recovery times. This information offers practitioners very
practicable policy choices that can also be effective. Furthermore, while they may not offer
directly practicable policy options, the results for Proportion of residents living in hospital
establishments and Social trust can still provide practitioners with useful information on
particular directions worth exploring in search of more effective FRM policies. Basically,
statistical analysis is a useful method for improving the potential added value of resilience by
making it an evidence-based concept.
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6.4.2 Limits of the model
As has been mentioned, quality of data may be a limiting factor on the inferences that
can be drawn from the modelling. One potential explanation for the low significance and
high standard errors could be that the metrics being used are insufficiently targeted to the
relevant scale (Frazier et al., 2013). Some socio-economic indicators for example, are only
available at county level, which means that potential variations between locations within the
same county would be lost. Similarly, because FRM in the UK is an amalgam of different
actors with responsibilities across varying geographical scales, it can be difficult to isolate
the influence of local versus regional/national factors. One method to account for scalar
factors as a next step for statistical analysis of resilience is to use multi-level modelling.
Multi-level models recognise that variables may be hierarchical, or clustered, and outcomes
can therefore be due to individual factors or cluster attributes (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).
For instance, even though many LLFAs have drafted LFRM strategies as required, there may
be county-level attributes that render these documents more or less effective, the so-called
“local authority” effect hypothesised in section 6.2.3. These attributes are not necessarily
socio-economic factors, but can instead be political tradition, managerial know-how, or other
attributes that are not immediately apparent when looking strictly at the socio-economic and
FRM indicators used in the statistical analysis earlier. Separating these cluster attributes
could potentially make it easier to identify the efficacy of individual measures, thereby
helping to narrow down policy choices.
Another limit of the statistical models is that while I would argue that recovery speed is
the best available metric for resilience, it is also an imperfect one. Faster recovery speeds do
not automatically entail greater capacity to cope with flooding, or even better outcomes (Platt
et al., 2015). For example, if there is a rush to get transportation infrastructure back to normal
after a flood, which results in sub-par repairs of roads that lead to a higher frequency of traffic
accidents, then it would be difficult to claim that the system exhibits resilience. As such, using
recovery time as a metric for resilience clearly requires speed to be balanced against other
criteria, such as well-being, social utility, and economic costs. But despite the challenges in
finding the appropriate specifications, if the goal is to use resilience to inform policy-making,
then defining it as a specific property, such as recovery speed, is still preferable to the general
definition currently being used. This is because while recovery speed may need fine-tuning
in order to be a practicable measurement of resilience, analysing its relationship with various
variables still enables policy-makers to pinpoint particular instruments that can be effective.
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6.4.3 Other findings
Perhaps the main issue affecting the statistical modelling is the difficulty in obtaining quality
data, especially for variables in the FRM model. Determining baseline recovery time was
quite challenging for example, since half of the affected LLFAs had not produced Flood
Investigation Reports for the two flood events in the study, as is their statutory obligation.
Likewise, this lack of data and information also greatly affected the type of data that could
be included in the FRM model.
One crucial variable that was originally meant to be included in the FRM model is the
proportion of properties in an area that had undertaken wet-proofing, or flood-proofing, work
prior to the relevant flood events. Retrofitting is one of the most widely used measures in
the “flood mitigation” category, and is one of the core agenda objectives identified in the
2016 National Flood Resilience Review. Neither local councils or the Environment Agency
maintains any records of property retrofitting in flood risk areas. Insurers do have information
on properties that have done so for insurance underwriting purposes, but these do not cover
all properties at risk, only those that have already done retrofitting. Also, insurers are not very
forthcoming with their data since it is of commercial interest. The only potentially useful
source of information is the “Property Flood Resilience Database” currently being developed
by Innovate UK and Building Research Establishment (BRE) Group in partnership with Axa
and Lexis Nexis. But it is unclear how comprehensive this database will be, or whether it
can offer enough detail about property retrofitting in order to accurately capture its effect on
flood recovery.
The paucity of data is arguably simply a manifestation of underlying issues such as
unclear responsibilities, and limited awareness of actors’ roles that afflicts British FRM
(Bosher, 2014). One issue that noticeably affected flood recovery time is whether the source
of flooding was fluvial, or whether it resulted from groundwater and surface water saturation.
Those locations where the cause of flooding was primarily fluvial all had shorter recovery
times than places where the primary cause was groundwater or surface water. This is
somewhat surprising since the risks of ground and surface water flooding are well known. In
fact, the Pitt Review of the summer floods in 2007 identified surface water as one of the most
important issues that needed to be addressed. Judging from the information obtained while
gathering data for the statistical models, it appears that the recommendations from the Pitt
Review have gone largely unheeded. There are probably numerous reasons why little has
been done about surface water management, but unclear responsibilities as well as potential




The core research question of this study has been to ascertain what new insights the concept
of “resilience” can offer policy-makers operating in a practical policy setting, by using flood
risk management as an example. I have explored this question by analysing the potential
added value of two facets of resilience that constitute its main theorised contributions to
policy-making. The first of these is the procedural aspect of resilience, consisting of a
learning component and a participation component, which are meant to improve how policies
are formulated. The second is the evidential aspect of resilience, which consists of the
information (i.e. data, reports etc.) used by practitioners to help them better understand
problems, and justify why particular policies are needed.
Summary of findings
In chapter 3, I studied learning and experimentation. In SES literature, learning is a highly
deliberate process of recursion that eventually leads to adaptation. The objective of learning,
as defined in resilience literature, is to acquire knowledge, which is then used to change poli-
cies and help improve the capacity of a system to adapt to disruptions. This conceptualisation
essentially understands adaptation as synonymous with policy change. This “experimental”
framework implies that policy-making is a rational process, where policy changes are only
made when taking into consideration relevant inputs from changing conditions. Given that
the recursive, experimental, approach to learning is highly idealised, there is a conspicuous
lack of empirical studies on how a recursive learning process might be carried out in practice.
With these issues in mind, the goal of the chapter was to determine if learning, as conceptu-
alised in SES literature, is feasible in a practical policy context. This was done by conducting
case studies of two Defra-funded experimental FRM pilot projects located on the Holnicote
Estate and in Pickering Beck. The case studies were carried out by performing preliminary
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desk studies of relevant project documents, and then I conducted interviews with relevant
policy managers and practitioners, focussing specifically on identifying how learning comes
about in a practical policy setting.
Findings from studying both the Holnicote and Pickering pilot projects suggest that
learning in a practical policy context bears little resemblance to the rational, experimental
process envisioned in resilience literature. While experimental projects can indeed lead to
knowledge acquisition and stakeholder learning, it is unclear to what extent they engender
wide-spread policy change. The case studies suggest that rather than being an open-ended,
evolving process, learning in practice is strongly influenced by stakeholders’ motivations and
organisational objectives. In particular, knowledge acquisition and learning from participants
of these experimental projects may not necessarily lead to successful knowledge transfer
to other parties, or result in policy change. The findings specifically point towards money
(i.e. Government funding) being an important factor for both limiting and motivating/driving
policy change. Furthermore, political influences and outside factors (such as the media or new
legislation) are substantially more important drivers of policy change than is acknowledged
in SES literature. Based on the results of studying the Holnicote and Pickering pilot projects,
it would appear that a policy process whereby policies are made through recursive learning
and experimentation may be too idealised to be feasible in a practical policy setting.
Chapter 4 focussed on the practicability of participatory methods. The main argument
for greater participation is that it leads to better information-sharing and enables knowledge
acquisition by fostering “social learning”. It is asserted that a participatory approach allows
greater diversity of problem perception, and empowers local communities so that they do not
become dependent on government interventions. These changes result in greater resilience
by increasing the variety of potential solutions for dealing with uncertainty, and by induc-
ing behavioural changes that lead to greater self-reliance. However, participation is often
defined in vague terms, with overly simplistic conceptualisations of the relationship between
"local communities" and central authorities. Despite widespread agreement that participa-
tory decision-making enhances resilience, some important questions remain unanswered,
including: (a) Are stakeholders able to freely engage in information sharing that leads to
policy decisions?, and (b), do participatory methods necessarily lead to a greater range of
problem perception? These issues were studied using a two-pronged approach, focussing
on participatory bodies engaged in FRM in the area around Pickering. The first section was
carried out through desk studies of meeting documents of the local participatory bodies to
ascertain any potential political or contextual constraints. The second section consisted of a
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survey questionnaire sent to local residents around Pickering, used to examine the views and
representativeness of local stakeholders that are likely to participate in these local bodies.
The main finding from chapter 4 is that the use of participatory methods is not a “magic
bullet” that can provide diverse interpretations, and informed arguments useful for solving
complex problems. Participatory methods do seem to confer clarification, and sometimes
even change participants’ views, by increasing awareness of complex issues. The participa-
tory bodies that were studied can be highly effective at collating information and exchanging
ideas when used in a strictly deliberative capacity, but the political and institutional context
in which these participatory bodies exist have significant influence on policy decisions.
Basically, it is possible that the role of a participatory body can be shaped as much by the
policy context in which it exists, as by its participants, or even its original intended purpose.
Additionally, it is likely that in order to make participatory bodies truly representative, it is
important to clearly designate who assumes the political accountability of decisions. This
is important because the findings suggest that local participatory bodies risk having partic-
ipants who are “usual suspects” with political views that may differ from the rest of the
local population. Without clearly specified protocols and guidelines for the functioning of a
participatory body, it risks becoming a means to circumvent the normal democratic process
since those who might disagree with their decisions would have minimal means of holding
the participants accountable, the way that they could of elected public officials.
In Chapter 5 and 6, I shift focus to the evidential aspect of resilience, by studying how
the concept is measured. The issue of substance, or information, is important because in
order to make better (i.e. more effective) policies, it is important that the information being
used is relevant for the task at hand, and gives policy-makers a better understanding of the
underlying issues that are being addressed. There is general agreement in the literature that
resilience is a difficult concept to measure, but I would argue that this is because current
methods for measuring resilience all define it as a multi-hazard property, meant to represent a
capacity to deal with any contingencies that may occur. By making resilience a multi-hazard
property, it becomes necessary to incorporate a wide range of variables that may be either
unrelated, or only cursorily related to the task facing policy-makers. With this in mind, it
is pertinent to question whether the measurement difficulties are in fact a problem derived
from the manner in which resilience is currently conceptualised. It appears that existing
literature conflates a “holistic approach” with imprecision and ambiguity, which has resulted
in vague definitions of resilience that can offer little clarity for policy-makers faced with
specific problems. Keeping in mind these issues, I explore the added value of existing
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resilience measurements by examining the relevance of socio-economic resilience indicators
for predicting flood recovery times of areas in England that were affected by the 2013/14 and
2015/16 Winter floods. I do this using survival analysis (a form of statistical modelling) to
compare the efficacy of a socio-economic indicator model to a control model consisting of
various modern FRM policy measures.
The statistal modelling suggests that there is equivocal evidence for the added value of
a multi-hazard resilience approach when applied to the field of FRM. The socio-economic
indicator model, which incorporates the most widely used indicators in existing measure-
ments of resilience, does not noticeably explain variations in flood recovery time better
than the control model consisting of modern FRM measures. While the results indicate that
there are individual socio-economic factors that can affect flood recovery time, a majority of
the socio-economic indicators proved insignificant. These results suggest that the current,
holistic, approach to measuring resilience is probably severely over-specifying the number
of variables that impact flood recovery times. This in turn indicates that if the objective is
simply to improve FRM policies, then it is likely more beneficial to have a narrower - and
more specific - definition of resilience than the current multi-hazard approach.
Some limiting factors that could potentially affect the findings from the statistical analysis
include firstly the issue of scale. As was mentioned in both chapter 5 and 6, the FRM model
and socio-economic model generally have parameters that are measured at different spatial
scales (county vs. district). Both models also differ in scale from the dependent variable,
which is measured at town/civil parish scale. The discrepancy in detail could potentially
lead to a failure to identify significant effects. Additionally, the results from the statistical
model suggest that a multi-hazard approach to resilience does not appear to be effective in
predicting flood recovery time. However, there is room to debate whether "recovery time" is
the most suitable metric to represent resilience, as many scholars would argue that adaptation
and "bounce forward" better conceptualise resilience to natural hazards such as flooding.
As such, it is possible that a multi-hazard concept of resilience can have more significant
modelled effects on "bounce forward". This would require finding a suitable way to measure
"bounce forward", which as has been mentioned in chapter 5, is far from a straightforward
task.
A final limiting factor on the inferences that could be drawn from the statistical mod-
elling is that the quality of data available was sometimes inferior, with inconsistencies in
flood incidence reporting between various local authorities being one of the main prob-
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lems. Despite the responsibilities of the local authorities - as Lead Local Flood Authorities
(LLFAs) - being made quite clear in the Flood and Water Management Act 2010, there
was considerable variation in the extent to which they had carried out such duties. One
potential method that can be used in future research to deal with variable data quality and
other limiting factors resulting from differences between local authorites, is to use multi-
level modelling. Multi-level modelling allows hierarchical and clustered effects (such as
managerial or political differences between local authorities for example) to be isolated
from other model paramenters, thereby making it more straightforward to identify the effi-
cacy of individual indicators, which would be more useful for narrowing down policy choices.
With the above issues in mind, a more effective approach for dealing with complexity
and uncertainty is then to be more specific rather than general when defining resilience. In
order to provide better information for policy decisions, a more effective approach would be
to focus efforts on identifying the most relevant factors rather than incorporating as many
as possible. By specifying, and limiting, what is meant by resilience, it becomes easier to
identify pertinent factors that influence it. Defining resilience as a specific – rather than
general – property makes it easier to connect decision parameters to policy objectives, which
in turn will help narrow down the specific instruments needed to effectively manage flood
resilience.
Concluding remarks
Batabyal (1998) noted early on that resilience was “too vague a concept” to offer concrete
methods and tools for analysing social systems, and it seems that his observation is still
largely valid today. The rapid expansion and popularisation of the concept seems to have
inadvertently turned the term resilience into a political Rorschach test, in that resilience can
be what one wants it to be. Currently, it is at once: a conceptual framework for thinking
about society as a system, a tool for advancing social justice and citizen empowerment, a
mechanism for promoting sustainable resource use, and much more. Its malleability risks
making resilience into a buzz-word, that can be presented as an identikit solution to any
problem, regardless of its nature. It is interesting that resilience is widely touted as a suitable
concept to be employed for dealing with climate change. The issue of climate change is
indeed representative of complexity, with various factors and feedback mechanisms that
make it hard to predict its gravity, and how it will impact societies. But it is quite clear that
unsustainable levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the driver of this change. As a
result, it is also quite straightforward that the overall objective of any policy intended to tackle
climate change should be to reduce or eliminate GHG emissions. There is currently no such
148 Conclusion
clarity for policies to enhance resilience. What is the objective of resilience, other than being
resilient? Is it economic development to increase capacity? Educational reform? Increasing
the effectiveness and affordability of public health? The answer currently seems to be: do ev-
erything. As well-meaning as the intentions are, this is not useful input for informing policies.
I would argue that current conceptualisations of resilience have simply committed the
classic design error of approaching a problem in the middle instead of the beginning. Re-
silience, as it is currently defined in social contexts, is essentially a concept for understanding
decision-making under uncertainty. Where current conceptualisations have jumped into the
middle is that the onus has been put on complexity, thereby making the need to account
for complexity the central element of resilience. In terms of decision-making and choosing
policies however, the fact that a system is complex is secondary to the fact that complexity
causes uncertainty in our decisions, and we want to reduce these uncertainties. Having to
deal with uncertainty is nothing new, since most planning decisions are “conducted in a state
of relative ignorance of the full behaviour of the system being designed” (Petroski, 1994).
What is important is that decision-makers fully understand what is to be achieved, and what
is to be avoided during the formulation of the problem. If resilience is to be a concept that is
useful for dealing with uncertainties, then rather than adopting a general, holistic approach,
it probably would be more useful if policies were directed towards a specific goal. This
most likely means that resilience would need to shift from being defined as a general system
property, to one that refers to specific issues, such as for example flooding. By having a more
specific definition of resilience, it is possible - through extensive statistical modelling - to sort
through the white noise variables prevalent in the real world, and identify truly informative
parameters that can change outcomes, such as preventing or reducing floods. Thus, rather
than assuming that anything can happen, as is the case under a holistic approach to resilience,
a targeted approach informed by statistical analysis would allow policy-makers to focus on
the most relevant factors that can affect policy results, thereby reducing both the underlying
uncertainties of their decisions, as well as improving the effectiveness of policies.
References
ADA (2013). Establishing new internal drainage boards - guidance. Technical report,
Association of Drainage Authorities.
Adger, W. (2000). Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Prog. in Human
Geography, 24(3):347–364.
Adger, W. and Adams, H. (2013). Migration as an adaptation strategy to environmental
change. In 2013, W. S. S. R., editor, Changing Global Environments: the Social Challenge.
International Social Science Council, Paris.
Adger, W., Barnett, J., Brown, K., Marshall, N., and O’Brien, K. (2012). Cultural dimensions
of climate change impacts and adaptation. Nature Climate Change, 3:112–117.
Adger, W., Brown, K., Nelson, D., Berkes, F., Eakin, H., Folke, C., Galvin, K., Gunderson,
L., Goulden, M., O’Brien, K., Ruitenbeek, J., and Tompkins, E. (2011). Resilience
implications of policy responses to climate change. Climate Change, 2:757–766.
Adger, W., Hughes, T., Folke, C., Carpenter, S., and Rockstrom, J. (2005). Social-ecological
resilience to coastal disasters. Science, 309(5737):1036–1039.
Aerts, J., Wouter-Botzen, W., de Moel, H., and Bowman, M. (2013). Cost estimates for flood
resilience and protection strategies in new york city. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 1294:1–104.
Aerts, J., Wouter-Botzen, W., Emanuel, K., Lin, N., de Moel, H., and Michel-Kerjan, E.
(2014). Evaluating flood resilience strategies for coastal megacities. Science, 344:473–475.
Ahern, J. (2011). From fail-safe to safe-to-fail: Sustainability and resilience in the new urban
world. Landscape and Urban Planning, 100:341–343.
Ahern, J. (2013). Urban landscape sustainability and resilience: the promise and challenges of
integrating ecoology with urban planning and design. Landscape Ecology, 28:1203–1212.
Aldrich, D. and Meyer, M. (2015). Social capital and community resilience. American
Behavioral Scientist, 59(2):254–269.
Aldunce, P., Beilin, R., Handmer, J., and Howden, M. (2014). Framing disaster resilience:
The implications of the diverse conceptualisations of ’bouncing back’. Disaster Prevention
and Management, 23(3):252–270.
Aldunce, P., Beilin, R., Handmer, J., and Howden, M. (2016). Stakeholder participation in
building resilience to disasters in a changing climate. Environmental Hazards, 15(1):58–73.
150 References
Alexander, D. (1997). The study of natural disasters, 1977-1997: Some reflections on a
changing field of knowledge. Disasters, 21(4):284–304.
Alexander, D. (2013). Resilience and disaster risk reduction: an etymological journey.
Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 13:2707–2716.
Alexander, E. (1982). Design in the decision-making process. Policy Sciences, 14:279–292.
Allison, H. and Hobbs, R. (2004). Resilience, adaptive capacity, and the ’lock-in trap’ of the
western australian agricultural region. Ecology and Society, 9(1):3.
Allison, P. (2014). Event history and survival analysis. SAGE, Los Angeles, 2nd edition
edition.
Anbarci, N., Escaleras, M., and Register, C. (2005). Earthquake fatalities: the interaction of
nature and political economy. Journal of Public Economics, 89:1907–1933.
Anderies, J., Janssen, M., and Ostrom, E. (2004). A framework to analyze the robustness of
social-ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecology and Society, 9(1):18.
Anderies, J., Walker, B., and Kinzig, A. (2006). Fifteen weddings and a funeral: Case studies
and resilience-based management. Ecology and Society, 11(1):3.
Armitage, D., Marschke, M., and Plummer, R. (2008). Adaptive co-management and the
paradox of learning. Global Environmental Change, 18(1):86–98.
Armitage, D., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R., Charles, A., Davidson-Hunt, I., Diduck, A.,
Doubleday, N., Johnson, D., Marschke, M., McConney, P., Pinkerton, E., and Wollenberg,
E. (2009). Adaptive co-management for social-ecological complexity. Frontiers in Ecology
and the Environment, 7(2):95–102.
Armitage, D. and Plummer, R. e. (2010). Adaptive Capacity and Environmental Governance.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of
Planners, 35(4):216–224.
Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Holling, C., Jansson, B., Levin,
S., Maler, K., Perrings, C., and Pimentel, D. (1995). Economic growth, carring capacity,
and the environment. Science, 268(5210):520–521.
Ashby, W. (1963). An introduction to cybernetics. Wiley, New York, 1st science editions
printing edition.
Atkinson, M. and Coleman, W. (1992). Policy networks, policy communities, and the
problems of governance. Governance, 5(2):154–180.
Australia (2011). National strategy for disaster resilience.
https://www.ag.gov.au/EmergencyManagement/Documents/NationalStrategyforDisasterResilience.PDF.
Axelrod, R. and Cohen, M. (1999). Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of
a Scientific Frontier. The Free Press, New York.
References 151
Baiocchi, G. (2005). Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in
Porto Alegre. Stanford University Press, Standford (CA).
Baiocchi, G. and Ganuza, E. (2014). Participatory budgeting as if emancipation mattered.
Politics and Society, 42(1):29–50.
Balica, S. and Wright, N. (2011). Reducing the complexity of the flood vulnerability index.
Environmental Hazards, 9(4):321–339.
Balsells, M., Barroca, B., Becue, V., and Serre, D. (2015). Making urban flood resilience
more operational: current practice. Water Management, 168(2):57–65.
Baranger, M. (2000). Chaos, complexity, and entropy.
http://necsi.edu/projects/baranger/cce.pdf.
Baron, J. (2008). Thinking and Deciding. Cambridge University Press, New York, 4th edition
edition.
Batabyal, A. (1998). The concept of resilience: retrospect and prospect. Environment and
Development Economics, 3(2):235–239.
Becker, G., Huitema, D., and Aerts, J. (2015). Prescriptions for adaptive co-management:
the case of flood management in the german rhine basin. Ecology and Society, 20(3):12.
Beetham, D., Blick, A., Margetts, H., and Weir, S. (2008). Power and Participation in
Modern Britain: a literature review for Democratic Audit. Creative Print Group, Wembley.
Bene, C. (2013). Towards a quantifiable measure of resilience. Technical report, Institute of
Development Studies, Brighton. IDS working paper 434.
Bennett, C. and Howlett, M. (1992). The lessons of learning: Reconciling theories of policy
learning and policy change. Policy Sciences, 25:275–294.
Bergstrand, K., Mayer, B., Brumback, B., and Zhang, Y. (2015). Assessing the relationship
between social vulnerability and community resilience to hazards. Soc. Indic. Res.,
122(2):391–409.
Berk, R. (2004). Regression analysis: a constructive critique. SAGE, Thousand Oaks (CA).
Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C. (2000). Rediscovery of traditional ecological knowledge
as adaptive management. Ecological Applications, 10:1251–1262.
Biggs, R., Carpenter, S., and Brock, W. (2009). Turning back from the brink: Detecting
an impending regime shift in time to avert it. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 106(3):826–831.
Biggs, R., Schlueter, M., Biggs, D., Bohensky, E., Burnsilver, S., Cundill, G., Dakos, V.,
Daw, T., Evans, L., Kotschy, K., Leitch, A., Meek, C., Quinlan, A., Raudsepp-Hearne,
C., Robards, M., Schoon, M., Schultz, L., and West, P. (2012). Toward principles for
enhancing the resilience of ecosystem services. Annual Review of Environment and
Resources, 37(1):421–448.
152 References
Birkeland, J. (2012). Design blindness in sustainable development: From closed to open
systems design thinking. Journal of Urban Design, 17(2):163–187.
Birkmann, J., Cardona, O., Carreno, M., Barbat, A., Pelling, M., Schneiderbauer, S., Kien-
berger, S., Keiler, M., Alexander, D., Zeil, P., and Welle, T. (2013). Framing vulnerability,
risk and societal responses: the move framework. Natural Hazards, 67:193–211.
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I., and Wisner, B. (1994). At risk: natural hazards, people’s
vulnerability, and disaster. Routledge, London.
Blann, K., Light, S., and Musumeci, J. (2003). Facing the adaptive challenge: practition-
ers’ insights from negotiating resources crises in minnesota. In Berkes, F., Colding, J.,
and Folke, C., editors, Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for
Complexity and Change. Cambridge University Press.
Bodin, P. and Wiman, B. (2004). Resilience and other stability concepts in ecology: notes on
their origin, validity and usefulness. The ESS Bulletin, 2(2):33–43.
Boettiger, C. and Hastings, A. (2013). From patterns to predictions. Nature, 493:157–158.
Bohensky, E. and Leitch, A. (2014). Framing the flood: a media analysis of themes of
resilience in the 2011 brisbane flood. Regional Environmental Change, 14:475–488.
Boon, H. (2014). Disaster resilience in a flood-impacted rural australian town. Natural
Hazards, 71:683–701.
Bosher, L. (2014). Built-in resilience through disaster risk reduction: operational issues.
Building Research and Information, 42(2):240–254.
Bosker, M., Garretsen, H., Marlet, G., and van Woerkens, C. (2014). Nether lands: Evidence
on the price and perception of rare flood disasters. Technical report, RePEc. IDEAS
working paper series.
Boyd, E. (2012). Adapting to global climate change: evaluating resilience in two networked
public institutions. In Boyd, E. and Folke, C., editors, Adapting Institutions: Governance,
Complexity and Social-ecological Resilience. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Brand, F. and Jax, K. (2007). Focusing the meaning(s) of resilience: Resilience as a
descriptive concept and a boundary object. Ecology and Society, 12(1):23.
Brannan, T., John, P., and Stoker, G. (2006). Active citizenship and effective public services
and programmes: How can we know what really works? Urban Studies, 43(5):993–1008.
Brown, D., Platt, S., and Bevington, J. (2010). Disaster recovery indicators: guidelines for
monitoring and evaluation.
Bruneau, M. and Reinhorn, A. (2007). Exploring the concept of seismic resilience for acute
care facilities. Earthquake Spectra, 23(1):41–62.
Bryman, A. (2004). Interviewing in qualitative research. In Bryman, A., editor, Social
Research Methods. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edition edition.
References 153
Bulkeley, H. and Broto, V. (2013). Government by experiment? global cities and the
governing of climate change. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 38:361–
375.
Bulkeley, H. and Mol, A. (2003). Participation and environmental governance: Consensus,
ambivalence and debate. Environmental Values, 12:143–154.
Bulkeley, H. and Tuts, R. (2013). Understanding urban vulnerability, adaptation and resilience
in the context of climate change. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice
and Sustainability, 18(6):646–662.
Burton, C. (2015). A validation of metrics for community resilience to natural hazards and
disasters using the recovery from hurricane katrina as a case study. Annals of the Assoc of
Am Geographers, 105(1):67–86.
Burton, I., Kates, R., and White, G. (1978). The Environment as Hazard. Oxford University
Press, New York, 1st edition edition.
Busenberg, G. (2001). Learning in organizations and public policy. Journal of Public Policy,
21:173–189.
Cairney, P. (2009). The role of ideas in policy transfer: The case of the uk smoking bans
since devolution. Journal of European Public Policy, 16:471–488.
Campbell, F. (2008). Elements of Metallurgy and Engineering Alloys. ASM International.
Campos, J. and Heilman, J. (2005). Governance gone local: Does decentralization improve
accountability? In East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work. International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, Washington D.C.
Canada (2016). National disaster mitigation program (ndmp) - guidelines.
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/dsstr-prvntn-mtgtn/ndmp/prgrm-
gdlns-en.aspx.
Cannon, T. (2008). Reducing people’s vulnerability to natural hazards: Communities and
resilience. Technical report, United Nations University. WIDER Working Paper 34.
Carothers, T. (2000). Civil society. Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter.
Carpenter, S., Arrow, K., Barrett, S., Biggs, R., Brock, W., Crepin, A., Engstrom, G.,
Folke, C., Hughes, T., Kautsky, N., Li, C., McCarney, G., Meng, K., Maler, K., Polasky,
S., Scheffer, M., Shogren, J., Sterner, T., Vincent, J., Walker, B., Xepapadeas, A., and
de Zeeuw, A. (2012). General resilience to cope with extreme events. Sustainability,
4(12):3248–3259.
Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J., and Abel, N. (2001). From metaphor to measurement:
Resilience of what to what? Ecosystems, 4(8):765–781.
Cavallo, A. and Ireland, V. (2014). Preparing for complex interdependent risks: A system of
systems approach to building disaster resilience. International Journal of Disaster Risk
Reduction, 9:181–193.
154 References
CCC (2015). Progress in preparing for climate change - 2015 report to parliament. Technical
report, Committee on Climate Change.
Chang, S., McDaniels, T., Fox, J., Dhariwal, R., and Longstaff, H. (2014). Toward disaster-
resilient cities: Characterizing resilience of infrastructure systems with expert judgments.
Risk Analysis, 34(3).
Chapin III, F., Carpenter, S., Kofinas, G., Folke, C., Abel, N., Clark, W., Olsson, P., Stafford-
Smith, D., Walker, B., Young, O., Berkes, F., Biggs, R., Grove, J., Naylor, R., Pinkerton,
E., Steffen, W., and Swanson, F. (2009). Ecosystem stewardship: sustainability strategies
for a rapidly changing planet. Trends in Ecology and Evolution, 25(4):241–249.
Chatterton, J., Clarke, C., Daly, E., Dawks, S., Elding, C., Fenn, T., Hick, E., Miller, J.,
Morris, J., Ogunyoye, F., and Salado, R. (2016). The costs and impacts of the winter 2013
to 2014 floods. Technical report, Environment Agency, Bristol. Report SC140025/R1.
Chelleri, L., Waters, J., Olazabal, M., and Minucci, G. (2015). Resilience trade-offs:
addressing multiple scales and temporal aspects of urban resilience. Environment and
Urbanization, 27(1):181–198.
Chung, A. and Rimal, R. (2016). Social norms: A review. Review of Communication
Research, 4:1–29.
Cigler, B. (1990). Public administration and the paradox of professionalism. Public Adminis-
tration Review, 50(6):637–653.
Cleaver, F. (1999). Paradoxes of participation: Questioning participatory approaches to
development. Journal of International Development, 11(4):597–599.
Coaffee, J. and Rogers, P. (2008). Rebordering the city for new security challenges: from
counter-terrorism to community resilience. Space and Polity, 12:101–118.
Comfort, L. (1994). Risk and resilience: Inter-organizational learning following the
northridge earthquake of 17 january 1994. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Manage-
ment, 2(3):157–179.
Common, M. and Perrings, C. (1992). Towards an ecological economics of sustainability.
Ecological Economics, 6(1):7–34.
Cornwall, A. (2008). Unpacking ’participation’: models, meanings and practices. Community
Development Journal, 43(3):269–283.
Coulthard, S. (2011). More than just access to fish: The pros and cons of fisher participation
in a customary marine tenur (padu) system under pressure. Marine Policy, 35(3):405–412.
Cracknell, J., Miller, F., and Williams, H. (2013). Passionate collaboration? taking the pulse
of the uk environmental sector. Technical report, Environmental Funders Network.
Cutter, S. (2016). The landscape of disaster resilience indicators in the usa. Natural Hazards,
80:741–758.
Cutter, S., Ash, K., and Emrich, C. (2014). The geographies of community disaster resilience.
Global Environmental Change, 29:65–77.
References 155
Cutter, S., Barnes, L., Berry, M., Burton, C., Evans, E., Tate, E., and Webb, J. (2008). A
place-based model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters. Global
Environmental Change, 18:598–606.
Cutter, S., Burton, C., and Emrich, C. (2010). Disaster resilience indicators for benchmarking
baseline conditions. Journal of Homeland Sec and Emergency Mgmt, 10(1):51.
Dai, L., Vorselen, D., Korolev, K., and Gore, J. (2012). Generic indicators for loss of
resilience before a tipping point leading to population collapse. Science, 336:1175–1177.
Davidson-Hunt, J. and Berkes, F. (2003). Nature and society through the lens of resilience.
In Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C., editors, Navigating Social-Ecological Systems:
Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge University Press.
Davoudi, S. (2012). Resilience: A bridging concept or a dead end? Planning Theory and
Practice, 13(2):299–333.
Diez, D., Barr, C., and Cetinkaya-Rundel, M. (2015). OpenIntro Statistics. OpenIntro, 3rd
edition edition.
Dolowitz, D. (2013). Low impact development (lid): the transfer that was not? In Carroll, P.
and Common, R., editors, Policy Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management:
International contexts, content and development. Routledge, New York.
Dovers, S. and Handmer, J. (1992). Uncertainty, sustainability and change. Global Environ-
mental Change, 2(4):262–276.
Dudley, G. (2003). Ideas, bargaining, and flexible policy communities: Policy change and
the case of the oxford transport strategy. Public Administration, 81(3):433–458.
Dunn, A. (2007). Champions of participation: Engaging citizens in local gover-
nance. http://www.drc-citizenship.org/system/assets/1052734705/original/1052734705-
dunn.2008-champions.pdf.
Dussauge-Laguna, M. (2013). Contested policy transfer - when chile’s ’programa de mejo-
ramiento de la gestion’ travelled to mexico. In Carroll, P. and Common, R., editors, Policy
Transfer and Learning in Public Policy and Management: International contexts, content
and development. Routledge, New York.
Dutta, D. (2009). Elite capture and corruption: Concepts and definitions: Bibliography with
an overview of the suggested literature. Technical report, National Council of Applied
Economic Research.
Dyke, J. and Weaver, I. (2013). The emergence of environmental homeostasis in complex
ecosystems. PLoS Comput Biol, 9(5).
EA (2009). Flooding in england: A national assessment of flood risk. Technical report,
Environment Agency, Bristol.
EA (2012). Advice note: Ordinary watercourse regulation - consenting. Technical report,
Environment Agency.
156 References
EA (2016). Slowing the flow scheme helped avoid christmas flooding.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/slowing-the-flow-scheme-helped-avoid-christmas-
flooding.
Eberg, J. (1997). Waste policy and learning. Policy Dynamics of Waste Management and
Waste Incineration in the Netherlands and Bavaria. Eburon, Delft.
EFRA (2016). Future flood prevention. https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmenvfru/115/115.pdf.
Escaleras, M. and Register, C. (2008). Mitigating natural disasters through collective action:
The effectiveness of tsunami early warnings. Southern Economic Journal, 74(4):1017–
1034.
Etheredge, L. and Short, J. (1983). Thinking about government learning. Journal of
Management Studies, 20(1):41–58.
Evans, J. (2011). Resilience, ecology and adaptation in the experimental city. Transactions
of the Institute for British Geographers, 36:223–237.
Fekete, A., Hufschmidt, G., and Kruse, S. (2014). Benefits and challenges of resilience and
vulnerability for disaster risk management. Int J Disaster Risk Sci, 5(3):20.
FEMA (2012). Crisis response and disaster resilience 2030: Forging strategic action in
an age of uncertainty. https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1816-25045-
5167/sfi_report_13.jan.2012_final.docx.pdf.
Field, J. (2003). Social Capital. Routledge, London.
Fisher, L. (2015). Disaster responses: More than 70 ways to show resilience. Nature, 518(35).
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems
analyses. Global Environmental Change, 16:253–267.
Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Scheffer, M., Chapin, T., and Rockstrom, J. (2010).
Resilience thinking: Integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability. Ecology and
Society, 15(4):20.
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P., and Norberg, J. (2005). Adaptive governance of social-
ecological systems. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1):441–473.
Foot, J. (2009). Citizen involvement in local governance. Technical report, Josepth Rowntree
Foundation, York.
Franklin, A., Ho, A., and Ebdon, C. (2009). Participatory budgeting in midwestern states:
Democratic connection or citizen disconnection? Public Budgeting and Finance, 29(3):52–
73.
Frazier, T., Thompson, C., Dezzani, R., and Butsick, D. (2013). Spatial and temporal
quantification of resilience at the community scale. Applied Geography, 42:95–107.
Fung, A. (2006). Varieties of participation in complex governance. Public Administration
Review, 66:66–75.
References 157
Gaillard, J. (2010). Vulnerability, capacity and resilience: Perspectives for climate and
development policy. Journal of International Development, 22:218–232.
Galaz, V., Moberg, F., Olsson, E., Paglia, E., and Parker, C. (2011). Institutional and
political leadership dimensions of cascading ecological crises. Public Administration,
89(2):361–380.
Gallopin, G. (2006). Linkages between vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity. Global
Environmental Change, 16(3):293–303.
Gavidia-Payne, S., Denny, B., Davis, K., Francis, A., and Jackson, M. (2015). Parental
resilience: A neglected construct in resilience research. Clinical Pyschologist, 19(3):111–
121.
Ginsborg, P. (2005). The Politics of Everyday Life: Making Choices, Changing Lives. Yale
University Press, New York.
Gober, P., Strickert, G., Clark, D., Chun, K., Payton, D., and Bruce, K. (2015). Divergent
perspectives on water security: Bridging the policy debate. The Professional Geographer,
67(1):62–71.
Goldenfeld, N. and Kadanoff, L. (1999). Simple lessons from complexity. Science,
284(5411):87–89.
Gordon, J. (1978). Structures. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK.
Green, C., Parker, D., and Penning-Rowsell, E. (1993). Designing for failure. In Merri-
man, P. and Browitt, C., editors, Natural Disasters: Protecting Vulnerable Communities.
Proceedings of the Conference held in London.
Grin, J. and Loeber, A. (2007). Theories of policy learning: Agency, structure, and change.
In Fischer, F., Miller, G., and Sidney, M., editors, Handbook of Public Policy Analysis:
Theory, Politics, and Methods. CRC Press, Boca Raton (FL).
Grogger, J. and Karoly, L. (2005). Welfare Reform: Effects of a Decade of Change. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge (MA).
Grootaert, C. (1998). Social capital: The missing link? Technical report, World Bank. Social
Capital Initiative, Working Paper No. 3.
Gunderson, L. (2010). Ecological and human community resilience in response to natural
disasters. Ecology and Society, 15(2):18.
Gunderson, L. and Holling, C. (2002). Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human
and natural Systems. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Gunderson, L., Peterson, G., and Holling, C. (2008). Practicing adaptive management in
complex social-ecological systems. In Norberg, J. and Cumming, G., editors, Complexity
Theory for a Sustainable Future. Columbia University Press.
Hajer, M. (2003). Policy without polity? policy analysis and the institutional void. Policy
Sciences, 36:175–195.
158 References
Hajer, M. and Wagenaar, H. (2003). Deliberative policy analysis: Understanding governance
in the network society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hall, P. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning and the state. the case of economic
policy-making in britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3):275–296.
Harrison, M. and Singer, M. (2007). The time-squeeze generation: What the public are doing
with their spare time. In Creasy, S., editor, Participation Nation: Reconnecting Citizens to
the Public Realm. Involve, London.
Hay, c. (1998). The tangled webs we weave: the discourse, strategy and practice of network-
ing. In Marsh, D., editor, Comparing Policy Networks. Open University Press.
HC (2014). Flood defence spending in england. Technical report, House of Commons.
SN/SC/5755.
HC (2016). Winter floods 2015-16. Technical report, House of Commons. Briefing paper
CBP7427.
Hegger, D., Green, C., Driessen, P., Bakker, M., Dieperink, C., Crabbe, A., Deketelaere, K.,
Delvaux, B., Suykens, C., Beyers, J., Fournier, M., Larrue, C., Manson, C., Van Doorn-
Hoekveld, W., Van Rijswick, M., Kundzewicz, Z., and Goytia-Casermeiro, S. (2013).
Flood risk management in europe: Similarities and differences between teh star-flood
consortium countries. Technical report, STAR-FLOOD Consortium, Utrecth.
Hewitt, K. (1983). Interpretations of calamity: From the viewpoint of human ecology. Allen
and Unwin, Winchester.
Hinkel, J. (2010). Indicators of vulnerability and adaptive capacity: Towards a clarification
of the science-policy interface. Global Environmental Change, 21:198–208.
HMG (2012). Uk climate change risk assessment: Government report. Technical report,
HM Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-climate-change-risk-
assessment-government-report.
HMG (2013). Uk emergency response and recovery guidelines. Technical report, HM Gov-
ernment. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-response-and-recovery.
Hodgson, D., McDonald, J., and Hosken, D. (2015). What do you mean, ’resilient’? Trends
in Ecology and Evolution, 30(9):503–506.
Holling, C. (1973). Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics, 4:1–23.
Holling, C. (1996). Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. In Schulze, P., editor,
Engineering within ecological constraints. National Academy.
Holling, C. (2001). Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social
systems. Ecosystems, 4(5):390–405.
Holling, C. (2003). Foreword. In Berkes, F., Colding, J., and Folke, C., editors, Navigating
Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge
University Press.
References 159
Holling, C. and Meffe, G. (1995). Command and control and the pathology of natural
resource management. Conservation Biology, 10(2):328–337.
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D., and Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience Engineering: Concepts and
Precepts. Ashgate, Burlington (VT).
Howlett, M. (2011). Designing public policies: principles and instruments. Routledge,
London.
Huitema, D., van de Kerkhof, M., and Pesch, U. (2007). The nature of the beast: Are citizens’
juries deliberative or pluralist? Policy Sciences, 40(4):287–311.
Hyogo (2005). Hyogo framework for action 2005-2015: Building the resilience of nations
and communities to disasters. https://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa.
IPCC (2014). Climate change 2014 synthesis report. Technical report, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, Geneva.
Jabareen, Y. (2013). Planning the resilient city: Concepts and strategies for coping with
climate change and environmental risk. Cities, 31:220–229.
Jaccard, J. and Turrisi, R. (2003). Interaction effects in multiple regression [electronic
resource]. SAGE, Thousand Oaks (CA), 2nd edition edition.
Janssen, M. and Ostrom, E. (2006). Resilience, vulnerability, and adaptation: a crosscutting
theme of the international human dimensions programme on global environmental change.
Global Environmental Change, 16(3):237–239.
Japan (2013). Japan’s fundamental plan for national resilience - creating a strong and resilient
city. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kokudo_kyoujinka/en/fundamental_plan.html.
Jha, A., Miner, T., and Stanton-Geddes, Z. e. (2013). Building urban resilience: Principles,
tools, and practice. directions in development. Technical report, World Bank, Washington,
DC. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-8865-5.
Jochum, V. (2003). Social capital: beyond the theory. NCVO, London.
Jochum, V., Pratten, B., and Wilding, K. (2005). Civil renewal and active citizenship: A
guide to the debate. NCVO, London.
Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. (1997). Accounting for subgovernments: Explaining the
persistence of policy communities. Administration and Society, 29(5):557–583.
Kates, R. (1962). Hazard and choice perception in flood plain management. Technical report,
University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research. Research Paper No. 78.
Kay, A. (2005). A critique of the use of path-dependency in policy studies. Public Adminis-
tration, 83(3):553–571.
Kekes, J. (1993). The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
160 References
Kelman, I. (2007). Disaster and risk benefits: Do the needs of society and environment match?
In Low, P., editor, Global Change, Environment and Development in Asia. Cambridge
University Press.
Kelman, I., Gaillard, J., Lewis, J., and Mercer, J. (2016). Learning from the history of disaster
vulnerability and resilience research and practice for climate change. Natural Hazards,
82:129–143.
Klein, R., Nicholls, R., and Thomalla, F. (2003). Resilience to natural hazards: How useful
is this concept? Environmental Hazards, 5:35–45.
Kleinbaum, D. and Klein, M. (2005). Survival Analysis. Springer, New York, 2nd edition
edition.
Kotzee, I. and Reyers, B. (2016). Piloting a social-ecological index for measuring flood
resilience: A composite index approach. Ecological Indicators, 60:45–53.
Kuhlicke, C. (2013). Resilience: a capacity and a myth - findings from an in-depth case
study in disaster management research. Natural Hazards, 67:61–76.
Landwehr, C. (2010). Discourse and coordination: Modes of interaction and their roles in
political decision-making. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(1):101–122.
Leeuw, F., Rist, R., and Sonnichsen, R. (2000). Can Governments Learn? Comparative
Perspectives on Evaluation and Organizational learning. Transaction Publishers, New
Brunswick (NJ).
Leichenko, R. (2011). Climate change and urban resilience. Current Opinion in Environmen-
tal Sustainability, 3:164–168.
Lerner, J. and Secondo, D. (2012). By the people, for the people: Participatory budgeting
from the bottom up in north america. Journal of Public Deliberation, 8(2):3.
Levin, S. (1999). Fragile Dominion. Perseus Books, Reading (MA).
Levin, S., Barrett, S., Aniyar, S., Baumol, W., Bliss, C., Bolin, B., Dasgupta, P., Ehrlich,
P., Folke, C., Gren, I.-M., Holling, C., Jansson, A., Jansson, B., Maler, K., Martin, D.,
Perrings, C., and Sheshinski, E. (1998). Resilience in natural and socio-economic systems.
Environment and Development Economics, 3:221–262.
Leykin, D., Lahad, M., Cohen, O., Goldberg, A., and Aharonson-Daniel, L. (2013). Con-
joint community resiliency assessment measure-28/10 items (ccram28 and ccram10): A
self-report tool for assessing community resilience. American Journal of Community
Psychology, 52:313–323.
Liao, K. (2012). A theory on urban resilience to floods - a basis for alternative planning
practices. Ecology and Society, 17(4):11.
Liao, K. (2014). From flood control to flood adaptation: a case study on the lower green river
valley and the city of kent in king county, washington. Natural Hazards, 71:723–750.
Lin, N. and Erickson, B. (2008). Social capital: an international research program. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
References 161
Linder, S. and Peters, B. (1985). From social theory to policy design. Journal of Public
Policy, 4:237–259.
Lindley, S., O’Neill, J., Kandeh, J., Lawson, N., Christian, R., and O’Neill, M. (2011).
Climate change, justice and vulnerability. Technical report, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Linkov, I., Bridges, T., Creutzig, F., Decker, J., Fox-Lent, C., Kroger, W., Lambert, J.,
Levermann, A., Montreuil, B., Nathwani, J., Nyer, R., Renn, O., Scharte, B., Scheffler, A.,
Schreurs, M., and Thiel-Clemen, T. (2014). Changing the resilience paradigm. Nature
Climate Change, 4:407–409.
Liu, J., Dietz, T., Carpenter, S., Alberti, M., Folke, C., Moran, E., Pell, A., Deadman, P.,
Kratz, T., and Lubchenko, J. e. a. (2007). Complexity of coupled human and natural
systems. Science, 317(5844):1513–1516.
Lodge, M. and Hood, C. (2002). Pavlovian policy responses to media feeding frenzies?
dangerous dogs regulation in comparative perspective. Journal of Contingencies and
Crisis Management, 10(1):1–13.
Longstaff, P. (2009). Managing surprises in complex systems: Multidisciplinary perspectives
on resilience. Ecology and Society, 14(1):49.
Lorenz, D. (2013). The diversity of resilience: contributions from a social science perspective.
Natural Hazards, 67:7–24.
Lugeri, N., Kundzewicz, Z., Genovese, E., Hochrainer, S., and Radziejewski, M. (2010).
River flood risk and adaptation in europe - assessment of the present status. Mitig. Adapt.
Strateg. Glob. Change, 15:621–639.
Manyena, S., O’Brien, G., O’Keefe, P., and Rose, J. (2011). Disaster resilience: a bounce
back or bounce forward ability? Local Environment, 16(5):417–424.
Marchezini, V., Wisner, B., Londe, L., and Saito, S. (2017). Reduction of vulnerability to
disasters: from knowledge to action. Sao Carlos, RiMa Editora.
Marsh, T., Kirby, C., Muchan, K., Barker, L., Henderson, E., and Hannaford, J. (2016). The
winter floods of 2015/2016 in the uk - a review. Technical report, Centre for Ecology and
Hydrology, Wallingford. 37 pages.
Marshall, N. (2010). Understanding social resilience to climate variability in primary
enterprises and industries. Global Environmental Change, 20(1):36–43.
Marshall, N., Gordon, I., and Ash, A. (2011). The reluctance of resource-users to adopt
seasonal climate forecasts to enhance resilience to climate variability on the rangelands.
Climatic Change, 107:511–529.
Marshall, N., Park, S., Adgers, W., Brown, K., and Howden, S. (2012). Transformational
capacity and the influence of place and identity. Environ. Res. Lett., 7:9.
May, R., Levin, S., and Sugihara, G. (2008). Ecology for bankers. Nature, 451:893–895.
162 References
McShane, T., Hirsch, P., Trung, T., Songorwa, A., Kinzig, A., Monteferri, B., Mutekanga,
D., Thang, H., Dammert, J., Pulgar-Vidal, M., Welch-Devine, M., Brosius, J., Coppolillo,
P., and O’Connor, S. (2011). Hard choices: Making trade-offs between biodiversity
conservation and human well-being. Biological Conservation, 144:966–972.
Mees, H., Crabbe, A., Alexander, M., Kaufmann, M., Bruzzone, S., Levy, L., and
Lewandowski, J. (2016). Co-producing flood risk management through citizen involve-
ment: insights from cross-country comparison in europe. Ecology and Society, 21(3):7.
Melgar, T. (2014). A time of closure? participatory budgeting in porto alegre, brazil, after
the workers’ party era. J. Lat. Amer. Stud., 46:121–149.
Melis, T., Walters, C., and Korman, J. (2015). Surprise and opportunity for learning in
grand canyon: the glen canyon dam adaptive management program. Ecology and Society,
20(3):20.
Mendenhall, W. and Sincich, T. (2012). A second course in statistics: regression analysis.
Pearson Education, Boston (MA), 7th edition edition.
Menoni, S., Molinari, D., Parker, D., Ballio, F., and Tapsell, S. (2012). Assessing multifaceted
vulnerability and resilience in order to design risk-mitigating strategies. Natural Hazards,
64(3):2057–2082.
Merriam, S. and Tisdell, E. (2016). Qualitative research: a guide to design and implementa-
tion. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 4th edition edition.
Mills, M. (2011). Introducing Survival and Event History Analysis. SAGE, London.
Mohan, G. (2007). Participatory development: From epistemological reversals to active
citizenship. Geography Compass, 1(4):779–796.
Morecroft, M., Crick, H., Duffield, S., and Macgregor, N. (2012). Resilience to climate
change: translating principles into practice. Journal of Applied Ecology, 49:547–551.
Moser, S. (2008). Resilience in the face of global environmental change. Community and
Regional Resilience Initiative Report 2.
Mozumder, P., Flugman, E., and Randhir, T. (2011). Adaptation behavior in the face of
global climate change: Survey responses from experts and decision makers serving the
florida keys. Ocean and Coastal Management, 54(1):37–44.
NAO (2011). Flood risk management in england. Technical report, National Audit Office.
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
NDRF (2012). National disaster recovery framework: Strengthening disaster recovery for
the nation. https://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf.
Nelson, D., Adger, W., and Brown, K. (2007). Adaptation to environmental change: Con-
tributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review of Environment and Resources,
32:395–419.
References 163
Newig, J., Challies, E., Jager, N., and Kochskamper, E. (2014). Whate role for public partici-
pation in implementing the eu flood directive? a comparison with the water frameworkd
directive, early evidence from germany and a research agenda. Environmental Policy and
Governance, 24(4):275–288.
NFRR (2016). National flood resilience review. Technical report, HM Government.
Nisbet, T. and Huw, T. (2008). Project sld2316: Restoring floodplain woodland for flood
alleviation. Technical report, Forest Research. Final Report.
Nisbet, T., Marrington, S., Huw, T., Broadmeadow, S., and Valatin, G. (2011). Project
rmp5455: Slowing the flow at pickering. Technical report, Forest Research. Phase 1 Final
Report.
Nisbet, T., Marrington, S., Huw, T., Broadmeadow, S., and Valatin, G. (2015). Project
rmp5455: Slowing the flow at pickering. Technical report, Forest Research. Phase 2 Final
Report.
Norberg, J. and Cumming, G. (2008). Complexity Theory for a Sustainable Future. Columbia
University Press, New York.
Norris, F., Stevens, S., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K., and Pfefferbaum, R. (2008). Community
resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness.
American Journal of Community Psychology, 41(1):127–150.
NRC (2012). Disaster resilience: A national imperative. Technical report,
National Research Council - The National Academies Press, Washington, DC.
doi:https://doi.org/10.17226/13457.
NT (2015). From source to sea: Natural flood management - the holnicote experience.
Technical report, National Trust. Defra Multi-objective flood management demonstration
project.
NT (2016). National trust annual report 2015/16. Technical report, National Trust.
NWRM (2013). Acteon nwrm project. contract 07.0330/2013/659147/SER/ENV.C1.
Nye, M., Tapsell, S., and Twigger-Ross, C. (2011). New social directions in uk flood risk
management: moving towards flood risk citizenship? Journal of Flood Risk Management,
4:288–297.
O’Keefe, P., Westgate, K., and Wisner, B. (1976). Taking the naturalness out of natural
disasters. Nature, 260:566–567.
Oliver, J. and Lodge, M. (2003). The limitations of ’policy transfer’ and ’lesson drawing’ for
public policy research. Political Studies Review, 1:179–193.
Olsson, P., Bodin, O., and Folke, C. (2010). Building transformative capacity for ecosystem
stewardship in social ecological systems. In Armitage, D. and Plummer, R., editors,
Adaptive Capacity and Environmental Governance. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Olsson, P., Folke, C., and Berkes, F. (2004). Adaptive co-management for building resilience
in social-ecological systems. Environmental Management, 34(1):75–90.
164 References
Orr, L. (1999). Social Experiments: Evaluating Public Programs with Experimental Methods.
SAGE, Thousand Oaks (CA).
Park, J., Seager, T., and Rao, P. (2011). Lessons in risk-versus resilience-based design and
management. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 7(3):396–399.
Park, J., Seager, T., Rao, P., Convertino, M., and Linkov, I. (2013). Integrating risk and
resilience approaches to catastrophe management in engineering systems. Risk Analysis,
33(3):356–367.
Pattie, C., Seyd, P., and Whiteley, P. (2004). Citizenship in Britain: Values, participation,
and democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Patton, M. (2005). Qualitative Research. John Wiley and Sons, London.
Peacock, W., Brody, S., Seitz, W., Merrell, W., Vedlitz, A., Zahran, S., and Sticknew, R.
(2010). Advancing the resilience of coastal localities: Developing, implementing, and
sustaining the use of coastal resilience indicators. Technical report, Coastal Services
Center and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, DC.
Pedersen, L. (2007). Ideas are transformed as they transfer: A comparative study of eco-
taxation in scandinavia. Journal of European Public Policy, 14:69–77.
Penning-Rowsell, E., Evans, E., Hall, J., and Borthwick, A. (2013). From flood science to
flood policy: the foresight future flooding project seven years on. Foresight, 15(3):190–
210.
Petroski, H. (1994). Design Paradigms: Case histories of error and judgment in engineering.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Pfefferbaum, R., Pfefferbaum, B., Van Horn, R., Klomp, R., Norris, F., and Reissman, D.
(2013). The communities advancing resilience toolkit (cart): an intervention to build
community resilience to disasters. J Public Health Manag Pract, 19(3):250–258.
Pfefferbaum, R., Reissman, D., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K., Norris, F., and Klomp, R. (2008).
Factors in the development of community resilience to disasters. In Blumenfeld, M., editor,
Intervention and Resilience after Mass Trauma. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Pilkington, M., Mount, D., Walker, J., Allott, T., Ashton-Ward, R., Evans, M., Hammond, G.,
Huggett, D., Nisbet, T., and Rose, S. (2013). Natural flood management; an appraisal of
current status. Technical report, Moors for the Future Partnership, Edale, Derbyshire.
Pitt, M. (2007). Learning lessons from the 2007 floods. Technical report, HM Government.
Platt, S., Hughes, M., and Brown, D. (2015). Measuring resilience and recovery. Conference
Paper. 7th International Conference on Seismology and Earthquake Engineering.
Popay, J., Attree, P., Hornby, D., Milton, B., Whitehead, M., French, B., Kowarzik, U.,
Simpson, N., and Povall, S. (2007). Community engagement in initiatives addressing the
wider social determinants of health: A rapid review of evidence on impact, experience and
process. Technical report, Department of Health, London.
References 165
Prior, T. and Hagmann, J. (2013). Measuring resilience: methodological and political
challenges of a trend security concept. Journal of Risk Research, 17(3):281–298.
Purseglove, J. (2015). Taming the Flood: Rivers, Wetlands and the centuries-old battle
against flooding. William Collins, London, 2nd edition edition.
Reber, B. (2007). Technology assessment as policy analysis: From expert advice to partici-
patory approaches. In Fischer, F., Miller, G., and Sidney, M., editors, Handbook of Public
Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods. CRC Press, Boca Raton (FL).
Reed, M. (2008). Stakeholder participation for environmental management: A literature
review. Biological Conservation, 141:2417–2431.
Reid, J. (2012). The disastrous and debased subject of resilience development. Dialogue,
58:67–81.
Reid, R. and Botterill, L. (2013). The multiple meanings of ’resilience’: An overview of the
literature. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72(1):31–40.
Reyers, B., Nel, J., O’Farrell, P., Sitas, N., and Nel, D. (2015). Navigating complexity
through knowledge co-production: Mainstreaming ecosystem services into disaster risk
reduction. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(24):7362–7368.
Rockstrom, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin III, F., Lambin, E., Lenton, T.,
Scheffer, M., Folke, C., Schellnhuber, H., Nykvist, B., de Wit, C., Hughes, T., van der
Leeuw, S., Rodhe, H., Sorlin, S., Snyder, P., Costanza, R., Svedin, U., Falkenmark, M.,
Karlberg, L., Corell, R., Fabry, V., Hansen, J., Walker, B., Liverman, D., Richardson,
K., Crutzen, P., and Foley, J. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity. Nature,
461:472–475.
Rogers, S., Rose, S., Spence, J., and Hester, N. (2015). Holnicote payments for ecosystem
services (pes) pilot research project 2014-2015: Final report to defra. Technical report,
Natural England. Project NR0156.
Sabatier, P. (1987). Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change. an advocacy
coalition framework. Knowledge, 8:649–692.
Sabatier, P. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework: An assessment. In Sabatier, P., editor,
Theories of the Policy Process. Westview Press, Boulder.
Saleh, J. (2008). Analyses for Durability and System Design Lifetime: A Multidisciplinary
Approach. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Saris, W. and Gallhofer, I. (2014). Design, evaluation and analysis of questionnaires for
survey research. Wiley, Hoboken, 2nd edition edition.
Scheffer, M., Bascompte, J., Brock, W., Brovkin, V., Carpenter, S., Dakos, V., Held, H.,
van Nes, E., Rietkerk, M., and Sugihara, G. (2009). Early-warning signals for critical
transitions. Nature, 461:53–59.
166 References
Schlueter, M., McAllister, R., Arlinghaus, R., Bunnefeld, N., Eisenack, K., Holker, F.,
Milner-Gulland, E., and Mueller, B. (2012). New horizons for managing the environment:
a review of coupled social-ecological systems modeling. Nartural Resource Modeling,
25(1):219–272.
Schultz, L., Duit, A., and Folke, C. (2011). Participation, adaptive co-management, and
management performance in the world network of biosphere reserves. World Development,
39:662–671.
Schultz, L., Folke, C., and Olsson, P. (2007). Enhancing ecosystem management through
social-ecological inventories: Lessons from kristianstads vattenrike, sweden. Environmen-
tal Conservation, 34:140–152.
Sewell, J. and Salter, M. (1995). Panarchy and other norms for global governance: Boutros-
ghali, rosenau, and beyond. Global Governance, 1(3):373–382.
Sharifi, A. (2016). A critical review of selected tools for assessing community resilience.
Ecological Indicators, 69:629–647.
Sherrieb, K., Norris, F., and Galea, S. (2010). Measuring capacities for community resilience.
Social Indicators Research, 99(2):227–247.
Sikder, S., Asadzadeh, A., Kuusaana, E., Mallick, B., and Koetter, T. (2015). Stakeholder
participation for urban climate resilience: A case of informal settlements regularization in
khulna city, bangladesh. Journal of Urban and Regional Analysis, 7:5–20.
Simon, H. (1977). The New Science of Management Decision. Prentice Hall, Englewood
Cliffs (NJ), 3rd edition edition.
Smith, K. and Ward, R. (1998). Floods: Physical Processes and Human Impacts. Wiley,
Chichester.
Snijders, T. and Bosker, R. (2012). Multilevel analysis: an introduction to basic and advanced
multilevel modelling. SAGE, London, 2nd edition edition.
Stark, A. and Taylor, M. (2014). Citizen participation, community resilience and crisis-
management policy. Australian Journal of Political Science, 49(2):300–315.
Stewart, L., Miller, S., Hildreth, R., and Wright-Phillips, M. (2014). Participatory budgeting
in the united states: A preliminary analysis of chicag’s 49th ward experiment. New
Political Sciences, 36(2):193–218.
Sweden (2015). Resilient cities in sweden: Six inspiring examples on drr
action. https://www.msb.se/sv/Produkter–tjanster/Publikationer/Publikationer-fran-
MSB/Resilient-cities-in-Sweden—Six-inspiring-examples-on-DRR-action/.
Taylor, M. (2003). Public Policy in the Community: Public Policy and Politics. Palgrave-
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Tempels, B. and Hartmann, T. (2014). A co-evolving frontier between land and water:
dilemmas of flexibility versus robustness in flood risk management. Water International,
39(6):872–883.
References 167
Thompson, D. (2008). Deliberative democratic theory and empirical political sciences.
Annual Review of Political Science, 11:497–520.
Thorne, C. (2014). Geographies of uk flooding in 2013/14. The Geographical Journal,
180(4):297–309.
Timmerman, P. (1981). Vulnerability, resilience and the collapse of society. Environmental
Mongraph, 1.
Torres, B., Oliveira, J., Thomas, T., Rath, P., Cumnock, K., and Schneider, D. (2016).
Tracking resilience to infections by mapping disease space. PLoS Biol, 14(4). e1002436.
Toubin, M., Laganier, R., Diab, Y., and Serre, D. (2014). Improving the conditions for urban
resilience through collaborative learning of parisian urban services. J. Urban Plann. Dev.,
141(4):9.
Turnbull, M., Sterret, C., and Hilleboe, A. (2013). Toward Resilience: A guide to disaster
risk reduction and climate change adaptation. Catholic Relief Services, Rugby.
Turner, B., Kasperson, R., Matson, P., McCarthy, J., Corell, R., Christensen, L., Eckley, N.,
Kasperson, J., Luers, A., Martello, M., Polsky, C., Pulsipher, A., and Schiller, A. (2003). A
framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 100(14):8074–8079.
UNDP (2014). Understanding community resilience: findings from community-
based resilience analysis (cobra) assessments. http://www.disasterriskreduction.
net/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/docs/CoBRA
UNFCCC (2004). United nations framework concention on climate change: The first ten
years. Technical report, United Nations Framework Concention on Climate Change, Bonn,
Germany.
UNISDR (2009). Unisdr terminology on disaster risk reduction. Technical report, United
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Geneva, Switzerland.
UNISDR (2012). How to make cities more resilient - a handbook for mayors and local
government leaders. Technical report, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction, Geneva, Switzerland.
USDHS (2007). The national strategy for homeland security.
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/gc_1193938363680.shtm.
Van Est, R. (1999). Winds of Change. A Comparative Study of the Politics of Wind Energy
Innovation in California and Denmark. International Books, Utrecht.
Van Valen, L. (1973). A new evolutionary law. Evolutionary Theory, 1:1–30.
von Foerster, H. (1992). Ethics and second-order cybernetics. Cybernetics and Human
Knowing, 1(1):40–46.
Voss, J. and Bornemann, B. (2011). The politics of reflexive governance: Challenges for
designing adaptive management and transition management. Ecology and Society, 16(2):9.
168 References
Wagner, M., Chhetri, N., and Sturm, M. (2014). Adaptive capacity in light of hurricane
sandy: The need for policy engagement. Applied Geography, 50:15–23.
Walker, B., Abel, N., Anderies, J., and Ryan, P. (2009). Resilience, adaptability, and trans-
formability in the goulburn-broken catchment, australia. Ecology and Society, 14(1):12.
Walker, B. and Cooper, M. (2011). Genealogies of resilience: From systems ecology to the
political economy of crisis adaptation. Security Dialogue, 42(2):143–160.
Walker, B., Gunderson, L., Kinzig, A., Folke, C., Carpenter, S., and Schultz, L. (2006).
A handful of heuristics and some propositions for understanding resilience in social-
ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 11(1):8.
Walker, B., Holling, C., Carpenter, S., and Kinzig, A. (2004). Resilience, adaptability and
transformability in social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 9(2):5.
Walker, B. and Salt, D. (2006). Resilience thinking: sustaining ecosystems and people in a
changing world. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Wampler, B. (2012). Participatory budgeting: Core principles and key impacts. Journal of
Public Deliberation, 8(2):15.
Wardekker, J., de Jong, A., Knoop, J., and van der Sluijs, J. (2010). Operationalising a
resilience approach to adapting an urban delta to uncertain climate change. Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 77:987–998.
Warner, K., Afifi, T., Kalin, W., Leckie, S., Ferris, B., Martin, S., and Wrathall, D. (2013).
Changing climate, moving people: framing migration, displacement and planned relocation.
Unu-ehs policy brief, UNU-EHS.
WB (2008). Climate resilient cities: A primer on reducing vulnerabilities to climate change
impacts and strengthening disaster risk management in east asian cities. Technical report,
World Bank, Sustainable Development East Asia and Pacific Region, Washington, DC.
Webster, P., Rangeley-Wilson, C., Juniper, T., and Harrison, P. (2014). Floods and dredging -
a reality check. http://www.ciwem.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Floods-and-Dredging-
a-reality-check.pdf.
Weichselgartner, J. and Kelman, I. (2015). Geographies of resilience: Challenges and
opportunities of a descriptive concept. Prog. in Human Geography, 39(3):249–267.
Weiss, C. (1982). Policy research in the context of diffuse decision making. In Rist, R.,
editor, Policy Studies Review Annual. SAGE, Newbury Park (CA).
Welsh, M. (2014). Resilience and responsibility: governing uncertainty in a complex world.
The Geographical Journal, 180(1):15–26.
Westley, F., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Homer-Dixon, T., Vredenburg, H., Loorbach, D., Thomp-
son, J., Nilsson, M., Lambin, E., Sendzimir, J., Banerjee, B., Galaz, V., and van der Leeuw,
S. (2011). Tipping toward sustainability: Emerging pathways of transformation. Ambio,
40:762–780.
References 169
White, R., Edwards, W., Farrar, A., and Poldinec, M. (2015). A practical approach to building
resilience in america’s communities. Am Behav Sci, 59(2):200–219.
Whittle, R., Medd, W., Deeming, H., Kashefi, E., Mort, M., Twigger-Ross, C., Walker, G.,
and Watson, N. (2010). After the rain - learnign the lessons from flood recovery in hull.
Technical report, Lancaster University. final project report for ’Flood, Vulnerability and
Urban Resilience: a real-time study of local recovery following the floods of June 2007 in
Hull.
Wiering, M., Green, C., van Rijswick, M., Priest, S., and Keessen, A. (2015). The rationales
of resilience in english and dutch flood risk policies. Journal of Water and Climate Change,
6(1):38–54.
Winderl, T. (2014). Disaster resilience measurements: stock-taking
of ongoing efforts in developing systems for measuring resilience.
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/37916_disasterresiliencemeasurementsundpt.pdf.
Wisner, B. (2011). Are we there yet? reflections on integrated disaster risk management after
ten years. Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management, 1(1).
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., and Davis, I. (2004). At risk: natural hazard, people’s
vulnerability and disasters. Routledge, London, 2nd edition edition.
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27:151–208.
Wrathall, D. (2012). Migration amidst social-ecological regime shift: The search for stability
in garifuna villages of northern honduras. Human Ecology, 40(4):583–596.
Wright, G., Arthur, S., Bowlese, G., Bastien, N., Unwin, D., and Wright, G. (2011). Urban
creep in scotland: stakeholder perceptions, quantification and cost impliations of permeable
solutions. Water and Environment Journal, 25(4):513–521.
Xu, L. and Marinova, D. (2013). Resilience thinking: a bibliometric analysis of socio-
ecological research. Scientometrics, 96:911.
Yamori, K. (2008). Action research on disaster reduction education: Building a ’community
of practice’ through a gaming approach. Journal of Natural Disaster Science, 30(2):83–96.
Yamori, K. (2011). The roles and tasks of implementation science on disaster prevention
and reduction knowledge and technology: From efficient application to collaborative
generation. Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management, 1(1).

Appendix A
People interviewed for case studies
People in national and strategic roles
• Lord Chris Smith - Environment Agency
• Colin Smith - Defra
• Nick Gupta - Environment Agency
• Paul Murby - Defra
• Duncan Huggett - Environment Agency
• Ruth Ashton-Ward - Defra
People directly involved in Holnicote project
• John Buttivant - Environment Agency
• Rachael Hill - Environment Agency
• Nick Lyness - Environment Agency
• Nigel Hester - National Trust
People directly involved in Pickering project
• Beckie Bennett - Ryedale District Council
• David Summers - Ryedale District Council
• Jon Bates - Environment Agency
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• Jeremy Walker - NYMNPA/Environment Agency
• Mark Scott - Environment Agency
• Lucy Huckson - Environment Agency
• Mike Potter - Pickering Civic Society
• Phil Long - Ryedale District Council
• Tom Nisbet - Forest Research/Forestry Commission
Appendix B
Locations included in statistical models
174 Locations included in statistical models
Amesbury Bingley Blandford Forum Boroughbridge
Bradford Bradford on Avon Bridgwater Brightlingsea
Brighouse Burnham on Crouch Burnley Carlisle
Carnforth Castleford Chertsey Christchurch
Cookham Datchet Dewsbury Dorchester
Edenbridge Eton Fordingbridge Henley on Thames
Highbridge Keighley Kendal Kessingland
Keynsham Knottingley Lancaster Leeds
Leatherhead Lowestoft Maidenhead Maidstone
Malton Norton Marlow Martlesham Molesey
Newbury Oxford Paddock Wood Padiham
Penrith Purley on Thames Reading Salisbury
Selby Shepperton Shipley Skipton
Staines upon Thames St. Osyth Sunbury on Thames Tadcaster
Taunton Tonbridge Wallingford Wareham
Wetherby Wimborne Minster Windsor Wivenhoe
Wooburn - Bourne End Woodbridge York
Appendix C
List of Abbreviations
• SES - Socio-ecological System
• CAS - Complex Adaptive System
• FRM - Flood Risk Management
• DRR - Disaster Risk Reduction
• UNISDR - United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
• FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
• Defra - Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
• NFM - Natural Flood Management
• PFDG - Pickering Flood Defence Group
• P&DCS - Pickering and District Civic Society
• LWD - Large Woody Debris Dam
• EA - Environment Agency
• PES - Payment for Ecosystem Services
• NT - National Trust
• NYMNPA - North York Moors National Park Authority
• FC - Forestry Commission
176 List of Abbreviations
• RFCC - Yorkshire Regional Flood and Coastal Committee
• LLFA - Lead Local Flood Authority
• SFA - Settlement Funding Assessment
• LSSG - Local Service Support Grant
• NYCC - North Yorkshire County Council
• CAP - Common Agricultural Payments
• IAPP - International Association for Public Participation
• FOI - Freedom of Information request
• LDLG - Ryedale District Land Drainage Liaison Group
• IDB - Internal Drainage Board
• YDPB - Yorkshire Derwent Partnership Board
• TEEC - Transport, Economy and Environment Overview and Scrutiny Committee
• RDC - Ryedale District Council
• NFU - National Farmers’ Union
• SDC - Scarborough District Council
• OLS - Ordinary Least Squares
• ABI - Association of British Insurers
• RRC - River Restoration Centre
• SWMP - Surface Water Management Plan
• SuDs - Sustainable Urban Drainage System
• LRF - Local Resilience Forum
• MAFP - Multi-agency Flood Response Plan
• LFRM - Local Flood Risk Management Plan
• ONS - Office for National Statistics
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• ASHE - Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
• DCMS - Department for Culture, Media & Sports
• IDBR - Inter Departmental Business Register
• NCVO - National Council for Voluntary Organisations
• OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
• IMD - English Index of Multiple Deprivations
• BRE - Building Research Establishment Group

